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Memory access violations are a leading source of unreliability in C programs. Although
the low-level features of the C programming language, like unchecked pointer arithmetic
and explicit memory management, make it a desirable language for many programming
tasks, their use often results in hard-to-detect memory errors. As evidence of this
problem, a variety of methods exist for retrofitting C with software checks to detect
memory errors at runtime. However, these techniques generally suffer from one or more
practical drawbacks that have thus far limited their adoption. These weaknesses include
the inability to detect all spatial and temporal violations, the use of incompatible
metadata, the need for manual code modifications, and the tremendous runtime cost
of providing complete safety.
This dissertation introduces MemSafe, a compiler analysis and transformation for
ensuring the memory safety of C programs at runtime while avoiding the above draw-
backs. MemSafe makes several novel contributions that improve upon previous work
and lower the runtime cost of achieving memory safety. These include (1) a method
for modeling temporal errors as spatial errors, (2) a hybrid metadata representation
that combines the most salient features of both object- and pointer-based approaches,
and (3) a data-flow representation that simplifies optimizations for removing unneeded
checks and unused metadata.
Experimental results indicate that MemSafe is capable of detecting memory safety
violations in real-world programs with lower runtime overhead than previous methods.
Results show that MemSafe detects all known memory errors in multiple versions
of two large and widely-used open source applications as well as six programs from
a benchmark suite specifically designed for the evaluation of error detection tools.
MemSafe enforces complete safety with an average overhead of 88% on 30 widely-used
performance evaluation benchmarks. In comparison with previous work, MemSafe’s
average runtime overhead for one common benchmark suite (29%) is a fraction of
that associated with the previous technique (133%) that, until now, had the lowest
overhead among all existing complete and automatic methods that are capable of
detecting both spatial and temporal violations.
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This dissertation shows that an automatic compiler analysis and transformation
technique is capable of ensuring the memory safety of C programs at runtime. A
program is transformed such that it detects spatial and temporal memory errors before
they occur, while remaining compatible with existing code and requiring lower runtime
overhead than similar techniques. The motivation and contributions of this research
are outlined below.
1.1 Motivation
Use of the C programing language remains common despite the well-known memory
errors it allows. The features that make C a desirable language for many system-level
programing tasks—namely its weak typing, low-level access to computer memory, and
pointers—are the same features whose misuse cause the variety of difficult-to-detect
memory access violations common among C programs. Although these violations often
cause a program to crash immediately, their symptoms can frequently go undetected
long after they occur, resulting in data corruption and incorrect results while making
1
software testing and debugging a particularly onerous task.
A commonly cited memory error is the buffer overflow, where data is stored to
a memory location outside the bounds of the buffer allocated to hold it. Although
buffer overflow errors have been understood as early as 1972 [5, pg. 61], they and
other memory access violations still plague modern software and are a major source of
recently reported security vulnerabilities. For example, according to the United States
Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT), 67 (29%) of the 228 vulnerability
notes released in 2008–2009 were due to buffer overflow errors alone [80].
Several safety methods [e.g. 9, 62, 68, 82] have characterized memory access vio-
lations as either spatial or temporal errors. A spatial error is a violation caused by
dereferencing a pointer that refers to an address outside the bounds of its “referent.”
Examples include indexing beyond the bounds of an array; dereferencing pointers
obtained from invalid pointer arithmetic; and dereferencing uninitialized, NULL or
“manufactured” pointers.1 A temporal error is a violation caused by using a pointer
whose referent has been deallocated (e.g. by calling the free standard library function)
and is no longer a valid memory object. The most well-known temporal violations
include dereferencing “dangling” pointers to dynamically allocated memory and at-
tempting to deallocate a pointer more than once. However, dereferencing pointers to
automatically allocated memory (i.e., stack variables) is also a concern if the address
of the referent “escapes” and is made available outside the function in which it was
1A manufactured pointer is a pointer created by means other than explicit memory allocation
(e.g., by calling the malloc standard library function) or taking the address of a variable using the
address-of operator (&). Type-casting an integral type to a pointer type is a common example. The
various memory safety violations are discussed in detail in Chapter 3.
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defined. A program is memory safe if it does not commit any spatial or temporal
errors.
Safe languages, such as Java, ensure memory safety through a combination of syntax
restrictions and runtime checks, and are widely-used when security is a major concern.
Others, like Cyclone [48] and Deputy [21], preserve many of the low-level features of C,
but require additional programmer annotations to assist in ensuring safety. Although
the use of these languages may be ideal for safety-critical environments, the reality is
that many of today’s applications—including operating systems, web browsers, and
database management systems—are still typically implemented in C or C++ because
of its efficiency, predictability, and access to low-level features. This trend will likely
continue into the future.
As an alternative to safe languages, sophisticated static analysis methods for C [e.g.
11, 13, 27, 32, 34] can be used alone, or in conjunction with other systems, to ensure
the partial absence of spatial and temporal errors statically. While these techniques are
invaluable for software verification and debugging, they can rarely prove the absence
of all memory errors and often require a significant amount of verification time due to
the precision of their analyses.
A growing number of methods rely primarily on inserted runtime checks to detect
memory access violations dynamically. However, the methods capable of detecting
both spatial and temporal memory safety violations [9, 24, 30, 33, 43, 49, 64, 66,
68, 74, 82, 83] generally suffer from one or more practical drawbacks that have thus
far limited their widespread adoption. These drawbacks can be summarized by the
following qualities.
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• Completeness. Methods that associate metadata (the base and bound infor-
mation required for runtime checks) with objects [e.g. 24, 30, 33, 43, 49, 74, 83]—
rather than the pointers to these objects—generally do not detect two kinds
of memory errors. First, because C supports the allocation of nested objects
(e.g., an array of structures), spatial errors involving sub-object overflows are
not detected since inner objects share metadata with the outer object. Second,
if the system allocates an object to a previously deallocated location, temporal
errors are not detected since dangling pointers to the deallocated object may
still refer to a location within bounds of the newly allocated object.
• Compatibility. The use of alternate pointer representations, such as multi-
word “fat-pointers” [e.g. 9, 64] to store metadata raises compatibility concerns.
Inline metadata breaks many legacy programs—and requires implicit language
restrictions for new ones—because it changes the memory layout of pointers.
For example, since their data types are the same size, programmers often cast
pointers to integers to compute certain addresses. However, since fat-pointers
alter memory layout, this computation is no longer valid and can result in
data corruption. Inline metadata also breaks the calling convention of external
libraries whose parameters or return types involve pointers.
• Code Modifications. Some methods [e.g. 64] require non-trivial source code
modifications to avoid the above compatibility issues or to prevent an explosion
in runtime. A common example is for a programmer to write “wrapper functions”
that remove inline metadata in order to interface with external libraries.
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• Cost. Methods capable of detecting both spatial and temporal errors often
suffer from high performance overheads [e.g. 9, 66, 68, 82]. This is commonly
due to the cost of maintaining the metadata required for ensuring spatial safety
and the use of conservative garbage collection for ensuring temporal safety. High
runtime overhead can make a method prohibitively expensive for deployment
and can slow the development process when it is used for testing, especially if a
program is to be executed many times to increase coverage.
1.2 Contributions
This dissertation introduces MemSafe [77], a method for ensuring both the spatial
and temporal memory safety of C programs at runtime. MemSafe is a whole-program
compiler analysis and transformation that, like other runtime methods, utilizes a
limited amount of static analysis to prove memory safety whenever possible, and
then inserts checks to ensure the safety of the remaining memory accesses at runtime.
MemSafe is complete, compatible, requires no code modifications, and generally has
lower runtime cost than other complete and automatic methods achieving the same
level of safety. MemSafe makes the following contributions for lowering the runtime
cost of dynamically ensuring memory safety:
• MemSafe uniformly handles all memory violations by modeling temporal errors
as spatial errors. Therefore, the use of separate mechanisms for detecting
temporal errors (e.g. garbage collection or explicit checks for temporal safety
[9, 68, 82, 83]) is no longer required.
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• MemSafe captures the most salient features of object and pointer metadata
in a hybrid spatial metadata representation. MemSafe’s handling of pointer
metadata is similar to that of SoftBound [62], a previous technique for detecting
spatial errors, and ensures MemSafe’s completeness and compatibility. However,
MemSafe’s additional use of object metadata creates a novel synergy with pointer
metadata that allows the detection of temporal errors as well.
• MemSafe uniformly handles pointer data-flow in a representation that simplifies
several performance-enhancing optimizations. Unlike previous methods that
require checks for all dereferences and the expensive propagation of metadata
at every pointer assignment [e.g. 9, 66, 68, 82], MemSafe eliminates redundant
checks and the propagation of unused metadata. This capability is further
enhanced with whole-program analysis.
In order to achieve the above, MemSafe exploits several key insights related to the
flow of pointer values in a program. The following program behavior models form the
foundation of MemSafe’s approach.
1. Memory deallocation can be modeled as an assignment. For example, the
statement free(p) can be represented by the statement p = invalid, where
invalid is a special untyped pointer to a temporally “invalid” range of memory.
This insight is useful because it enables spatial safety mechanisms to be
reused to ensure temporal safety. In order to detect spatial safety violations,
existing methods insert before pointer dereferences runtime checks that determine
whether the pointers refer to a location within the base and bound addresses of
6
their referents. If a dereferenced pointer refers to a location outside the region
of memory occupied by its referent, a spatial safety violation is signaled. By
assigning pointers to deallocated memory to be equal to the invalid pointer, they
inherit the base and bound addresses of the “invalid” region of memory. If the
base and bound addresses of this region are defined such that they represent some
impossible address range (e.g., a block with a negative size), any legal pointer
must refer to a location outside this range. Thus, dereferences of dangling
pointers and multiple deallocation attempts can then be detected with the
inserted checks for spatial safety.
2. Indirect pointer assignments can be modeled as explicit assignments. Statements
of the form ptr1 = *p, where both ptr1 and p are pointers, make low-cost mem-
ory safety difficult to achieve since ptr1’s set of potential referents is not known
statically. Alias analysis can be used to narrow this set, and MemSafe makes
the results of this analysis explicit in the program’s Static Single Assignment
(SSA) [26] form by using a new φ-like construct called the %-function.
For example, assume the statement s0:*p = ptr0 is the only direct reaching
definition of a pointer defined as s1:ptr1 = *p. The statement s2:*q = ptr2
may indirectly redefine ptr1 if p and q may alias and control-flow may reach
statement s1 from s2. Therefore, MemSafe models the statement ptr1 = *p as
ptr1 = %(ptr0, ptr2), meaning the value of ptr1 may equal that of ptr0 or
ptr2 but only these two values.
This insight is useful because it enables MemSafe to construct a convenient
7
Approach Complete Compatible No Code Whole Slowdown
Modifications Program
Purify [43] no yes yes yes 148.44∗
Patil, Fischer [68] yes yes yes no 6.38†
Safe C [9] yes no yes no 4.88†
Fail-Safe C [66] yes yes yes no 4.64†
MSCC [82] yes yes yes no 2.33
Yong, Horwitz [83] no yes yes no 1.37‡
CCured [64] yes no no yes 1.30
MemSafe yes yes yes yes 1.29
Table 1.1: Related work. A comparison of methods providing both spatial and
temporal memory safety is given. Slowdown is computed as the ratio of the execution
time of the instrumented program to that of the original program. Slowdown is
reported for the Olden benchmarks [71] unless otherwise noted.
∗Checks are only inserted for heap objects.
†Slowdown is the average of all results reported by the authors.
‡Checks are only inserted for store operations.
data-flow graph that codifies both direct and indirect pointer assignments—in
addition to memory deallocation with the insight above (1)—as simple definition
and use relationships. Thus, this representation greatly simplifies optimizations
for reducing the cost of achieving memory safety.
A prototype implementation of MemSafe has been evaluated in terms of its com-
pleteness and runtime cost. MemSafe was able to successfully detect known memory
violations in multiple versions of the Apache HTTP server [6] and the GNU Core
Utilities [39] software package. Additionally, MemSafe detected all previously reported
memory errors in six programs from the BugBench [60] benchmark suite. In terms
of cost, MemSafe’s average overhead was 88% on 30 large programs widely-used in
evaluating error detection tools. Finally, as evidence of its compatibility, MemSafe
compiled each of the above programs without requiring any code modifications or
programmer intervention.
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Table 1.1 summarizes previous software approaches for ensuring both spatial
and temporal safety.2 Each method is evaluated on its completeness, compatibility,
lack of code modifications, use of whole-program analysis, and runtime cost. For
consistency, slowdown is reported for the Olden benchmarks [71] where results are
available. MemSafe compares favorably in each category and has the lowest overhead
among all existing complete and automatic methods. This result is primarily due to
MemSafe’s novel contributions based on the above insights.
Since MemSafe’s performance overheads cannot necessarily be considered “low,”
MemSafe is deployable in systems whose primary concern is memory safety. In practice,
it has been observed that many runtime checks can be avoided with MemSafe’s
simple optimizations, and for safety-critical applications, MemSafe’s moderate runtime
overheads can be an acceptable trade-off compared to redesigning systems in a safe
language. However, for performance-critical applications, MemSafe is primarily useful
as a dynamic bug detection tool.
1.3 Organization of Dissertation
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents an
overview of the C programming language and compilation process. It briefly reviews
the history of the language, introduces the low-level features of C whose misuse can
result in memory safety violations, and describes the basic compiler analysis techniques
2Other methods (e.g, CIT [1], DFI [17], WIT [2], SoftBound [62], SafeCode [31], “baggy” bounds
checking [3], etc.) are excluded from Table 1.1 since they either are (1) not software-only mechanisms
for detecting memory errors or (2) do not aim to ensure complete spatial and temporal safety.
However, these methods are discussed in detail in Chapter 8.
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that MemSafe requires for enforcing memory safety.
Chapter 3 describes the memory safety violations that are commonly found in C
programs and reviews prior work related to the detection and prevention of memory
errors. In reviewing previous work, this chapter primarily focusses on the way in
which prior methods organize the base and bound information required by runtime
safety checks, and it discusses the strengths and weakness of each approach.
Chapter 4 describes MemSafe’s basic, unoptimized approach for ensuring the
memory safety of C programs at runtime. It presents the challenges associated with
the use of memory deallocation and indirect pointer assignments, and it describes the
C language syntax extensions that MemSafe uses to reason about these programming
idioms. This chapter then defines the runtime checks, metadata, and metadata
propagation rules required for MemSafe to enforce spatial and temporal memory safety.
The chapter concludes with additions to these basic rules that allow MemSafe to
ensure the memory safety of multithreaded programs.
Chapter 5 describes how MemSafe is able to reduce the runtime overhead of
achieving memory safety. It builds upon the language extensions introduced in
Chapter 4 to construct a novel data-flow representation for pointers, and it then
describes how this representation can be utilized for identifying and eliminating
unneeded runtime checks and code for propagating unused metadata.
Chapter 6 describes the prototype implementation of MemSafe and some of its
limitations. Then, Chapter 7 evaluates the implementation of MemSafe based on its
ability to detect memory safety violations in real-world programs and the runtime
overhead required for it to do so. This chapter demonstrates that MemSafe’s key
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contributions—namely, the modeling temporal errors as spatial errors, a hybrid
metadata representation, and MemSafe’s data-flow representation—are effective tools
for reducing the cost of dynamically ensuring memory safety.
Finally, Chapter 8 describes additional related work by reviewing methods capable
of detecting both spatial and temporal violations as well as techniques that can only
detect one type of memory error. This chapter also presents a discussion of previous
work related to MemSafe’s data-flow analysis. Chapter 10 concludes this dissertation




C Language Compilation and
Analysis
The C programming language is one of the most popular languages of all time, and a
C compiler is available for almost all computer architectures. However, despite its
ubiquity, the features that make C desirable for many system-level programing tasks—
namely its weak typing, low-level access to computer memory, and pointers—are the
same features whose misuse cause the variety of difficult-to-detect memory access
violations that are common among C programs.
This chapter presents an overview of the C programming language and the C
language compilation process. Specifically, Section 2.1 gives a brief history of C,
discusses its use in common systems and applications, and introduces the low-level
features whose misuse can result in memory safety violations. Section 2.2 describes
the basic steps involved in the C compilation process, and Section 2.3 introduces some
of the program analysis techniques used by most modern-day optimizing compilers.
These techniques include control- and data-flow analyses, the Static Single Assignment
(SSA) form [26], and alias analysis.
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2.1 The C Programming Language
The C programming language [46] is a general-purpose programming language that
was initially developed in 1972 by Dennis Ritchie at the Bell Telephone Laboratories
for use with the Unix operating system [70]. Although C was originally intended to be
used for implementing systems software, many of today’s commonly used applications—
including database management systems and web browsers—are implemented in C.
As such, the C programming language is one of the most widely-used programming
languages, and this trend is likely to continue into the future. This section reviews
the development of the C, discusses its most common uses, and presents the low-level
features of the language that are often responsible for contributing to the commonly
occurring violations of memory safety.
2.1.1 History
The origin of the C programming language is closely tied to the development of
the Unix operating system [70]. The Unix kernel (the central component of most
computer operating systems) was originally developed in assembly language for the
PDP-7 computer. The PDP-7 was an early computer developed by the Digital
Equipment Corporation (DEC). Since assembly code is non-portable and specific to
a particular computer architecture, changes in the computer hardware on which an
assembly program is designed to run require developers to rewrite the program to
match the physical features of the new architecture. The C programming language
was developed—based on the specification of a previous language named “B” (from
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which C derives its name)—to be a high-level version of assembly language with which
the Unix kernel could be portably rewritten. Due to the early success of C, Unix
became one of the first operating system kernels to be implemented in a language
other than assembly.
The first effort at standardizing the C programming language came in 1978 with
the publication of The C Programming Language by Kernighan and Ritchie [50]. This
book served as the de facto specification of the language before C became standardized.
Several new features were added to the language at this time, including a standard
library for I/O operations and the long int and unsigned int data types. In the
years following the publication of the book, several unofficial features were added to
the language in addition to these, which were supported to varying degrees by the
exiting C compilers. These extensions included void functions and the ability for a
function to return struct and union types.
Given the large number of extensions and the increasing popularity of C, stan-
dardization became necessary. The C Programming language was standardized by
the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) in 1989 and by the International
Organization for Standards (ISO) in 1990. This standard is commonly referred to
as ANSI C, C89, or C90. The standardization process resulted in the inclusion of
additional features, such as function prototypes (a declaration specifying a function’s
name, arity, and argument and return types) and void pointers. A program conform-
ing to the ANSI C standard that does not make any assumptions of the hardware on
which it will run (e.g., byte endianness) will run correctly, within resource constraints,
on any system that having an implementation of C (i.e., the standard libraries) that
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also conform to the ANSI standard.
At the time of this writing, the most recent update to the ANSI/ISO C standard
came in 1999. The corresponding specification is commonly referred to as C99, and it
introduced several new features, including inline functions, additional data types, and
support for variable-length arrays. C99 is backward compatible with ANSI C, but
the reverse is not true. That is, a program conforming to the previous C standard
conforms to the current C99 specification. MemSafe assumes that the source code to
which it is applied conforms to the C99 specification, and all code transformations
that MemSafe makes conform to this standard as well.
2.1.2 Common use
C is most often used for “systems programming.” Systems programming is distinct
from application programming in that the latter aims to produce software that provides
a particular service to an end user (e.g, a word processor) whereas the former aims
to produce software that provides services to a computer system. As such, systems
programming requires greater knowledge of computer hardware. Examples of systems
programming tasks include implementing operating systems and embedded systems
applications. The C programming language is well-suited for these tasks because of
its efficiency, predictability, weak typing, and low-level access to computer memory.
Ironically, it is the misuse of these features that results in the memory safety violations
MemSafe aims to detect.
Given its wide acceptance and efficiency, many commonly-used applications and
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language implementations are also written in C. For example, the C language is used
for implementing large database management systems and web browsers as well as
the compilers, libraries, and interpreters of other languages. Python, Perl and PHP
are examples of such languages. The efficiency of C code also makes it particularly
well-suited for implementing computationally intensive software, such as applications
for analyzing large amounts of scientific data.
2.1.3 Low-level features
As mentioned above, several of the features that make C a desirable programming
language are the same features that are often responsible for commonly occurring
memory access violations. Memory errors are made possible in C by the ability to
acquire low-level access to computer memory and to manipulate the data that is stored
in a particular region of memory. The discussion below describes the C language
features that can lead to violations of memory safety—namely the unrestricted use of
pointers and manual memory management.
2.1.3.1 Pointers
A pointer is a value that enables a program to indirectly access data that is stored
in a computer’s main memory or that is located in some peripheral device (e.g.,
through memory-mapped I/O). Pointers record the memory address of an object
or function and are said to “point” or “refer” to the data located at that address.
Pointers are dereferenced in order to access the data to which they point, or as is
the case with pointers to a function, they may be dereferenced to invoke a procedure.
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Pointers are useful for a variety purposes in C including manual memory management
(discussed below) and the implementation of common data structures, such as trees
and lists. Additionally, function pointers are frequently used to implement the callback
mechanism required by event handlers. However, because a pointer variable can be
made to refer to an arbitrary location, and because pointer operations are typically
unchecked in C, the misuse of pointers are responsible for a variety of memory access
violations, particularly those related to spatial safety.
Pointers in C are created using the address-of operator (&) or by calling the malloc
standard library function. However, the value of one pointer may be assigned to
another pointer, and a pointer may be assigned an arbitrary value through the use of
type-casting. Pointers are manipulated through simple assignments and arithmetic. A
pointer that is assigned the value of NULL refers to no object, and in most systems, a
dereference of the NULL pointer results in a runtime error. NULL pointers are useful in
C programming for indicating special cases. For example, a NULL pointer can be used
to indicate that there are no items beyond the last element of a linked list.
A pointer’s type indicates the type of data stored at the location to which it refers.
However, a void pointer points to an object of unknown or unspecified type, and
can therefore be used as a generic data pointer or to implement type polymorphism.
Pointers that are void cannot be dereferenced, and pointer arithmetic on them is
not allowed. However, a pointer of one type can be freely converted into a pointer of
another type through type-casting.
A unique feature of the C programming language is the duality that exists between
pointers and arrays. Essentially, a variable declared as an array of a particular type
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also acts as a pointer to that type, and when the variable is used by itself (i.e., the
array is not indexed), it is a pointer to the first element of the array. Formally, the
array sub-script notation a[i] is equivalent to *(a + i), where pointer arithmetic is
performed on a pointer to the first element of the array to compute the address of
the ith element. The dereference operation accesses the data stored at the resulting
address. Thus, pointer arithmetic and array indexing are identical operations. For
simplicity, MemSafe represents all array indexing operations as functionally equivalent
pointer arithmetic.
2.1.3.2 Manual memory management
The C programming language provides three mechanisms by which a programmer can
manually manage objects stored in memory. These include static memory allocation
for managing global objects, automatic memory allocation for managing stack objects,
and dynamic memory allocation for managing heap objects. The misuse of memory
allocation and deallocation mechanisms, especially those for managing heap-allocated
objects, are responsible for a variety of memory access violations, particularly those
related to temporal safety.
Static memory allocation refers to the process by which global variables are
allocated. Since the number and size of global variables is known statically, storage for
global variables is provided in a program binary by the compiler during compilation.
Static variables have a global scope, a lifespan equal to that of the program, and
are not deallocated until the program terminates and the binary in which they are
contained is removed from memory. Static allocation incurs no runtime overhead
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since the storage space is managed by the compiler. Although this lack of overhead is
desirable, static allocation is not suitable for many programming tasks, such as the
implementation of data structures that can potentially grow in size at runtime.
Automatic memory allocation refers to the process by which variables local to a
procedure are allocated on the stack. When a procedure is executed, the required
storage space for its local variables, having been determined by the compiler, is
automatically reserved on the procedure stack. Similarly, when a function exists, its
local variables are automatically deallocated. Unlike global variables, the deallocation
of local variables introduces the possibility of memory safety violations. If the address
of an automatically allocated objects “escapes” and is made available outside the
procedure in which the object is allocated, all references to the object’s location
become invalid when the procedure exists and the object is deallocated. Pointers
to a deallocated object, whether the object was originally allocated on the stack or
the heap, are collectively referred to as dangling pointers, and their dereference is a
violation of temporal safety.
Dynamic memory allocation refers to the process by which blocks of memory of
arbitrary size can be allocated dynamically at runtime on the system heap. This is
accomplished with the malloc standard library function, which allocates a region
of memory and returns either a pointer to its base address or the NULL pointer,
indicating that a block of the specified size could not be allocated. Dynamically
allocated memory is deallocated by passing, to the free function, a pointer that
refers to the base address of the allocated block. In giving the programmer complete
control over memory allocation and deallocation, memory safety violations related to
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dynamically allocated memory are commonplace. Dereferences of dangling pointers to
heap-allocated objects occur if a pointer to an object is dereferenced after the object
is deallocated. Similarly, a violation occurs if an attempt is made to deallocate an
object more than once with the free function. However, an example of a related
programming error that does not result in a memory safety violation is the “memory
leak.” A leak occurs when a pointer to dynamically allocated memory is lost, and the
program is never able to reclaim the allocated space. Since this is not a violation of
spatial or temporal safety, MemSafe does not aim to detect such an error.
2.2 Compilation
A C language compiler [7] is a computer program that transforms a program written in
C into a machine executable form. A compiler is responsible for performing a variety
of tasks, including lexical and semantic analysis of the source code and machine code
generation and optimization. Typically, tasks are organized into three groups based
on the order in which they occur: the compiler frontend, middle-end and backend.
The main task of a compiler frontend is to analyze the source code in order to build
an internal target-independent representation of the program, called the intermediate
representation (IR), for use by the middle-end. This process includes the following
steps: (1) Lexical analysis involves the tokenization of the source code in order to
recognize keywords, identifiers, and symbols. (2) Preprocessing involves performing
macro substitutions and the processing of inclusion, conditional compilation, and other
preprocessor directives. (3) Syntax analysis involves parsing the resulting sequence
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of tokens to identify the syntactic structure of the program. (4) Semantic analysis,
the final step, involves performing various semantic checks (e.g. type checking) of the
program’s structure and is responsible for rejecting incorrect programs and issuing
compiler warnings.
The primary task of the compiler backend is to transform the IR into a machine exe-
cutable representation. This process involves the following steps: (1) Target-dependant
analysis and optimization involves transforming a program into a functionally equiva-
lent, but optimized, program based on features of the target machine (e.g., a machine’s
memory hierarchy). (2) Instruction selection involves selecting the appropriate ma-
chine instructions to implement a given operation or operations present in the IR.
(3) Instruction scheduling involves determining the order in which the selected in-
structions are placed based on their latency on the target machine. (4) Register
allocation, typically one of the final steps, involves assigning the large number of
program variables to the much smaller number of machine registers.
Finally, the compiler middle-end is responsible for performing target-independent
analyses and optimizations. These processes are performed after the source code is
converted into the intermediate representation by the frontend and before the IR is
converted into machine code by the backend. The analyses and optimizations performed
by the middle-end (some of which are the focus of Section 2.3) are typically intended
for gathering machine-independent information about the structure of a program and
using this information to transform the program such that it becomes faster or smaller
than the original version. Example analyses include call graph construction, control-
and data-flow analysis, and alias analysis. Common optimizations include constant
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propagation and dead code elimination. MemSafe’s analysis and transformation is
target-independent and operates in the middle-end of a C compiler.
2.3 Analysis
Compiler analysis is the process of gathering information about a source program’s
structure in order to transform, or in some way optimize, it such that an attribute
of the executable program is maximized or minimized. Frequently, this involves the
optimization of programs to minimize execution time, memory consumption, or power
consumption. Given that some of the most basic compiler analyses have been shown
to be undecidable [54], the goal of most analyses and optimizations is not to produce
a program that is necessarily “optimal” in any way. Rather the goal is to apply
heuristics that improve desirable characteristics of a “typical” program.
Compiler analyses can be grouped and categorized in several ways based on their
scope and precision. The scope of an analysis can be (1) intraprocedural, meaning that
each procedure is considered individually, (2) interprocedural, meaning that multiple
procedures are considered at the same time, and (3) whole-program, meaning that the
analysis considers the entire program at once. Interprocedural and whole-program
analyses can acquire a greater amount of information about a program’s behavior and
lead to more effective optimizations. However, because they must reason over more of
the program at once, these analyses can be complex and require a compilation time
that can often be impractical.
Additionally, analyses can be grouped by the precision of their results. An analysis
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is (1) flow-sensitive if it takes instruction ordering into consideration, and (2) context-
sensitive if it takes calling context into consideration when analyzing the target
procedure of function call. Flow- and context-insensitive analyses are more efficient to
perform than the above, but produce results that are not as precise.
Many compiler analyses exist, and they are useful for performing a variety of
program optimizations. However, only those required by MemSafe’s transformation
for ensuring memory safety are presented in this section.
2.3.1 Control-flow and call graph construction
A program’s potential execution paths can be effectively represented using control-flow
and call graphs. The construction of a control-flow graph (CFG) is an itraprocedural
analysis that produces a graph G = (V,E) where V is a set of vertices representing
each basic block in a function, and E is a set of edges such that if control-flow can
transfer from a block b1 to another block b2, there is an edge (b1, b2) in E. A sequence
of instructions forms a basic block [7], if the sequence has only one entry point, meaning
that only the first instruction is the target of a branch instruction, and has only one
exit point, meaning that only the last instruction can cause the program to begin
executing in a different basic block. The CFG is essential for many compiler analyses
and optimizations. For example, backedges in the CFG are useful in recognizing loops,
and disconnected subgraphs of the CFG are useful in identifying unreachable code.
The construction of a call graph is an interprocedural analysis that produces a
graph G = (V,E) where V is a set of vertices representing each function in a program,
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and E is a set of edges such that if a function f calls another function g, there is
an edge (f, g) in E. In the presence of function pointers, determining the exact call
graph of a program is undecidable, so graph construction algorithms must produce
over-approximations. That is, a program’s call graph contains every call relationship
that can potentially be realized at runtime in addition to other spurious relationships
that can never occur. Frequently, alias analysis (discussed below) is used to determine
a set of the potential targets of a function pointer. Call graphs are essential for most
interprocedural analyses and optimizations.
2.3.2 Data-flow analysis
Data-flow analysis is a technique for reasoning about the possible set of values
computed at various points in a computer program. Intuitively, a program’s CFG is
used to determine the locations in a program where particular values might propagate
during the program’s execution. Data-flow analysis is used by a compiler to perform
a variety of optimizations including constant folding, dead code elimination and
common-subexpression elimination [7].
Data-flow analysis is performed by iteratively solving a set of equations for each
basic block of the CFG until the system of equations stabilizes and reaches a fixpoint
[51]. Information is gathered at the boundaries among basic blocks instead of individual
instructions since, once the information is gathered for each block, it is trivial to
compute the required information for each point within a block. A data-flow analysis
can be forward or backward, depending on the type of analysis being performed. In a
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forward analysis, the exit state of a basic block is a function of its entry state, and the
entry state of a block is a function of the exit states of the block’s predecessors. Thus,
for each basic block b in a program, a forward data-flow analysis can be characterized
by the following equations:
inb = joinp∈predb(outp)
outb = transb(inb)
where transb, called the transfer function of block b, produces the exit state of b for a
given input sate. The join operation (usually set intersection or union) combines the
exit states of the predecessors of b to form the entry state of b. These equations are
applied iteratively to each basic block in the CFG until the entry and exit states of
each no longer change. A backward data-flow analysis operates analogously but with
the direction of the transfer function reversed.
2.3.3 SSA form
The Static Single Assignment (SSA) [26] form is a compiler intermediate representation
in which every variable is assigned exactly once. SSA ensures that a use of a variable
is dependent on exactly one definition, which greatly simplifies the construction of
use-def and def-use chains [7]. Furthermore, all evaluations of variables having the
same name are required to produce the same value. The primary reason for converting
a program into SSA form is that, because of the above properties, many compiler
analysis and optimization algorithms are enabled or significantly enhanced.
Within a single basic block, it is trivial to assign every definition a unique name.
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For example, consider the statement x = 1 and the following statement x = 2. In
SSA form, these two assignments are represent as x1 = 1 and x2 = 2. All remaining
uses of the original variable x would now be uses of variable x2. However, at the point
where control-flow paths merge, it is not obvious how each variable can have exactly
one definition. Assume a basic block b has exactly two predecessor blocks and that
variable x is assigned in each one, becoming definitions of x1 and x2 in SSA form. The
value of x that is used in b is dependent on the control-flow of the program. Therefore,
this uncertainty in control-flow is resolved using a special statement x3 = φ(x1, x2),
which is inserted at the beginning of b, meaning that the value of x3 is either equal to
the value of x1 or x2. The φ-function produces the value of x1 if the predecessor of b
contains the definition of x1 and produces the value of x2 if the predecessor contains
the definition of x2.
The algorithm for converting a program into SSA form is straightforward. It
first inserts the required φ-functions to resolve the uncertainty in control-flow, and
it then renames all definitions and uses of variables such that each assignment is
given a unique name. The algorithm relies on a data-flow analysis that computes
the dominance frontier [7] of each basic block in order to efficiently determine the
locations of the required φ-functions.
2.3.4 Alias analysis
Alias analysis is a type of data-flow analysis that is used to determine whether the
data stored at a particular location in memory may be accessed in more than one
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way. Two pointers are said to alias if they refer to the same location and, therefore,
could both be used to access the same data. Alias analysis is responsible for deciding,
for any two pointers, whether they must, must not, or may alias. The analysis is
commonly used for determining, for example, whether a value stored to memory (e.g.,
*q = x) can affect a value loaded from memory (e.g., x = *p). Such would be the
case if the two pointers (p and q) must alias. Compilers perform alias analysis because
it can significantly improve the performance of other analyses and transformations.
However, the usefulness of an alias analysis depends on the precision of the analysis.
For example, an analysis the produces a may-alias response for every alias query
would not improve the effectiveness of other analyses and optimizations. Flow- and
context-sensitive algorithms produce the most precise results yet typically require far
too much computation time and memory to be very useful in practice.
Andersen’s analysis [4] is widely-regarded to be one of the most precise inter-
procedural flow- and context-insensitive alias analyses. Even so, it requires O(n3)
computation time. In practice, techniques such as online cycle elimination [35] and
offline variable substitution [72] are required to make the analysis more efficient and
scalable to large programs. Because of its balance between precision and efficiency,
MemSafe uses Andersen’s analysis as its default alias analysis.
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Chapter 3
Memory Safety Violations and
Prior Enforcement Methods
Having introduced the C programming language, the processes by which it is compiled
and optimized, and the low-level features of C that can enable or contribute to the
existence of hard-to-detect memory errors, this chapter examines the resulting memory
safety violations in more detail. Section 3.1 presents the spatial and temporal errors
that can result from the misuse of the low-level C language features, and Section 3.2
gives and overview of previous methods for detecting some or all memory access
violations in C programs. The overall strengths and weaknesses of these strategies are
compared with that of MemSafe.
3.1 Memory Safety Violations
Memory safety violations can be divided into two categories: violations of spatial
safety and violations of temporal safety. A spatial safety violation is an error in which
a pointer is used to access the data at a location in memory that is outside the bounds
of an allocated object. The error is “spatial” in the sense that the dereferenced pointer
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Memory Safety Violation Example
Spatial Safety Bounds
violation
1: struct { ... int array[100]; ... } s;
2: int *p;
3: ...
4: p = &(s.array[101]);





3: ... *p ...  uninitialized pointer
dereference
NULL pointer 1: int *p;
2: ...
3: p = NULL;





3: p = (int*) 42;
4: ... *p ...  manufactured pointer
dereference




3: void f() {
4: int x;
5: ...
6: p = &x;
7: }
8: ...
9: void g() {
10: f();
11: ... *p ...  dangling stack
12: } pointer dereference
Dangling heap
pointer
1: int *p, *q;
2: ...
3: p = (int*) malloc(10*sizeof(int));
4: q = p;
5: ...
6: free(p);




1: int *p, *q;
2: ...
3: p = (int*) malloc(10*sizeof(int));
4: q = p;
5: ...
6: free(p);
7: free(q);  multiple deallocations
Table 3.1: Memory safety violations. Example code fragments demonstrating
memory safety violations are presented grouped by whether they affect aspects of
spatial or temporal safety.
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refers to an incorrect location in memory. A temporal safety violation is an error
in which a pointer is used in an attempt to access or deallocate an object that has
already been deallocated. The violation is “temporal” in the sense that the pointer
use occurs at an invalid instance during the execution of the program (i.e., after the
object to which it refers has been deallocated). Table 3.1 lists spatial and temporal
memory safety violations that MemSafe detects and gives examples of each. These
errors are discussed in detail below.
3.1.1 Bounds violations
A spatial violation occurs when a pointer is used to access a location outsize the
bounds of an allocated object. Common examples include accessing elements beyond
the end of an array and dereferencing a pointer derived from invalid pointer arithmetic.
Note that a pointer must be dereferenced for a violation to occur; it is not sufficient
for a pointer to simply refer to a location outside the bounds of an object to cause
a spatial safety violation. In many C programs, it is common for a pointer to be
out-of-bounds and later refer to an in-bounds location.
The first category of Table 3.1 (“Bounds violation”) shows the dereference of a
pointer that is out-of-bounds. Here, a pointer p is created that refers to a location
beyond the last element of the array field of structure s. The dereference of p is
an example of a “sub-object” bounds violation. A sub-object is an object that is
allocated at part of a larger, nested structure. Examples include arrays of structures
and structures containing array fields. Sub-object bounds violations frequently go
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undetected by error detection mechanisms since an out-of-bounds pointer to a sub-
object can remain within the bounds of the outer object.
3.1.2 Uninitialized pointer dereference
The dereference of an uninitialized pointer also results in a spatial violation. Statically
allocated pointer values that are not given an initial value are typically initialized by
the compiler to be equal to NULL. Therefore, a dereference of such a pointer, while still
resulting in a spatial violation, commonly results in a runtime error on many systems.
However, automatically allocated pointer values that are not given an initial value refer
to whatever address is specified in the location on the stack in which they are stored.
Thus, since it is not known statically what this value might be, the dereference of an
uninitialized pointer that is allocated on the stack might result in data corruption or
cause the program to eventually crash in a way that obfuscates the root problem. The
second category of Table 3.1 shows an example of an uninitialized pointer dereference.
3.1.3 Null pointer dereference
The NULL pointer, often—but not necessarily—equal the value zero, is used to indicate
that a pointer refers to no object. Thus, the dereference of a NULL pointer results in
a spatial violation. Commonly, the dereference of a NULL pointer causes a runtime
error and immediately halts a program with a segmentation fault, since an operating
system never allocates a running program the address of NULL.
However, this is not true for all systems. The XScale [45] and other ARM
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microprocessors [8] that lack virtual memory reserve address zero for their interrupt
vector table. An interrupt vector table contains the memory addresses of interrupt
handlers and is used by a processor to determine the correct response to hardware
interrupts and exceptions. A program running on these microprocessors is able to
modify the contents of the interrupt vector table by dereferencing the NULL pointer,
which results in a security exploit known as the vector rewrite attack [47]. The third
category of table 3.1 shows an example of a NULL pointer dereference.
3.1.4 Manufactured pointer dereference
A “manufactured” pointer is a pointer created by a means other than explicit memory
allocation (i.e., with the malloc standard library function) or by using the address-of
operator (&). Type-casting an integral type to a pointer type is a common method for
creating such a pointer, and in doing so, results in a pointer that refers to an address
equal to the value of the integer. The dereference of a manufactured pointer results
in a spatial safety violation since the layout of objects in memory is not specified by
the C language, and therefore, object addresses are unknown to a programmer at
compile-time.1 The fourth category of Table 3.1 shows the dereference of a pointer
that is type-cast from integer 42.
1Memory-mapped I/O locations (discussed in Section 4.3.6) are an exception to this rule since
the addressable memory map is made known to a programmer.
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3.1.5 Dereference of dangling stack pointers
As discussed previously, if the address of an automatic variable is made available
outside the function in which it is defined (e.g., by assigning it to a global pointer
or storing it in a heap object), all pointers to the local variable become dangling
when the function exists and its local storage is deallocated. Since a function’s local
storage may be reallocated for the execution of another function, reading or writing
the address of a previously allocated variable results in a of temporal violation.
The fifth row of table 3.1 shows two functions f and g, and function g is shown
calling f. However, in function f, the address of local variable x is assigned to the
global pointer p. The dereference of p in function g after the call to f results in a
temporal safety violation.
3.1.6 Dereference of dangling heap pointers
Like pointers to local variables, pointers to dynamically allocated memory become
dangling when the objects to which they refer are deallocated. In this case, memory
is deallocated dynamically by free instead of automatically when a function exits.
Since some or all of the storage occupied by a deallocated object may be subsequently
reallocated with malloc for another object of an incompatible type, reading or writing
the deallocated location is undefined, and results in a violation of temporal safety.
The sixth row of Table 3.1 shows two pointers p and q that must alias. A dynamic
array of integers is allocated with malloc, and the base address of the allocated region
(assuming the allocation was successful) is assigned to both p and q. Since p is used
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to deallocate the array with a call to free, the subsequent dereference of pointer q is
a dangling pointer dereference, and results in a temporal safety violation.
3.1.7 Multiple deallocations
A program that attempts to deallocate the same object more than once, or attempts
to deallocate a location that was not originally allocated by malloc, commits a
temporal safety violation. Calling free twice with the same value or with a value
not returned by malloc typically corrupts the internal data structures of a system’s
memory allocator. This can result in application data corruption, in malloc returning
the same value for subsequent allocations, and in the eventual crash of a program.
The last row of Table 3.1 shows two pointers p and q that must alias. A dynamic
array of integers is again allocated with malloc, and the base address of the allocated
region (assuming the allocation was successful) is assigned to both p and q. Since p is
used to deallocate the array with a call to free, the subsequent call to free using
pointer q results in multiple deallocation attempts of the same objects, and causes a
violation of temporal safety.
3.2 Prior Enforcement Methods
As evidence of the significance of the above memory safety violations, the instru-
mentation of C programs to ensure memory safety remains an actively researched
topic. This section reviews previous approaches for detecting some or all spatial and
temporal safety violations, primarily focusing on the prior works’ use of metadata. In
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the context of enforcing memory safety, metadata refers to the creation of additional
data for describing the spatial or temporal properties of an object or pointer. For
example, metadata often consists of the base and bound addresses that indicate the
valid address range to which a pointer may refer.
3.2.1 Spatial safety
The goal of spatial safety is to ensure that every memory access occurs within the
bounds of a known object. Spatial safety is typically enforced by inserting runtime
checks before pointer dereferences. Alternatively, checking for bounds violations after
pointer arithmetic is also possible [e.g. 3, 30, 49, 74], but requires care since pointers in
C are allowed to be out-of-bounds so long as they are not dereferenced. The metadata
required for spatial safety checks can be associated either with objects or pointers,
and there are strengths and weaknesses of each approach.
3.2.1.1 Object metadata
Methods that utilize object metadata usually record the base and bound addresses
of objects, as they are allocated, in a global database that relates every address in
an allocated region to the metadata of its corresponding object. Advantages of this
approach include efficiency, since it avoids the propagation of metadata at every pointer
assignment (see the discussion of pointer metadata below), and compatibility, since it
does not change the layout of objects in memory or prohibit the use of pre-compiled
libraries. Prominent methods employing this strategy include the work by Jones and
Kelly [49], Ruwase and Lam [74], Dhurjati and Adve [30], Akritidis et al. [3], SafeCode
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[31] and SVA [24].
However, the use of object metadata as means of enforcing spatial safety results
in several drawbacks. First, this approach prevents complete spatial safety. Since
nested objects (e.g., an array of structures) are assigned a base and bound address
that spans the entire allocated region, it is impossible to detect sub-object overflows if
an out-of-bounds pointer to an inner object remains within bounds of the outer object.
Second, this approach requires a runtime lookup operation to be performed in order
to retrieve metadata from the object database. Dhurjati and Adve [30] improve the
runtime cost associated with this lookup operation by partitioning the object database
using Automatic Pool Allocation [55, ch. 5], and Akritidis et al. [3] improve runtime
by constraining the size and alignment of allocated objects. However, these methods
do not detect sub-object overflows or temporal errors.
Figure 3.1 depicts the utility of object metadata (shown in red) in enforcing memory
safety. In order to ensure memory safety, complete spatial and temporal safety must be
enforced. Since all pointer dereferences are either object-level references or sub-object
references, it follows that all object and sub-object references must be both spatially
and temporally safe for a program to be memory safe. However, object-level base
and bound information is only useful in enforcing object-level spatial safety, since
sub-objects must share metadata with their corresponding outer objects. 2 Figure 3.1
will be referenced again when describing the remaining prior enforcement strategies.
2Some methods [e.g., 3, 24, 30, 31, 49, 74] are capable of using object metadata to detect some,
but not all, temporal safety violations. However, if an object is deallocated and its space is reallocated
for use by another object, dangling pointer dereferences to the original object will not be detected
because they are within bounds of the new object. Thus, these methods are incapable of enforcing











Garbage collection & temporal capabilities
Figure 3.1: Prior enforcement methods. The use of spatial
metadata, garbage collection, and temporal capabilities is shown
for previous methods of enforcing memory safety.
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3.2.1.2 Pointer metadata
An alternative to using object metadata for enforcing spatial safety is to associate
metadata with individual pointers. When a new pointer is created (i.e., with malloc or
the address-of operator), its metadata is initialized to be the base and bound address
of its referent, and when a pointer definition uses the value of another pointer (e.g.,
pointer arithmetic), its metadata is inherited from the original pointer. Advantages
of this approach include avoiding costly database lookups and the ability to ensure
complete safety, since sub-object overflows can be detected by assigning each pointer
a unique base and bound address.
Pointer metadata is commonly implemented using multi-word blocks of memory,
called “fat-pointers,” that record the required base and bound information inline
with pointers. Each pointer in a program essentially becomes a struct containing
three fields: the original pointer value and the base and bound address of its referent.
Prominent methods employing this strategy include Safe C [9], Fail-Safe C [66] and
CCured [64]. However, the use of inline metadata is not always compatible and breaks
many programs. Since a pointer’s size is no longer equal to the word size of the target
architecture, many programming idioms no longer work as expected. Additionally,
interfacing with external libraries becomes difficult and requires wrapper functions to
pack and unpack fat-pointers at boundaries with uninstrumented code.
Several pointer-based methods have developed approaches that avoid some of the
compatibility issues of fat-pointers. CCured [64], MSCC [82] and Patil and Fischer
[68] record metadata in disjoint structures that mirror the shape of the underlying
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data, but maintaining this representation increases runtime. Fail-Safe C [66] combines
fat-pointers with fat-integers and virtual structure offsets, but this too increases cost.
Finally, Softbound [62] maintains metadata for in-memory pointers in an efficient
global lookup table, but this method only detects spatial violations.
Another disadvantage of the use of pointer metadata as a means of enforcing spatial
safety is its runtime cost. While it avoids the need for expensive database lookups
operations, metadata must instead be propagated at every pointer assignment. CCured
[64] reduces metadata propagation by using a type system to infer pointer usage.
CCured classifies pointers as SAFE, SEQ and WILD and optimizes the inserted checks
and code for propagating metadata for each pointer kind. However, CCured requires
manual code modifications to avoid the expensive bookkeeping of WILD pointers and
to correct the compatibility issues of fat-pointers.
Figure 3.1 depicts the utility of pointer metadata (shown in blue) in enforcing
memory safety. Since individual pointers can be associated with a unique base and
bound address, pointer metadata can be used to enforce complete object-level and
sub-object spatial safety. However, prior methods are not capable of utilizing pointer
metadata in enforcing temporal safety.
3.2.1.3 MemSafe’s approach for ensuring spatial safety
MemSafe’s use of metadata as a means for ensuring spatial safety avoids the drawbacks
of the above approaches. MemSafe captures the most salient features of object and
pointer metadata in a hybrid representation. To ensure complete and compatible
spatial safety, MemSafe maintains disjoint pointer-based metadata in an approach
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similar to that of SoftBound. However, to lower runtime cost, MemSafe models
temporal errors as spatial errors and propagates pointer-based metadata only when
it is needed for performing runtime checks. Additionally, MemSafe maintains some
object-based metadata in a global database but performs lookup operations only when
MemSafe’s pointer-based metadata is insufficient for ensuring temporal safety.
3.2.2 Temporal safety
The goal of enforcing temporal safety is to ensure that every memory accesses refers
to an object that has not been deallocated. As described in Section 3.1, temporal
safety violations occur when dereferencing pointers to stack objects, if the function in
which they were defined has exited, and when dereferencing pointers to heap objects,
if the object to which they refer has been deallocated with free. Temporal safety is
typically enforced with garbage collection or by software checks. Like the methods for
ensuring spatial safety, there are strengths and weaknesses of each approach.
3.2.2.1 Garbage collection
Methods using garbage collection to prevent dangling pointers to heap objects com-
monly ignore calls to the free function and replace calls to malloc with the Boehm-
Demers-Weiser conservative garbage collector [16]. To prevent dangling pointers
to stack objects, local variables can be “heapified” and replaced with dynamically
allocated objects that are managed by the garbage collector. This is the approach
taken by CCured [64] and Fail-Safe C [66].
However, garbage collection negates several of C’s primary benefits, including its
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predictability and low-level access to memory. Garbage collection voids real-time
guarantees [10], increases address space requirements, reduces reference locality, and
increases page fault and cache miss rates [84]. Moreover, since the collector must
be conservative, some memory may never be reclaimed by the system, resulting in
memory leaks. Finally, heapifying stack objects increases the runtime overhead of
enforcing temporal safety since dynamic allocation is slower than automatic allocation.
Despite these drawbacks, conservative garbage collection is capable of enforcing
complete temporal safety. This capability is depicted in Figure 3.1, where the use of
garbage collection is shown in orange.
3.2.2.2 Temporal checks
An alternative to using garbage collection for enforcing temporal safety is to insert
explicit software checks that test the temporal validity of referenced objects. To
achieve this, a “capability store” is commonly used to record the temporal capability
of objects as they are created and destroyed. Additional temporal metadata that
is created and propagated with spatial metadata links a pointer to the temporal
capability of its referent. Methods employing this strategy include Safe C [9], MSCC
[82], and the work by Patil and Fischer [68] and Yong and Horwitz [83].
There are advantages and disadvantages of using explicit temporal checks for
enforcing temporal safety. The primary strength of this approach is that it retains C’s
memory allocation model and avoids the drawbacks associated with garbage collection.
However, the inclusion of additional runtime checks and metadata significantly increases
the runtime overhead beyond that of enforcing spatial safety alone. Figure 3.1 indicates
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that temporal capabilities (shown in orange), like garbage collection, can be used to
enforce complete temporal safety.
3.2.2.3 MemSafe’s approach for ensuring temporal safety
One of MemSafe’s main contributions is the modeling of temporal errors as spatial
errors. Therefore, MemSafe does not require conservative garbage collection or explicit
temporal checks, and it avoids the drawbacks of both approaches. Instead, MemSafe
relies on spatial safety checks and the hybrid metadata representation mentioned





MemSafe [77] is a compiler analysis and transformation for ensuring the spatial
and temporal memory safety of C programs at runtime. MemSafe’s source code
transformation ensures complete memory safety, produces transformed code that is
compatible with legacy software, and is entirely automatic. In order to reduce the
runtime cost of enforcing memory safety, MemSafe requires a limited amount of static
analysis—an alias analysis used for disambiguating memory operations—to avoid
inserting unnecessary checks and the propagation of unneeded metadata. MemSafe
inserts runtime checks and propagates the required metadata for the remaining memory
accesses that cannot be statically verified to be safe.
This chapter describes MemSafe’s basic, unoptimized approach for ensuring the
memory safety of C programs. (Chapter 5 will describe optimization techniques
for lowering the runtime cost associated with enforcing memory safety.) Section 4.1
presents a small C-like language and introduces syntax extensions of this language that
MemSafe uses to model the challenging aspects of enforcing memory safety—namely,
memory deallocation and pointer aliasing. Sections 4.2–4.3 present the runtime checks
and metadata propagation rules required to achieve safety. Section 4.4 discusses
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Atomic Types α := int | τ*
Types τ := α | struct{d+} | τ[n]
Declarations d := τ x;
Functions f := func(x∗) {b∗}
Blocks b := p∗ d∗ s+
φ-Functions p := x = φ(x+);
LHS Expressions l := x | *l | l.y
RHS Expressions r := r+r | l | &l | (α)r | malloc(r) | n
Statements s := l=r; | l(r); | for(l=r; r<r; l=r) {b}
| if(r) {b} else {b} | return r; | free(r);
where x ∈ variables
y ∈ structure field identifiers
n ∈ N
Figure 4.1: Language Syntax for MemSafe presentation. Syntax is given for a
simple SSA [26] language with procedures, pointers, control flow, and manual memory
management.
the use of MemSafe for ensuring the memory safety of multithreaded programs and
describes the changes to MemSafe’s basic approach that are required in order to
achieve thread safety. Finally, Section 4.5 shows an implementation of MemSafe’s
unoptimized checks and metadata for an example real-world application.
4.1 Language Extensions and Assumptions
This section describes the main components of MemSafe’s program analysis. Because
the C programming language, in its entirety, is both large and complex, the language
defined in Figure 4.1 will be used for describing MemSafe’s source code translations
and the rules for runtime check insertion and metadata propagation. Figure 4.1 defines
a small SSA [26] intermediate language that captures all the relevant pointer-related
portions of C. Features of the language include, among others, syntax for pointer
types, manual memory management, type-casting of pointer values, pointer arithmetic,
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and complex control-flow.
Without loss of generality, the following assumptions are made of the language
presented in Figure 4.1. First, it is assumed that memory is only accessed with
explicit load (e.g., x = *ptr) and store (e.g., *ptr = x) operations involving pointers.
Second, it is assumed that pointer values are only created with the address-of operator
(&) or by calling the malloc function. Recall that in C, a variable declared as an
array of some particular type can act as a pointer to that type, and when used by
itself, is a pointer that points to the first element of the array. To enforce the notion
that pointers are only created through the two mechanisms above, all array accesses
are represented as an indexing operation applied to the address of the first element of
the array. For example, for the allocation of an array a of ten elements, an access of
the fifth element a[4] is represented as (&a[0])[4]. That is, a pointer is created to
the first element of the array, and then this pointer is used to compute the address of
the fifth element. In this way, all new pointer values may only be created with the
address-of operator and by calling the malloc system function.
Furthermore, MemSafe assumes all global variable definitions define a symbol
that provides the address of an object instead of the actual object “contents.” Since
assignments of global variables must be conservatively accounted for in SSA form [26],
compiler intermediate representations (e.g., LLVM [56]) often represent global variables
as pointers to statically allocated regions of memory. The advantage of this approach
is that within a procedure, a global variable can be loaded from memory, renamed
according to the SSA conversion algorithm, and then stored back to memory before
control-flow reaches another procedure. Therefore, MemSafe identifies statically
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allocated objects by their location in memory. Note that MemSafe’s representation of
global variables is analogous to the discussion of arrays above in that the declaration
of an object implicitly creates a pointer to that object.
MemSafe models both memory deallocation and pointer store operations as explicit
assignments using syntax extensions to this C-like SSA language. The advantage of this
approach is that it enables MemSafe to ensure complete memory safety by reasoning
solely about pointer definitions, which eliminates the need for separate mechanisms
for detecting spatial and temporal errors and reveals optimization opportunities. The
remainder of this section describes these abstractions.
4.1.1 Memory deallocation
Memory deallocation can implicitly change the object to which a pointer refers. If the
region of memory that was occupied by a deallocated object is ever reallocated, the
contents of the region may change, and any remaining pointers to the original object
implicitly become invalid. This implicit redefinition of pointers can be made apparent
by modeling both automatic and dynamic memory deallocation as an explicit pointer
assignment. For example, MemSafe models the statement free(p) as p = invalid,
where invalid is a special untyped pointer constant that points to an “invalid” region
of memory. The base and bound address associated with this abstract memory region
are defined by the impossible address range [1, 0]. Thus, if the spatial metadata
of p is located at address addrp in memory, then p could be associated with the
base and bound of the invalid pointer by the statements addr_p->base = 1 and
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addr_p->bound = 0. Since the size of this block is −1, spatial safety checks involving
the base and bound of the invalid pointer are guaranteed to always report a memory
safety violation. Therefore, temporal safety violations can be detected with runtime
checks inserted for enforcing spatial safety. The rules for inserting assignments of the
invalid pointer are given below.
4.1.1.1 Automatic memory deallocation
If the address of a stack-allocated object is taken with the address-of operator (&),
the pointer to this object may “escape” and be made available outside the function in
which the object is allocated. Such an occurrence is possible, for example, if a local
variable’s address is stored in a global or heap variable. While this is a legal operation
in the C programming language, a common consequence of escaping pointers is the
program committing a temporal safety violation. When a function exits, its local
variables are automatically deallocated, and any escaping pointers to these deallocated
objects become dangling. To make the implicit redefinition of these pointers explicit,
MemSafe inserts assignments of the invalid pointer at the end of a procedure for each
of its local variables whose address is taken. MemSafe assumes the address of a local
variable escapes if it is ever stored in another variable. Assignments of the invalid
pointer are inserted according to the following rule for automatic memory deallocation.
Numbered lines represent original code.
Syntax Extension 4.1—Automatic memory deallocation:
1: void f() {
2: struct { ... int array[100]; ... } s, *p;
3: ...
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4: p = &s;  address of s is taken and may escape
5: ...
p = invalid;  MemSafe models deallocation as an explicit
6: } pointer assignment of ‘invalid’
In this example, the nested structure s is allocated automatically on the stack as a
local variable of function f. In line 4, the address of s is taken and stored in pointer
p. It is assumed that p may escape to another procedure and result in a dangling
pointer when function f exits. Therefore, MemSafe assigns p the value of the invalid
pointer before the function exits, indicating that the pointer now refers to a temporally
“invalid” region of memory. After this assignment, the base and bound of p would be
updated to be equal to that of the invalid pointer, and any pointer derived from p
would inherit this metadata as well (see Section 4.3).
4.1.1.2 Dynamic memory deallocation
If a pointer’s referent is deallocated dynamically by a program calling the free function,
all pointers that refer to this object become dangling pointers. The subsequent
dereference of a dangling pointer results in a temporal safety violation. To make
the redefinition of these pointers explicit, MemSafe inserts assignments of the invalid
pointer after calls to free for the pointer used in deallocating the object. Assignments
of the invalid pointer are inserted according to the following rule for dynamic memory
deallocation. Numbered lines represent original code.
Syntax Extension 4.2—Dynamic memory deallocation:
1: int *p;
2: ...
3: p = malloc(size);
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4: ...
5: free(p);  MemSafe models deallocation as an explicit
p = invalid; pointer assignment of ‘invalid’
In this example, an object of size bytes is dynamically allocated by a program with
the malloc function, and the base address of object is assigned to pointer p. In line
5, the object to which p refers is deallocated by the program with the free function.
Therefore, MemSafe assigns p the value of the invalid pointer to indicate that the
pointer now refers to a temporally “invalid” region of memory.
4.1.1.3 Inserting assignments of the invalid pointer
MemSafe inserts assignments of the invalid pointer according to the above rules for
the deallocation of stack- and heap-allocated objects. Since global variables have a
lifetime equal to that of the program, they are not deallocated until the program
terminates and, therefore, do not require assignments of the invalid pointer. MemSafe
removes all inserted assignments of invalid after instrumenting the program with the
required safety checks and code for propagating metadata. The pseudocode of the
algorithm for inserting assignments of the invalid pointer is given below. Pseudocode
conventions follow those of Cormen et al. [23].
Algorithm 4.1—Pseudocode for inserting assignments of invalid:
1: for each function f in the program
2: do for each instruction i in function f
3: do if i defines a pointer p
4: then if rhs(i) computes the address of a local variable
5: then invalidate-at-end(p, f)
6: else if i is a call to function free
7: then p← pointer argument of call
8: invalidate-after(p, i)
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The algorithm for inserting assignments of the invalid pointer is straightforward and
operates as follows. For each instruction in the program, if the instruction defines
a pointer to be equal to the address of a local variable, the pointer is assigned the
value of the invalid pointer at the end of the function containing the instruction,
according to the rule for automatic memory deallocation. The procedure invalidate-
at-end inserts the assignment into the program at the end of the specified function.
Otherwise, if the instruction is a call to free, the pointer argument of free is assigned
the value of the invalid pointer after the call, according to the rule for dynamic memory
deallocation. The procedure insert-after inserts the assignment into the program
after the specified instruction.
4.1.2 Pointer stores
Having inserted assignments of the invalid pointer to make the redefinition of pointers
to deallocated memory explicit, MemSafe then transforms the program to make
indirect pointer store operations explicit assignments as well.
Indirect assignments are problematic in SSA form and make the representation of
pointer stores nonintuitive. A key property of SSA is that each assignment is given a
unique name (hence, the “single assignment” condition of Static Single Assignment).
However, this property does not hold for in-memory assignments of the form *p = x.
In this case, *p is not given a unique name when it is assigned the value of x, and it
is unclear whether other values loaded from memory can be equal to x or not.
To address this problem for the indirect assignment of pointer values, MemSafe
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models in-memory pointer assignments (including those induced for the invalid pointer)
as explicit assignments using alias analysis and a φ-like SSA extension called the
%-function. In the same way that the φ-function of SSA is used to resolve control-flow
uncertainty, thereby giving a unique name to conditional assignments at the point
where control-flow paths merge, MemSafe uses the %-function to resolve the data-
flow uncertainty of pointer values, thereby giving a unique name to indirect pointer
assignments at the point where pointers are loaded from memory.
For example, assume the statement s0:*p = ptr0 is the only direct reaching
definition of a pointer defined as s1:ptr1 = *p. The statement s2:*q = ptr2 may
indirectly redefine ptr1 if p and q may alias and control-flow may reach statement s1
from s2. Therefore, MemSafe models ptr1 = *p as ptr1 = %(ptr0, ptr2), meaning
the value of ptr1 may equal that of ptr0 or ptr2 but only these two values. In this
way, all indirect pointer assignments and object deallocations are represented as direct
assignments of the pointers that are potentially modified.
The following code fragment provides a more concrete example of the %-function
and demonstrates how this syntax extension creates a synergy with MemSafe’s rep-
resentation of memory deallocation that results in the propagation of the data-flow
associated with the invalid pointer. Numbered lines represent original code.
Example 4.1—%-function insertion :
1: int *a, *b, *c;
2: int **p, **q;  assume p and q may alias
...
3: *q = a;
...
4: if (condition) {
5: *p = b;
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6: } else {
7: free(*p);
*p = invalid;  MemSafe models deallocation as an explicit
8: } pointer assignment of ‘invalid’
...
9: c0 = *q
c1 = %(a, b, invalid);  MemSafe models in-memory data-flow with the
%-function. All subsequent uses of c0 are
replaced with uses of c1.
In this example, all pointer values exist in memory, and pointer assignments are made
possible by pointer store and load operations. After the call to the free function in
line 7, an in-memory assignment of the invalid pointer is inserted to indicate that the
referent of *p has been deallocated. Since p and q are assumed to potentially alias,
this store operation and the ones in lines 3 and 5 may define the pointer loaded and
assigned to the variable c0 in line 9. Therefore, MemSafe resolves this uncertainty
in pointer data-flow and gives a unique name to these assignments by inserting the
%-function after line 9 and assigning it to the variable c1. Pointers a, b and invalid
are added to the %-function assigned to pointer c1, meaning c1 may be equal to any
of these three values, but only these values. All subsequent uses of pointer c0 are
replaced with uses of c1.
By default, MemSafe utilizes flow- and context-insensitive pointer alias information
to determine the arguments of %-functions. However, MemSafe is capable of using
more precise alias analyses, and in general, their uses result in %-functions with smaller
arity. In the case of the former, MemSafe performs a simple reachability analysis to
improve the results of alias analysis. For example, consider the pointer store operation
*ptr1 = p0 and the pointer load operation p1 = *ptr2. If alias analysis indicates
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that the pointers ptr1 and ptr2 may alias, p0 would be added to the %-function inserted
for p1. However, if there is no control-flow path from the store operation to the load
operation, this is unnecessary since there is no program execution in which the stored
value can modify the loaded value. MemSafe does not include stored pointers in the
%-functions inserted for loaded pointers if the store cannot reach the load. Note that
MemSafe’s reachability analysis does not result in a flow-sensitive alias analysis.
4.1.2.1 Inserting %-functions
MemSafe inserts %-functions after all pointer loads, and like the inserted assignments
of the invalid pointer, they are removed after MemSafe instruments the program with
the required runtime checks and code for propagating metadata. Crucially, MemSafe
does not insert %-functions for loads of non-pointer values since they are not required
for MemSafe’s analysis and could potentially lead to a large increase in code size.
The pseudocode of the %-function insertion algorithm is given below. Pseudocode
conventions follow those of Cormen et al. [23].
Algorithm 4.2—Pseudocode for inserting %-functions:
1: S ← set of all pointer store instructions
2: L← set of all pointer load instructions
3: for each load instruction l ∈ L
4: do Args← {}
5: for each store instruction s ∈ S
6: do if statement l is reachable from s
7: then m1 ← stored location of s
8: m2 ← loaded location of l
9: if m1 and m2 may alias
10: then q ← stored value of s
11: Args← Args ∪ {q}
12: pold ← defined value of l
13: pnew ← insert-rho(Args, pold)
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14: for each use of pold
15: do replace pold with pnew
Intuitively, the %-function insertion algorithm operates as follows. First, the algorithm
identifies all pointer load and store operations. Then, for each pointer load operation
it identified, the algorithm determines a set of stored pointer values such that (1) there
is a control-flow path from each corresponding store operation to the load operation
and (2) the memory locations stored by each store operation may alias the memory
location loaded by the load operation. The procedure insert-rho creates and inserts
into the program a new %-function at the location following the load operation, which
indicates that the loaded value may be equal to the computed set of stored pointer
values. Finally, each use of the original loaded value is replaced by a use of the value
defined by the newly created %-function.
4.2 The Required Checks and Metadata
After inserting code for modeling memory deallocation and pointer stores as explicit
assignments, MemSafe then inserts the runtime checks and metadata necessary for
enforcing memory safety. This section describes the pointer- and object-based checks
and metadata that MemSafe requires.
Figure 4.2 depicts MemSafe’s unique combination of object- and pointer-based
metadata. In contrast to the enforcement methods shown in Figure 3.1, MemSafe
utilizes this hybrid metadata representation for ensuring both the spatial and temporal












Figure 4.2: Hybrid metadata representation. The use
of object and pointer spatial metadata is shown for MemSafe’s
method of enforcing memory safety.
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The differences between Figures 3.1 and 4.2 can be explained as follows. First,
because MemSafe models temporal errors as spatial errors, MemSafe avoids the
drawbacks associated with the use of conservative garbage collection and the use of
additional checks and metadata for enforcing temporal safety (shown in orange in
Figure 3.1). Second, since MemSafe’s hybrid metadata representation captures the
most salient features of object and pointer metadata, MemSafe avoids the drawbacks
associated with the use of each in enforcing spatial safety, and gains the ability to reuse
this metadata for enforcing temporal safety as well. As shown in Figure 4.2, MemSafe
utilizes pointer-based metadata for enforcing complete spatial and partial temporal
safety, and MemSafe utilizes object-based metadata for enforcing complete temporal
and partial spatial safety. PBC and OBC are MemSafe’s runtime checks that utilize
this metadata. These checks, in addition to MemSafe’s object- and pointer-based
metadata, are discussed below.
4.2.1 Pointer metadata
For the definition of a new pointer p (i.e., a pointer created with malloc or the
address-of operator), MemSafe creates pointer metadata in the form of a 3-tuple
〈base, bound, id〉p of intermediate values. Together, basep and boundp indicate the
range [base, bound) of memory p is permitted to access. idp is a unique key that is
assigned to p’s referent object, and it is used to associate p with the metadata of its
referent (discussed in Section 4.2.3). MemSafe maintains pointer metadata in memory
and allocates at runtime an address addrp from a set of unused addresses A for storing
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〈base, bound, id〉p. These values are stored to memory with an explicit dereference
operation, represented by M [addrp]← 〈base, bound, id〉p, where M [addrp] holds the
value at address addrp in memory.
In addition to the pointer metadata described above, MemSafe also creates a
tuple 〈addr, id〉p of intermediate values. These values are created for the definition
of each pointer p in a program (i.e., not just those pointers created with malloc
or the address-of operator), and are statically named such that there is a known
compile-time association with p. Unlike the metadata described above, no dereference
is required at runtime for retrieving these values. As previously described, addrp is the
location in memory containing the base and bound addresses that indicate the range
of memory p is permitted to access. Finally, in order to allow the reuse of location
addrp (discussed later), a copy of the id associated with p’s referent is also maintained
with this statically associated tuple.
4.2.2 Pointer bounds check
MemSafe utilizes pointer metadata for performing a Pointer Bounds Check (PBC).
MemSafe inserts a PBC before each pointer dereference that cannot be verified to be
safe statically (see Chapter 5 for optimizations that reason about dereferences that
must be safe). PBC is the forcibly inlined procedure defined by:
Runtime Check 4.1—Pointer bounds check:
1: inline void PBC(ptr, size, addr, id) {
2: 〈base, bound, id〉ptr ←M [addr]





In the above runtime check, ptr, baseptr, and boundptr are all pointers to the type
unsigned char and size is the size in bytes (as indicated by the sizeof operator)
of ptr’s referent.1 For example, MemSafe utilizes the pointer metadata of a pointer
ptr to ensure the safety of its dereference at runtime:
Example 4.2—PBC insertion:
PBC(ptr, sizeof(*ptr), addrptr, idptr);
1: ... *ptr ...
2:  some load or store operation involving ptr
In this example, MemSafe will abort the program and report a violation of memory
safety (by calling signal_safety_violation) if the dereference *ptr will access
a location outside the range specified by [baseptr, boundptr). Because the PBC only
utilizes pointer metadata, no costly database lookup is required to retrieve baseptr
and boundptr, as 〈addr, id〉ptr are uniquely named symbols in the inserted code.
As depicted in Figure 4.2, the PBC and MemSafe’s pointer-based metadata are
capable of not only ensuring complete spatial safety, but also temporal safety with
a single check. Whenever a pointer p is assigned the value of the invalid pointer,
its pointer metadata is updated as M [addrp] ← 〈base, bound, id〉invalid, which will
always cause the PBC to signal a safety violation since the invalid pointer refers to an
impossible address range.
1These pointers are implicitly type-cast to be pointers to type unsigned char because
sizeof(unsigned char) is defined to always equal one byte [46]. This is required for the pointer
arithmetic performed in the body of the bounds check to be valid.
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As mentioned above, since addresses in A can be reused, a copy of the id associated
with a pointer p must be included with p’s pointer metadata. Whenever the metadata
associated with the invalid pointer is stored to a particular address, this address
is marked for potential reuse. Thus, addrp may be reused for storing the pointer
metadata of another pointer if p’s referent is deallocated. To ensure that addrp has not
been reused, the PBC checks whether the id associated with the dereferenced pointer p,
is equal to the id located at addrp. If it is not, addrp has been reused for the pointer
metadata of another pointer and p’s referent is temporally invalid.
However, the PBC is insufficient for ensuring complete temporal safety. Since a
nested object (e.g., an array of structures or a structure containing and array field) is
deallocated using a pointer to its base address, only pointers that refer to the outer
object are assigned the value of the invalid pointer upon the object’s deallocation.
The pointer metadata of any potential sub-object references are not updated in this
way (see the rules for metadata propagation in Section 4.3). Thus, object metadata is
required to associate pointers to inner objects with the base and bound address of
their corresponding outer object. Object metadata is introduced below.
4.2.3 Object metadata
For every object allocation, MemSafe creates and assigns a unique id to the object
and records a tuple 〈base, bound〉 for the allocated region in a global object metadata
facility. MemSafe removes entries for objects from the metadata facility when they are
deallocated. The object metadata facility maps an object’s id to its base and bound
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address and is formally defined by the partial function:
omd : I → O
id 7→ 〈base, bound〉id
where I is the set of ids and O is the set of object metadata. For notational convenience,
the function omd can also be represented more generally as the relation RO, where
(id, 〈base, bound〉id) ∈ RO if the object associated with id is a valid memory object
that has yet to be deallocated. A discussion of the implementation of the object
metadata facility is deferred until Section 6.2 in order to separate the presentation of
MemSafe’s method from its prototype implementation.
4.2.4 Object bounds check
MemSafe utilizes object metadata for performing an Object Bounds Check (OBC).
MemSafe inserts an OBC, in addition to the PBC described above, before each pointer
dereference that may access a sub-object if the pointer cannot be statically verified to
be temporally safe.2 OBC is the forcibly inlined procedure defined by:
Runtime Check 4.2—Object bounds check:
1: inline void OBC(ptr, size, id) {
2: 〈base, bound〉id = omd(id)




In the definition of the above runtime check, ptr is a pointer to type unsigned char,
2Refer to Section 5.1.3.4 for a discussion of how MemSafe utilizes its pointer data-flow represen-
tation for computing the set of potential sub-object references.
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id is a component of ptr’s pointer metadata, and size is the size in bytes of ptr’s
referent. An OBC is similar in functionality to the PBC. For example, MemSafe utilizes
the object metadata of pointer ptr’s referent, denoted 〈base, bound〉id, to ensure the
safety of its dereference at runtime:
Example 4.3—OBC insertion:
1: PBC(ptr, sizeof(*ptr), addrptr, idptr);
OBC(ptr, sizeof(*ptr), idptr);
2: ... *ptr ...
3:  some load or store operation involving ptr
In this example, MemSafe will abort the program and report a violation of memory
safety if the dereference *ptr will access a location outside the range specified by
[baseid, boundid). The OBC uses the id field of ptr’s pointer metadata to retrieve the
object metadata of its referent from the object metadata facility. Assuming pointer
ptr refers to a sub-object, the temporal safety of ptr’s dereference is ensured because,
had ptr’s referent been previously deallocated, its entry would have been unmapped
in the object metadata facility RO, causing omd(id) to fail and MemSafe to signal a
safety violation.
As depicted in Figure 4.2, the OBC and MemSafe’s object-based metadata are
capable of not only ensuring complete temporal safety, but also partial spatial safety
with a single check. Thus, if the detection of sub-object overflows is not a requirement,
the PBC in the above example can be eliminated since the OBC also verifies ptr is within
bounds of its outer object.
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4.3 Propagation of the Required Metadata
Having presented the runtime checks that MemSafe requires for ensuring memory
safety, this section describes MemSafe’s translations for creating and propagating
the required metadata. In doing so, it is assumed that the program has already
been transformed such that it includes the syntax extensions for modeling memory
deallocation and pointer stores as explicit pointer assignments (see Section 4.1). In
the discussion below, the rules for propagating the required metadata are addressed
according to the way in which pointers are defined.
4.3.1 Memory allocation
As described previously, MemSafe creates entries in the global object metadata facility
as objects are allocated. For automatic memory allocation (i.e., the allocation of stack
variables), MemSafe generates a new id for the allocated object and maps it to the
object’s base and bound address in RO. MemSafe updates the object metadata facility
according to the following metadata rule for automatic memory allocation. Numbered
lines indicate original code.
Metadata Rule 4.1—Automatic memory allocation:
1: struct { ... int array[100]; ... } s;
RO = RO ∪ {(id ∈ I, 〈&s, &s+sizeof(s)〉)} (4.1.1)
In this example, a structure containing an array field is allocated on the procedure
stack. Therefore, MemSafe obtains a new id for the allocated object and maps it to
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the base and bound address of the allocated region in RO (4.1.1).
For dynamic memory allocation (i.e., the allocation of objects on the heap),
MemSafe updates RO as it does for automatic memory allocation, but it also creates
pointer metadata for the pointer returned by malloc, since the malloc function is
responsible for creating a new object as well as a new pointer to the allocated object.
If the pointer returned by malloc is equal to the NULL pointer, the pointer inherits
the metadata of the invalid pointer. MemSafe creates the required object and pointer
metadata for heap-allocated objects according to the following metadata rule for
dynamic memory allocation. Numbered lines indicate original code.
Metadata Rule 4.2—Dynamic memory allocation:
1: int *p;
2: ...
3: p = (int*) malloc(size);
〈addr, id〉p = 〈addr ∈ A, id ∈ I〉 (4.2.1)
〈base, bound〉idp =
〈base, bound〉idinvalid if p = null,〈p, p+size〉 otherwise (4.2.2)





M [addrp]← 〈baseidp , boundidp , idp〉 (4.2.4)
In this example, an object of size bytes is allocated dynamically by calling malloc,
and the address returned by malloc is assigned to the pointer p. After the program
allocates the object, MemSafe obtains an address for holding the pointer metadata of
p and obtains a new unique id for the allocated object (4.2.1). If the value returned
by malloc is equal to NULL, the object metadata associated with idp is set to the
base and bound address of the “invalid” region of memory. Otherwise, the metadata
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associated with the object is defined such that it refers to the space occupied by the
allocated region of memory (4.2.2). Finally, MemSafe associates the object’s metadata
with idp in RO (4.2.3) and stores the metadata of p at its associated address (4.2.4).
For static memory allocation (i.e., the allocation of global variables), MemSafe
initializes the object metadata facility to include entries for the base and bound address
of each allocated region, since the number and size of global variables in known at
compile-time.
4.3.2 Memory deallocation
Whenever an object is deallocated, MemSafe removes its entry from RO and sets
the pointer metadata of the pointer that refers to the object to be equal to that of
the invalid pointer. Stack-allocated objects are deallocated when the function in
which they are defined exits. Therefore, MemSafe removes their entries from RO just
before the end of the procedure. MemSafe updates object and pointer metadata for
automatic memory deallocation according to the following metadata rule. Numbered
lines indicate original code.
Metadata Rule 4.3—Automatic memory deallocation:
1: void f() {
2: struct { ... int array[100]; ... } s;
3: int *p;
4: ...
5: p = &(s.array[42]);
6: ...
RO = RO \ {(ids, omd (ids))} (4.3.1)
M [addrp]← 〈base, bound, id〉invalid (4.3.2)
7: p = invalid;  MemSafe models deallocation as an explicit
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8: } pointer assignment of ‘invalid’
In this example, structure s is an automatic variable of function f and contains an
array sub-object that is nested within it. In line 5, pointer p is assigned the address
of an element of the structure’s array field, and it is assumed that p may escape to
another procedure. Before the procedure exits, MemSafe removes the entry for s from
RO (4.3.1) using the unique id associated with s (“\” denotes set difference). Since p
may escape, it is assigned the value of the invalid pointer in line 7, and its pointer
metadata is updated to refer to the metadata associated with invalid (4.3.2).
Heap-allocated objects are deallocated dynamically with the free function. Similar
to the above rule for automatic memory deallocation, MemSafe updates object and
pointer metadata for dynamic memory deallocation according to the following metadata
rule. Numbered lines indicate original code.
Metadata Rule 4.4—Dynamic memory deallocation:
1: int *p;
2: ...
RO = RO \ {(idp, omd (idp))} (4.4.1)
M [addrp]← 〈base, bound, id〉invalid (4.4.2)
3: free(p);
4: p = invalid;  MemSafe models deallocation as an explicit
pointer assignment of ‘invalid’
In this example, a pointer p to a heap-allocated object is used to deallocate its referent
dynamically by the program calling the free function. Before the call to free in line
3, MemSafe removes the entry for the deallocated object from RO with idp (4.4.1)
and sets the pointer metadata of p to be equal to that of the invalid pointer (4.4.2).
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Pointer p is assigned the value of invalid in line 4.
If idp had been previously unmapped in the object metadata facility (indicating
that p’s referent was already deallocated before the call to free), the lookup operation
represented by omd (idp) would fail. In this case, MemSafe would signal a temporal
safety violation to indicate the multiple deallocation attempt.
4.3.3 Address-of operator
Like dynamic memory allocation, the address-of operator (&) creates a pointer to
a new location. Therefore, having already updated RO for an object’s allocation,
MemSafe creates pointer metadata for pointers to the object. MemSafe sets the pointer
metadata of a pointer defined in terms of the address-of operator according to the
following metadata rule. Numbered lines indicate original code.
Metadata Rule 4.5—Address-of operator:
1: struct { ... int array[100]; ... } s;
2: int *p;
3: ...
4: p = &(s.array[42]);
〈addr, id〉p = 〈addr ∈ A, ids〉 (4.5.1)
M [addrp]← 〈&s.array[0], sizeof(s.array), idp〉 (4.5.2)
In this example, as in previous examples, a pointer p is assigned the address of an
element of the array field of structure s. Because the program creates a new pointer,
MemSafe obtains a new address for storing the pointer metadata of p (4.5.1). MemSafe
then creates and stores pointer metadata for p to indicate that it refers to the base
and bound address of the array field of s (4.5.2).
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This example also demonstrates MemSafe’s ability to detect sub-object overflows.
Although p refers to a location within object s (indeed, p inherits the id of s), p’s
base and bound address are associated with the array field of s.
4.3.4 Pointer copies and arithmetic
Pointers defined as simple pointer copies or in terms of pointer arithmetic (e.g., array
and structure indexing) inherit the pointer metadata of the original pointer.3 MemSafe
sets the pointer metadata of pointers defined by simple assignments according to the
following metadata rule. Numbered lines indicate original code.
Metadata Rule 4.6—Pointer copies and arithmetic:
1: int x, *p0, *p1;
2: ...
3: p1 = p0 + x;
〈addr, id〉p1 = 〈addr, id〉p0 (4.6.1)
In this example, since pointer p1 is defined in terms of pointer arithmetic, it simply
inherits the pointer metadata associated with pointer p0 (4.6.1).
4.3.5 %-functions
Since the value produced by a %-function is not known statically, MemSafe must
“disambiguate” it for the returned pointer to inherit the correct metadata. Thus,
MemSafe requires an additional metadata facility. Like the object metadata facility,
3SSA φ-functions that involve pointer values are no different than ordinary pointer copies. For
example, p2 = φ(p0, p1) copies p0 to p2 at the end of the basic block defining p0 and copies p1 to
p2 at the end of the basic block defining p1.
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the pointer metadata facility maps the address of an in-memory pointer to its pointer
metadata and is defined by the partial function:
pmd : A→ P
ptr 7→ 〈addr, id〉*ptr
where A is the set of addresses, and P is the set of pointer metadata. For notational
convenience, the function pmd can also be represented more generally as the relation
RP , where (ptr, 〈addr, id〉*ptr) ∈ RP .
For pointer loads, MemSafe creates a new definition for the loaded value and assigns
it the result of a %-function, which indicates the set of values to which the loaded
value may potentially be equal. For a pointer ptr whose pointed-to location is loaded
in defining another pointer p, MemSafe retrieves from the pointer metadata facility
the required pointer metadata for p with the lookup operation pmd(ptr). MemSafe
performs this operation according to the following metadata rule for pointer loads.
Numbered lines indicate original code.
Metadata Rule 4.7—Pointer loads:
1: int **ptr1, *p0, *p1, ...;
2: ...
3: p0 = *ptr1;  MemSafe models in-memory data-flow with
4: p1 = %(a0, b0, ...); the %-function
〈addr, id〉p1 = pmd(ptr1) (4.7.1)
In this example, an in-memory pointer is loaded and assigned to pointer p0. MemSafe
then creates a new pointer p1 and assigns it the result of a %-function indicating the
values the in-memory pointer may potentially equal. The pointer metadata for p1
is retrieved from the pointer metadata facility with the pmd(ptr1) lookup operation
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(4.7.1), and all uses of p0 are replaced with uses of p1.
For each argument of the %-function (including the invalid pointer), MemSafe
saves their pointer metadata in RP at the locations each pointer is stored to memory.
MemSafe updates the pointer metadata facility for pointer stores according to the
following metadata rule. Numbered lines indicate original code.
Metadata Rule 4.8—Pointer stores:
1: int **ptr2, *a0;
2: ...
3: *ptr2 = a0;  ptr2 may alias ptr1 from above
RP = (RP \ {(ptr2, pmd(ptr2))}) ∪ {(ptr2, 〈addr, id〉a0)} (4.8.1)
In this example, pointer ptr2 is assumed to potentially alias with pointer ptr1 from
the previous example. Thus, pointer a0 appears in the %-function defined above for
pointer p1 because of the pointer store in line 3. Here, MemSafe maps pointer ptr2
to the pointer metadata of a0 in RP (4.8.1). If ptr1 happens to be equal to ptr2, the
pointer metadata of a0 would be retrieved in the previous example.
4.3.6 NULL and manufactured pointers
Pointer type-casts and unions do not require any additional metadata propagation.
The new pointer simply inherits the pointer metadata of the original pointer, as in
the rule for pointer copies and arithmetic. However, pointers defined as NULL or
as a cast from a non-pointer type must inherit the base and bound of the invalid
pointer. Although this may result in false positives, they have been observed to be rare
occurrences in practice. For reading and writing to memory-mapped I/O locations,
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MemSafe requires a target’s backend to specify the base and bound address of all valid
address ranges. MemSafe propagates the metadata of the invalid pointer according
to the following rule for NULL and manufactured pointers. Numbered lines indicate
original code.
Metadata Rule 4.9—NULL and manufactured pointers:
1: int *p;
2: ...
3: p = (int*) 42;
〈addr, id〉p = 〈addr, id〉invalid (4.9.1)
In this example, pointer p is defined as a type-cast from the integer 42. Thus, MemSafe
defines the pointer metadata for p to be equal to that of the invalid pointer (4.9.1).
The result would have been the same if p had been assigned the value of NULL.
4.3.7 Function arguments and return values
MemSafe requires an additional metadata facility in order to propagate pointer
metadata for pointers passed as arguments to functions or returned from functions.
Let callee values refer to formal pointer arguments and pointer values that are returned
from functions. Similarly, let caller values refer to actual pointer arguments and local
pointer values to be returned from functions. The function metadata facility maps a
callee value to the pointer metadata of its corresponding caller value and is defined
by the partial function:
fmd : C → P
callee 7→ 〈addr, id〉caller
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where C is the set of caller values, P is the set of pointer metadata, and callee is
a tuple 〈&f, i〉 indicating the ith pointer associated with function f. Pointers are
statically assigned an index i based on their usage: the return value of a function is
assigned index zero, and the pointer arguments of a function are assigned an index
equal to their offset in the function’s argument list, beginning at one. For notational
convenience, the function fmd can also be represented more generally as the relation
RF , where (callee, 〈addr, id〉caller) ∈ RF .
For function calls, MemSafe creates an entry in the function metadata facility for
pointer arguments passed to the function. Similarly, MemSafe defines the pointer
metadata of a pointer returned from the function call by performing a lookup operation
of RF . MemSafe updates and defines pointer metadata for function calls according to
the following metadata rule. Numbered lines indicate original code.
Metadata Rule 4.10—Function calls:
1: int *p0, *p1;
2: ...
RF = (RF \ {(〈&f, 1〉, fmd(〈&f, 1〉))}) ∪ {(〈&f, 1〉, 〈addr, id〉p0)} (4.10.1)
3: p1 = f(p0);
〈addr, id〉p1 = fmd(〈&f, 0〉) (4.10.2)
In this example, a pointer p0 is passed as an argument to function f and pointer p1 is
assigned the returned value. The return value of f is statically associated with the
index “0,” and its single pointer argument is given an index of “1.” Thus, before the
function call, the pointer metadata of p0 is associated with the tuple 〈&f, 1〉 in RF
(4.10.1). That is, a key represented by the address of f and the integer “1” is mapped
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to the pointer metadata of p0. Similarly, after the call returns, the pointer metadata
for p1 is retrieved from RF with the tuple 〈&f, 0〉 (4.10.2).
For the declaration of a function with pointer arguments, MemSafe retrieves the
pointer metadata for each incoming pointer by performing a lookup operation of
RF . Similarly, if a function returns a pointer value, MemSafe creates an entry in the
function metadata facility for its pointer metadata just before the function returns.
MemSafe updates and defines pointer metadata for function declarations according to
the following metadata rule. Numbered lines indicate original code.
Metadata Rule 4.11—Function declarations:
1: int* f(int *q) {
2: int *r;
3: ...
〈addr, id〉q = fmd(〈&f, 1〉) (4.11.1)
2: . . .
RF = (RF \ {(〈&f, 0〉, fmd(〈&f, 0〉))}) ∪ {(〈&f, 0〉, 〈addr, id〉r)} (4.11.2)
3: return r;
4: }
In this example, pointer q is a formal argument of function f, and pointer r is returned
at the end of the procedure. Since q is declared to be the first pointer in the function’s
argument list, MemSafe retrieves the pointer metadata for q from RF with the tuple
〈&f, 1〉 at the beginning of the procedure (4.11.1). Similarly, since MemSafe statically
assigns pointer return values the index “0,” the pointer metadata of r is associated
with the tuple 〈&f, 0〉 in RF before the procedure exits (4.11.2).
MemSafe’s approach for propagating metadata for pointer arguments and return
values is quite robust. It is sufficient for interfacing with pre-compiled libraries,
74
handling variable-argument functions, and passing metadata through poorly-typed
function pointers. For complete safety, pre-compiled libraries must have been compiled
with MemSafe’s safety checks, but a safe application is capable of interfacing with
unsafe libraries as well.
4.4 Memory Safety for Multithreaded Programs
Concurrent programming is an increasingly common method for improving application
performance. Advantages of concurrency include (1) increased application throughput,
since the parallel execution of a concurrent program can increase the total number
tasks completed in a given time period and (2) increased application responsiveness,
since time spent waiting for input/output operations to complete can be effectively
used for another task.
Given the current proliferation of multi-core and multiprocessor CPUs, the multi-
threading paradigm has emerged as a widespread—if not the dominant—concurrent
programming and execution model. Multithreading refers to the ability of a computer
to efficiently execute multiple threads. An execution thread is the smallest unit of
processing that is schedulable by an operating system, and it exists within the context
of a traditional operating system process. The use of multithreading to exploit task
parallelism has two main advantages over multiprocessing, the other primary technique
for increasing application throughput. First, context switching between threads in
the same process is typically faster than context switching between processes since
processes maintain a considerable amount of state information. Multiple threads
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existing within the same process share the same state. Second, multiple threads within
the same process share the same address space, which allows concurrently-running
code to conveniently communicate using shared memory. Processes have separate
address spaces and must rely on expensive inter-process communication mechanisms
for exchanging data.
However, because of the tight coupling of concurrent threads, the potential exists
for race conditions to occur, whereby multiple threads simultaneously attempt to
update shared data structures. To prevent such concurrency errors, multithreaded
applications must use synchronization primitives that lock shared data structures
against concurrent access. A multithreaded piece of code is said to be thread safe if
it lacks such concurrency errors, which is to say that the piece of code is guaranteed
to function correctly during simultaneous execution by multiple threads. Because
concurrency errors can be very difficult to reproduce and isolate, thread safety is a
major challenge for the multithreaded programming paradigm.
For MemSafe to be an effective method of enforcing memory safety for the increas-
ingly large number of multithreaded applications, MemSafe’s inserted safety checks,
metadata, and code for propagating the required metadata must be made thread safe.
Therefore, since the potential exists for the RO, RP , and RF global metadata facilities
to be concurrently operated upon by separate threads of a multithreaded program,
a locking mechanism is required so that simultaneous updates to these metadata
facilities is prevented.
MemSafe requires read/write locks [37] for controlling access to each global meta-
data facility. A read/write lock is a synchronization primitive that allows multiple
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threads to read from the same shared memory area concurrently, but enforces mutual
exclusion for any thread that writes to the shared memory. Therefore, RO, RP , and
RF are each able to be simultaneously read by multiple threads, but when a thread
attempts to update a particular metadata facility, all other threads wishing to read or
write that metadata facility must wait until the write operation is completed.
The POSIX threads (Pthreads) standard [44] defines an implementation of the
read/write locks MemSafe requires for managing concurrent accesses of the global
metadata facilities. Pthreads is a commonly-used standard for creating and manip-
ulating threads for various Unix-like operating systems, including GNU/Linux and
Max OS X, and it defines a set of C programming language types and functions (in
the pthread.h header file) that, in addition to implementing thread synchronization
mechanisms, also provides an API for creating and joining threads.
In the remainder of this section, the checks MemSafe inserts for enforcing memory
safety and the rules MemSafe uses for propagating the required object and pointer
metadata are updated to ensure thread safety. Note that only the portions of MemSafe’s
method that requires modification (i.e., the portions that access the RO, RP , and
RF global metadata facilities) are repeated in this section. All other components of
MemSafe’s method remain the same as presented in Sections 4.1–4.3.
4.4.1 Declaration of the required locks
Before describing how the checks and rules for metadata propagation are altered to
achieve thread safety, the required locks must first be declared and initialized. The
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following code fragment demonstrates the use of the Pthreads API for initializing a
read/write lock for each metadata facility at the beginning of a program.
Example 4.4—Declaration of metadata facility locks:
1: #include <pthread.h>
2: ...
3: pthread_rwlock_t object_lock, pointer_lock, function_lock;
4: ...
5: int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
6: if (pthread_rwlock_init(&object_lock, NULL) |
7: pthread_rwlock_init(&pointer_lock, NULL) |
8: pthread_rwlock_init(&function_lock, NULL) != 0) {




In this example, three global read/write locks are declared in line 3 for the three
metadata facilities RO, RP , and RF . The locks are initialized at the beginning of
main so that they will be available for managing access to the metadata facilities
before execution enters the concurrent sections of the code. The program aborts in
line 9 if any one of the locks could not be initialized.
4.4.2 Object bounds check
Recall that if a pointer may potentially refer to a sub-object, MemSafe inserts an
object bounds check (OBC) to enforce the temporal safety of the pointer’s dereference,
in addition to the pointer bounds check (PBC) required for enforcing spatial safety.
The OBC uses the id field of a pointer’s pointer metadata to retrieve from the object
metadata facility RO the object metadata 〈base, bound〉id associated with the pointer’s
referent. The OBC then determines whether the dereferenced pointer refers to a location
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that is within the base and bound address of its referent, and if it is not, the OBC
signals a safety violation.
Since the OBC retrieves metadata with the lookup operation omd(id), if a thread
allocates an object and inserts its base and bound address into RO at the same moment
that another thread is executing an OBC, a race could occur and incorrect or undefined
program behavior could result. Therefore the lookup operation is a critical section
of execution that must be protected by an appropriate locking mechanism, which is
shown below in the following revised definition of the object bounds check. Numbered
lines indicate code present in the original definition of OBC.
Runtime Check 4.3—Object bounds check (thread safe):
1: inline void OBC(ptr, size, id) {
if (pthread_rwlock_rdlock(&object_lock) != 0) {
abort("Unable to acquire read lock for metadata facility");
}
2: 〈base, bound〉id = omd(id)
pthread_rwlock_unlock(&object_lock);
3: if ((ptr < baseid) or (ptr+size > boundid))
4: signal_safety_violation();
5: }
Before the lookup operation in line 2, MemSafe acquires a read lock for RO or aborts
the program if it is unable to successfully obtain the lock. After the lookup operation
is complete, MemSafe releases the read lock for RO, and performs the bounds check.
4.4.3 Memory allocation
MemSafe creates entries in the object metadata facility as objects are allocated. Since
inserting entries into RO changes the state of this global data structure, memory
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allocation is a critical section of execution. Therefore, a thread that updates RO to
include the metadata of a newly allocated object must obtain a write lock before
performing the operation.
For automatically allocated stack variables, MemSafe generates a new id for the
allocated object, and maps it to the base and bound address of the allocated region of
memory. MemSafe inserts thread synchronization primitives for automatic memory
allocation according to the following revised rule. Numbered lines indicate code present
in the original definition of the metadata propagation rule for automatic memory
allocation.
Metadata Rule 4.12—Automatic memory allocation (thread safe):
1: struct { ... int array[100]; ... } s;
if (pthread_rwlock_wrlock(&object_lock) != 0) {
abort("Unable to acquire write lock for metadata facility");
}
2: RO = RO ∪ {(id ∈ I, 〈&s, &s+sizeof(s)〉)}
pthread_rwlock_unlock(&object_lock);
Before the update operation in line 2, MemSafe acquires a write lock for RO or aborts
the program if is unable to successfully obtain the lock. After the update operation is
complete, MemSafe releases the write lock for RO.
For dynamically allocated heap variables, MemSafe updates the object metadata
facility as it does for automatic allocation, and it also creates pointer metadata for the
pointer returned by malloc since malloc is responsible for creating a new object as well
as a new pointer to the allocated object. Thus, the object metadata facility must again
be protected with a write lock. MemSafe inserts thread synchronization primitives for
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dynamic memory allocation according to the following revised rule. Numbered lines
indicate code present in the original definition of the metadata propagation rule for
dynamic memory allocation.
Metadata Rule 4.13—Dynamic memory allocation (thread safe):
1: int *p;
2: ...
3: p = malloc(size);
4: 〈addr, id〉p = 〈addr ∈ A, id ∈ I〉
5: 〈base, bound〉idp =
〈base, bound〉idinvalid if p = null,〈p, p+size〉 otherwise
if (pthread_rwlock_wrlock(&object_lock) != 0) {
abort("Unable to acquire write lock for metadata facility");
}




7: M [addrp]← 〈baseidp , boundidp , idp〉
pthread_rwlock_unlock(&object_lock);
Before the update operation in line 6, MemSafe acquires a write lock for RO or aborts
the program if it is unable to successfully obtain the lock. MemSafe releases the write
lock for RO after the update operation is complete. Note that unlike the creation of
object metadata, the creation of pointer metadata is local to a thread and, therefore,
does not require the use of thread synchronization primitives.
For statically allocated global variables, their number and size are known at
compile-time. Therefore, MemSafe initializes RO to include entries for the base and
bound address of each allocated region at the beginning of a program’s main procedure.
The initialization of RO does not require thread synchronization since it occurs when
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the program is executing sequential code and has not yet spawned additional threads
of execution.
4.4.4 Memory deallocation
Whenever an object is deallocated—whether it was allocated automatically on the
stack or dynamically on the heap—MemSafe removes its entry from RO and sets the
pointer metadata of the pointer that refers to the object to be equal to that of the
invalid pointer. Since the removal of entries from RO changes the state of this data
structure (as was the case for the insertion of new entries) memory deallocation is also
a critical section of execution, and a thread that updates RO to remove the metadata
of a deallocated object must obtain a write lock before performing the operation.
Stack-allocated objects are deallocated when the function in which they are
defined exits. Therefore, MemSafe removes from RO the entries for a function’s
locally allocated objects just before the end of the function. MemSafe inserts thread
synchronization primitives for the deallocation of stack-allocated objects according
to the following revised rule. Numbered lines indicate code present in the original
definition of the metadata propagation rule for automatic memory deallocation.
Metadata Rule 4.14—Automatic memory deallocation (thread safe):
1: void func() {
2: struct { ... int array[100]; ... } s;
3: int *p;
4: ...
5: p = &(s.array[42]);
6: ...
if (pthread_rwlock_wrlock(&object_lock) != 0) {
abort("Unable to acquire write lock for metadata facility");
}
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7: RO = RO \ {(ids, omd (ids))}
8: M [addrp]← 〈base, bound, id〉invalid
pthread_rwlock_unlock(&object_lock);
9: p = invalid;  MemSafe models deallocation as an explicit
10: } pointer assignment of ‘invalid’
Before the lookup and update operations in line 7, MemSafe acquires a write lock for
RO or aborts the program if is unable to successfully obtain the lock. After completing
the operations, MemSafe releases the write lock for RO.
Heap-allocated objects are deallocated by a program calling the free function.
Therefore, MemSafe removes from RO the entry for the object being deallocated
just before a call to free. MemSafe inserts thread synchronization primitives for
the deallocation of heap-allocated objects according to the following revised rule.
Numbered lines indicate code present in the original definition of the metadata
propagation rule for dynamic memory deallocation.
Metadata Rule 4.15—Dynamic memory deallocation (thread safe):
1: int *p;
2: ...
if (pthread_rwlock_wrlock(&object_lock) != 0) {
abort("Unable to acquire write lock for metadata facility");
}
3: RO = RO \ {(idp, omd (idp))}
4: M [addrp]← 〈base, bound, id〉invalid
pthread_rwlock_unlock(&object_lock);
5: free(p);
6: p = invalid;  MemSafe models deallocation as an explicit
pointer assignment of ‘invalid’
Like the rule for stack-allocated objects, MemSafe acquires a write lock for RO before
the lookup and update operations in line 3 or aborts the program if is unable to
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successfully obtain the lock. After completing the operations, MemSafe releases the
write lock for RO.
Since statically allocated object have a global scope and a lifespan equal to that of
the program, they are not deallocated until the program terminates. Thus, an update
of RO is not required to remove entries for global variables.
4.4.5 %-functions
MemSafe uses the global pointer metadata facility RP to “disambiguate” the value
produce by %-functions. Since inserting entries into RP changes the state of this
global data structure, pointer loads and stores are critical sections of execution, and a
thread that reads or updates RP must obtain an appropriate read/write lock before
performing these operations.
For pointer loads, MemSafe creates a new definition for the produced value and
assigns it the result of a %-function, which indicates the set of values to which the loaded
value may potentially be equal. For a pointer ptr whose pointed-to location is loaded
in the definition of another pointer p, MemSafe retrieves from the pointer metadata
facility the required pointer metadata for p with the lookup operation pmd(ptr).
MemSafe inserts thread synchronization primitives for pointer loads according to the
following revised rule. Numbered lines indicate code present in the original definition
of the metadata propagation rule for pointer loads.
Metadata Rule 4.16—Pointer loads (thread safe):
1: int **ptr1, *p0, *p1, ...;
2: ...
84
3: p0 = *ptr1;  MemSafe models in-memory data-flow with
4: p1 = %(a0, b0, ...); the %-function
if (pthread_rwlock_rdlock(&pointer_lock) != 0) {
abort("Unable to acquire read lock for metadata facility");
}
5: 〈addr, id〉p1 = pmd(ptr1)
pthread_rwlock_unlock(&pointer_lock);
Before the lookup operation in line 5, MemSafe acquires a read lock for RP or aborts
the program if it is unable to successfully obtain the lock. MemSafe releases the read
lock for RP after the lookup operation is complete.
For each argument of a %-function, MemSafe updates RP at the location the
pointer is stored to memory. Since this operation involves the insertion of a new
entry into the pointer metadata facility, a write lock is required for a thread to obtain
exclusive access to RP . MemSafe inserts thread synchronization primitives for pointer
loads according to the following revised rule. Numbered lines indicate code present in
the original definition of the metadata propagation rule for pointer stores.
Metadata Rule 4.17—Pointer stores (thread safe):
1: int **ptr2, *a0;
2: ...
3: *ptr2 = a0;  ptr2 may alias ptr1 above
if (pthread_rwlock_wrlock(&pointer_lock) != 0) {
abort("Unable to acquire write lock for metadata facility");
}
4: RP = (RP \ {(ptr2, pmd(ptr2))}) ∪ {(ptr2, 〈addr, id〉a0)}
pthread_rwlock_unlock(&pointer_lock);
Before the lookup and update operations in line 4, MemSafe acquires a write lock for
RP or aborts the program if is unable to successfully obtain the lock. After completing
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the operations, MemSafe releases the write lock for RP .
4.4.6 Function calls
Like the pointer metadata facility is used to disambiguate the value produced by %-
functions, MemSafe uses the global function metadata facility RF in an analogous role
for disambiguating pointers passed as arguments to and returned from functions. Since
the state of RF is modified when a program makes a call to a function that requires
pointer arguments or returns a pointer value, threads must obtain an appropriate
read/write lock before performing such an operation.
For function calls that pass a pointer p as an actual argument, MemSafe maps
a tuple—composed of the address of the callee and the offset of p in the argument
list—to the pointer metadata of p. Since this operation involves the insertion of a new
entry into the function metadata facility, a write lock is required for a thread to obtain
exclusive access to RF . Similarly, a read lock is required to obtain the metadata
of a returned pointer value. MemSafe inserts thread synchronization primitives for
function calls involving pointer arguments or returned pointer values according to the
following revised rule. Numbered lines indicate code present in the original definition
of the metadata propagation rule for function calls.
Metadata Rule 4.18—Function calls (thread safe):
1: int *p0, *p1;
2: ...
if (pthread_rwlock_wrlock(&function_lock) != 0) {
abort("Unable to acquire write lock for metadata facility");
}
3: RF = (RF \ {(〈&f, 1〉, fmd(〈&f, 1〉))}) ∪ {(〈&f, 1〉, 〈addr, id〉p0)}
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pthread_rwlock_unlock(&function_lock);
4: p1 = f(p0);
if (pthread_rwlock_rdlock(&function_lock) != 0) {
abort("Unable to acquire read lock for metadata facility");
}
5: 〈addr, id〉p1 = fmd(〈&f, 0〉)
pthread_rwlock_unlock(&function_lock);
Before the lookup and update operations in line 3, MemSafe acquires a write lock for
RF or aborts the program if is unable to successfully obtain the lock. After completing
the operations, MemSafe releases the write lock for RF . Similarly, MemSafe acquires
and releases a read lock for RF for the lookup operation in line 5.
For the definition of a function f that declares a pointer p as a formal argument at
offset one in its argument list, MemSafe retrieves from the function metadata facility
the required pointer metadata for p with the lookup operation fmd(〈&f, 1〉). Similarly,
for functions that return a pointer value, MemSafe updates RF with the pointer
metadata of the returned value. MemSafe inserts thread synchronization primitives
for function declarations having formal pointer arguments or returning a pointer value
according to the following revised rule. Numbered lines indicate code present in the
original definition of the metadata propagation rule for function declarations.
Metadata Rule 4.19—Function declarations (thread safe):
1: int* f(int *q) {
2: int *r;
3: ...
if (pthread_rwlock_rdlock(&function_lock) != 0) {
abort("Unable to acquire read lock for metadata facility");
}
2: 〈addr, id〉q = fmd(〈&f, 1〉)
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pthread_rwlock_unlock(&function_lock);
3: . . .
if (pthread_rwlock_wrlock(&function_lock) != 0) {
abort("Unable to acquire write lock for metadata facility");
}




Before the lookup operation in line 4, MemSafe acquires a read lock for RF or aborts
the program if it is unable to successfully obtain the lock. MemSafe releases the read
lock for RF after the lookup operation is complete. Similarly, MemSafe acquires and
releases a write lock for RF for the update and lookup operations in line 6.
4.5 Example Application
Having presented MemSafe’s unoptimized runtime checks and metadata, it is useful to
consider a real-world code example in order to better understand how the metadata
propagation code is actually implemented. A small, widely-used piece of code that can
serve this purpose is the merge sort algorithm. The merge sort algorithm, first proposed
in 1945 by John von Neumann [52, p. 159], is a comparison-based sorting algorithm.
Having a worst case performance of Θ(n log n), the merge sort algorithm easily scales to
large data sets and is typically stable, meaning that most implementations preserve the
input order of equal elements in the sorted output. Merge sort is a classical example of
a divide-and-conquer algorithm [23], and is becoming an increasingly popular sorting





4:  Merge 2 sorted sequences. A2 is an array
5: and p, q, and r are indices numbering
6: elements of the array such that p ≤ q < r.
7:
8: void merge(int *A2, int p, int q, int r) {
9:
10: int n1 = q - p + 1;
11: int n2 = r - q;
12:
13: int *L = (int*) malloc((n1+1)*sizeof(int));
14:
15: for (int i=0; i < n1; i++) {
16: L[i] = A2[p+i-1];
17: }
18:
19: int *R = (int*) malloc((n2+1)*sizeof(int));
20:
21: for (int i=0; i < n2; i++) {
22: R[i] = A2[q+i];
23: }
24:
25: L[n1] = INT_MAX;
26: R[n2] = INT_MAX;
27:
28: int i = 0;
29: int j = 0;
30: for (int k=p; k <= r; k++) {
31: if (L[i] <= R[j]) {
32: A2[k] = L[i];
33: i = i+1;
34: } else {
35: A2[k] = R[j];







43:  Sort the elements in the subarray A1[p..r].
44: If p ≥ r, the subarray has at most one
45: element and is therefore already sorted.
46:
47: void merge_sort(int* A1, int p, int r) {
48: if (p < r) {
49: int q = (p+r)/2;
50: merge_sort(A1, p, q);
51: merge_sort(A1, q+1, r);
52: merge(A1, p, q, r);
53: }
54: }
Figure 4.3: Merge sort algorithm. An implementation of the merge sort algorithm
[23] is shown for sorting an unordered array of integers.
the standard sorting routine for the Perl, Python, and Java interpreted programming
languages. Because the merge sort algorithm is used so frequently and is relatively
small in size, it provides a convenient and illustrative example of the application of
MemSafe’s method.
Figure 4.3 shows the C language source code for a simple implementation [23] of
the merge sort algorithm for sorting integer arrays. Intuitively, the algorithm operates
by dividing an n-element sequence of items to be sorted into two subsequences, each
containing n/2 elements. It then recursively sorts the two subsequences. Finally the
algorithm merges the two sorted subsequences to produce the final sorted sequence.
The recursion is terminated when the subsequence to be sorted contains only one
element. When this is the case, there is nothing to be done since a sequence of length
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one is, by definition, already sorted.
The primary operation of the merge sort algorithm is the actual merging of the
sorted sequences. The merge procedure, shown in line 8 of Figure 4.3, takes four
arguments as input. A is an array of integers and p, q, and r are indices enumerating
elements of A such that p ≤ q < r. The procedure assumes that the sub-arrays
A[p . . . q] and A[q + 1 . . . r] are in sorted order. It then copies the sub-arrays to
temporary storage (the L and R dynamically allocated arrays) and merges the sub-
arrays to form a single sorted sub-array that replaces A[p . . . r].
The merge procedure is used as a subroutine of the merge_sort procedure defined
in line 47, which takes three arguments as input. A is the sub-array to be sorted
and p and r are array indices. If p ≥ r, the sub-array has at most one element and
is, therefore, already sorted. If p < r, the algorithm computes an array index q
that partitions A[p . . . r] into two sub-arrays. The sub-array A[p . . . q] contains dn/2e
elements and A[q + 1 . . . r] contains bn/2c elements. Thus, to sort an entire sequence
A using merge sort, the algorithm is initialized as merge_sort(A, 1, n) where n is
the length of array A.
Figure 4.4 shows the source code for the two procedures used in the merge sort
algorithm after (1) conversion to the SSA form and (2) insertion of MemSafe’s syntax
extensions for modeling memory deallocation and pointer stores. Note that the for
loops from the original source code are implemented here as equivalent do while
structures to show the inserted φ-functions. Complex expressions are also shown
separated into elementary operations, and it is assumed that all variables are SSA





4:  Merge 2 sorted sequences. A2 is an array
5: and p, q, and r are indices numbering
6: elements of the array such that p ≤ q < r.
7:
8: void merge(int *A2, int p, int q, int r) {
9:
10: int n1 = q - p + 1;
11: int n2 = r - q;
12:




17: int i0 = φ(0, i9);
18: if (i0 < n1) {
19: int *tmp2 = A2+p+i0-1;
20: int *tmp4 = L+i0;
21: *tmp4 = *tmp2;
22: } else {
23: break;
24: }
25: i9 = i0+1;
26: } while (1);
27:




32: int i1 = φ(0, i2);
33: if (i1 < n2) {
34: int *tmp7 = A2+q+i1;
35: int *tmp9 = R+i1;
36: *tmp9 = *tmp7;
37: } else {
38: break;
39: }
40: i2 = i1+1;
41: } while (1);
42:
43: int *tmp12 = L+n1;
44: int *tmp14 = R+n2;
45: *tmp12 = INT_MAX;
46: *tmp14 = INT_MAX;
47:
48: int i4, j2, k1;
49: do {
50: int i3 = φ(0, i4);
51: int j0 = φ(0, j2);
52: int k0 = φ(p, k1);
53: if (k0 <= r) {
54: int *tmp16 = L+i2;
55: int *tmp18 = R+j0;
56: if (*tmp16 <= *tmp18) {
57: int *tmp20 = L+i2;
58: int *tmp22 = A2+k0;
59: *tmp22 = *tmp20;
60: int i5 = i2+1;
61: } else {
62: int *tmp25 = R+j0;
63: int *tmp27 = A2+k0;
64: *tmp27 = *tmp25;
65: int j1 = j0+1;
66: }
67: } else {
68: break;
69: }
70: i4 = φ(i5, i2);
71: j2 = φ(j1, j0);
72: k1 = k0+1;








79:  Sort the elements in the subarray A1[p..r].
80: If p ≥ r, the subarray has at most one
81: element and is therefore already sorted.
82:
83: void merge_sort(int* A1, int p, int r) {
84: if (p < r) {
85: int q = (p+r)/2;
86: merge_sort(A1, p, q);
87: merge_sort(A1, q+1, r);
88: merge(A1, p, q, r);
89: }
90: }
Figure 4.4: Merge sort in SSA form. The implementation of the merge sort
algorithm presented in Figure 4.3 is shown here in SSA form [26] with MemSafe’s
extensions for modeling memory deallocation and pointer stores.
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program dynamically deallocates the L and R arrays at the end of the merge procedure,
MemSafe inserts the assignments of the invalid pointer after lines 75 and 76. However,
since there are no pointer store or load operations in this example, MemSafe does not
insert any %-functions.
Figure 4.5 shows an implementation of MemSafe’s unoptimized checks and metadata
for a portion of the merge sort algorithm shown in Figure 4.4. Since MemSafe’s code
insertions for the entire algorithm would be significantly long and complex, only the
first 25 lines of the algorithm (in SSA form) are shown with the required checks and
metadata for ensuring memory safety. Although this fragment of code is only a portion
of the complete algorithm, it includes the allocation of the L array and the copying of
the first sorted subsequence of A2 into L.
Before line 4, MemSafe creates type definitions to represent both pointer and
object metadata. The type pmdb_t is a structure for representing the 3-tuple pointer
metadata 〈base, bound, id〉, and the type pmda_t is a structure for representing pointer
metadata of the form 〈addr, id〉. Finally, the type omd_t is a structure that represents
the tuple 〈base, bound〉 of object metadata.
Since pointer A2 is an argument of the merge procedure, it’s pointer metadata
〈addr, id〉A2 must be defined according to Metadata Rule 4.11, which is used for
handling function declarations. Pointer metadata for A2 is retrieved from the function
metadata facility with the fmd_get procedure.
After the allocation of the L array in line 13, MemSafe creates additional metadata.
Since storage for L is allocated dynamically, MemSafe defines both pointer and object
metadata according to Metadata Rule 4.2, which is used for handling dynamic memory
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 Type for 〈base, bound, id〉 pointer metadata
typedef struct {
unsigned char *base, *bound; int id;
} pmdb_t;
 Type for 〈addr, id〉 pointer metadata
typedef struct {
pmdb_t *addr; int id;
} pmda_t;
 Type for 〈base, bound〉 object metadata
typedef struct {
unsigned char *base, *bound;
} omd_t;
4:  Merge 2 sorted sequences. A2 is an array
5: and p, q, and r are indices numbering
6: elements of the array such that p ≤ q < r.
7:
8: void merge(int *A2, int p, int q, int r) {
 Retrieve pointer metadata for A2
according to Metadata Rule 4.11.1
pmda_t pmda_A2 = fmd_get(&merge, 1);
...
13: int *L = (int*) malloc((n1+1)*sizeof(int));
 Define pointer metadata for L
according to Metadata Rule 4.2.1




 Define object metadata for L
according to Metadata Rule 4.2.2
omd_t *omd_L = (omd_t*)malloc(sizeof(omd_t));
if (L == NULL) {
*omd_L = *omd_invalid
} else {




 Map object metadata of L in the object
metadata facility according to Metadata
Rule 4.2.3
omd_set(pmda_L.id, omd_L);
 Store pointer metadata of L to memory
according to Metadata Rule 4.2.4







17: int i0 = φ(0, i9);
18: if (i0 < n1) {
19: int *tmp2 = A2+p+i0-1;
 Define pointer metadata for tmp2
according to Metadata Rule 4.6.1
pmda_t pmda_tmp2 = pmda_A2;
20: int *tmp4 = L+i0;
 Define pointer metadata for tmp4
according to Metadata Rule 4.6.1
pmda_t pmda_tmp4 = pmda_L;
 Perform PBC for dereference of tmp4
PBC(tmp4, sizeof(int),
pmda_tmp4.addr, pmda_tmp4.id);
 Perform PBC for dereference of tmp2
PBC(tmp4, sizeof(int),
pmda_tmp2.addr, pmda_tmp2.id);
21: *tmp4 = *tmp2;
22: } else {
23: break;
24: }
25: i9 = i0+1;
26: } while (1);
...
Figure 4.5: Merge sort fragment with metadata and checks. A portion of
the merge sort algorithm presented in Figure 4.4 in SSA form [26] is shown here with
the required checks and metadata MemSafe inserts to ensure memory safety.
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allocation. First, MemSafe inserts a call to malloc to create an address addrL for
storing the pointer metadata associated with L, and MemSafe creates the unique
key idL for the allocated object with the getUniqueId procedure. Second, MemSafe
defines the object metadata 〈base, bound〉idL associated with the allocated region
of memory. If the pointer returned by malloc is equal to NULL, the region’s object
metadata is set to that of the “invalid” region. Otherwise, the region’s object metadata
is defined to be the base and bound of the allocated object. Third, MemSafe maps
the allocated object’s key idL to it’s metadata 〈base, bound〉idL in the object metadata
facility with the omd_set procedure. Finally, MemSafe defines the pointer metadata
of the returned pointer 〈base, bound, id〉L and stores it to memory at location addrL.
Since pointers tmp2 and tmp4 are defined in lines 19 and 20 in terms of pointer
arithmetic, MemSafe creates their pointer metadata 〈addr, id〉tmp2 and 〈addr, id〉tmp4
according to Metadata Rule 4.6, which is used for pointer copies and arithmetic. This
metadata is then utilized to perform the pointer bounds checks before the pointers
are dereferenced in line 21. MemSafe inserts metadata and runtime checks for the
remaining portion of the merge sort algorithm in a similar way.
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Chapter 5
Reducing the Runtime Cost of
Enforcing Memory Safety
Because the runtime overhead of MemSafe’s basic approach can be prohibitively
expensive for use in real systems, this chapter develops several tools and optimizations
for reducing the cost associated with the inserted checks for memory safety and the code
required for propagating metadata. First, a novel pointer data-flow representation
is presented that is made possible by the modeling of both memory deallocation
and pointer store operations as explicit pointer assignments. Then, this data-flow
representation is used as the foundation of several optimizations that identify and
eliminate unneeded runtime checks and code for propagating unused metadata.
5.1 A Data-flow Graph for Pointers
By utilizing the abstractions developed in Section 4.1 for memory deallocation and
pointer stores, MemSafe creates a whole-program Data-Flow for Pointers Graph
(DFPG). The DFPG is a definition-use graph for the flow of all pointer metadata
in a program. Since the invalid pointer creates a direct pointer assignment for each
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deallocated object, and since the %-function creates a pointer assignment for indirect
pointer stores, every pointer assignment, whether it is an explicit or implicit assignment,
is given a unique name in the SSA representation of the program. Therefore, if the
pointer metadata associated with a pointer p is copied to that of another pointer q,
there is a directed edge from p to q in the DFPG.1 Similarly, if the pointer metadata
of q is loaded from memory, a %-function is inserted that indicates the pointers whose
metadata may equal that of q, and these pointers are represented in the DFPG as
predecessors of q. In general, since the data-flow of pointers may flow recursively,
cycles are possible in the DFPG. Recall that since the data-flow associated with
pointer loads and stores is represented by the %-function, the definitions and uses
associated with these operations are not included in the DFPG.
Figure 5.1 shows (a) an example code fragment and (b) its associated DFPG. In
this code fragment, which was introduced during the discussion of the invalid pointer
and %-function (see Section 4.1.2), the only pointer definition that is not a pointer
load or store operation is that of c1, which occurs after line 9. Since the definition
of c1 uses the value of three other pointers (a, b, and invalid), there is an edge in
the DFPG from each of these pointers to c1. More complicated pointer data-flow is
possible, and the DFPG for a real-world program is presented in Section 5.1.4.
The remainder of this section describes the process by which the DFPG is con-
structed, the issue of DFPG connectivity, and important properties of the DFPG
that will be utilized for performing the optimizations that eliminate unneeded runtime
1For simplicity, nodes in the DFPG are identified by named pointer values. However, in actuality,
DFPG nodes represent the pointer metadata associated with these pointers, and not the pointers
themselves.
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1: int *a, *b, *c;
2: int **p, **q;
 assume p and q may alias
...
3: *q = a;
...
4: if (condition) {
5: *p = b;





9: c0 = *q







Figure 5.1: DFPG construction. A code fragment with MemSafe’s syntax ex-
tensions (a) and its corresponding DFPG (b). Numbered lines indicate original
code.
checks and metadata propagation. The section ends by discussing the construction of
the DFPG for a real-world application.
5.1.1 Construction
The construction of the DFPG is a straightforward process that involves analyzing
pointer definitions and uses and reasoning about the propagation of their associated
pointer metadata, according to the rules presented in Section 4.3, were it to be inserted
for runtime checks. The construction process takes place after (1) a program has been
converted to SSA form, (2) pointers assignments for the invalid pointer have been
inserted for memory deallocation, and (3) %-functions have been inserted to represent
the data-flow of pointer stores and loads. The DFPG = (V,E) is a directed graph
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consisting of a set of vertices V that represent the pointers in a program (i.e., the
〈base, bound, id〉 metadata associated with the pointers) and a set of directed edges
E that connect pointer uses to pointer definitions. The pseudocode for the DFPG
construction algorithm is given below. Pseudocode conventions follow those of Cormen
et al. [23].
Algorithm 5.1—Pseudocode for constructing the DFPG:
1: V ← {}
2: E ← {}
3: for each instruction i in the program
4: do if i is a function call
5: then F ← set of all potential callees of i
6: for each potential callee f ∈ F
7: do for each actual pointer argument p of i
8: do if p /∈ V
9: then V ← V ∪ {p}
10: q ← the formal argument of f corresponding to p
11: if q /∈ V
12: then V ← V ∪ {q}
13: E ← E ∪ {(p, q)}
14: if i defines a pointer p
15: then if p /∈ V
16: then V ← V ∪ {p}
17: for each potential callee f ∈ F
18: q ← the return value of f
19: if q /∈ V
20: then V ← V ∪ {q}
21: E ← E ∪ {(q, p)}
22: else if i defines a pointer p
23: then if p /∈ V
24: then V ← V ∪ {p}
25: for each pointer q that i uses
26: do if q 6∈ V
27: then V ← V ∪ {q}
28: E ← E ∪ {(q, p)}
29: DFPG← graph(V,E)
Intuitively, the DFPG construction algorithm operates as follows. For each instruction
in the program, if the instruction is a function call, the algorithm first determines
98
the potential set of functions the call instruction may be calling. This is done by
analyzing a conservative call graph that was created using alias analysis to determine
the set of potential functions to which each function pointer may refer. The algorithm
then connects each actual pointer argument of the call instruction with the formal
argument of each potential callee, adding the pointers to the graph in the process if
they are not already present. Similarly, pointers that are function return values are
connected with the pointer defined by each potential caller of the function. Finally,
for instructions that are not function calls, if the instruction defines a pointer value,
the pointer is added to the graph and an edge is created to it from each pointer value
the definition uses.
5.1.2 Connectivity
While the number of regular vertices in the DFPG (i.e., all vertices excluding those
representing %-functions) is fixed for a given program, the number of edges is largely
dependent on the precision of the alias analysis that was used for inserting %-functions.
For example, assume a naïve alias analysis that responds with may alias for every
alias query. The analysis would declare that any pointer stored to memory may alias
with any pointer loaded from memory. Thus, if this analysis was used for inserting
%-functions, there would be an edge from every stored pointer to the %-function
representing each loaded pointer. The large number of DFPG edges, in this case,
would indicate that a high amount of uncertainty exists in the data-flow of pointer
values. This ambiguity is detrimental for the optimizations described in Section
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5.2 as the removal of unneeded checks and metadata propagation relies on knowing
statically—with certainty—that particular conditions must or must not occur.
MemSafe uses Andersen’s alias analysis [4] as the default analysis for %-function
insertion (see Section 4.1.2). Andersen’s analysis is widely-regarded as the most
precise flow- and context- insensitive analysis. However, MemSafe is not tied to one
particular analysis, and it can benefit from improved alias analysis precision, although
the improved precision would likely come at the expensive of longer compile times.
5.1.3 Properties
Several properties can be derived for the pointers in the DFPG based on the structure
of the graph. Examples include the potential for a pointer to be spatially unsafe
and the potential for it to be temporally unsafe. Such properties are essential for
performing the optimizations that eliminate unneeded runtime checks and code for
propagating metadata. The properties required for the optimizations in Section 5.2
are described below.
5.1.3.1 DFPG transpose
The transpose of the DFPG is a new graph DFPGT on the same set of vertices
but with all the edges reversed compared to their original orientation in the DFPG.
Formally, the transpose of DFPG = (V,E) is DFPGT = (V,ET ) where ET =
{(u, v) : (v, u) ∈ E}. DFPGT is computed efficiently in Θ(|V | + |E|) time using
adjacency lists. The transpose of the DFPG is useful when considering a reverse
data-flow analysis. That is, while the DFPG is a definition-use graph, meaning there
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is a directed edge from the definition of a pointer to its uses, the DFPGT is the
corresponding use-definition graph.
5.1.3.2 Undirected DFPG
Similarly, the undirected version of the DFPG is a new graph DFPGU = (V ′, EU)
where V ′ = V \ {invalid}. EU is formed by (1) replacing all directed edges in E with
undirected edges and (2) removing all edges incident with the vertex representing the
invalid pointer. invalid is removed when constructing the DFPGU to simplify the
graph and reveal features that are discussed below. Additionally, since the removal
of invalid may leave vertices representing %-functions with only a single immediate
predecessor, such vertices are also removed to simplify the graph, and edges are
inserted to connect the predecessor of each removed %-function with its immediate
successors. For example, assume p is defined as a %-function and edges (u, p) and
(p, v) are in EU . If p has only the single immediate predecessor u after the removal
of the invalid pointer, then p, (u, p), and (p, v) are also removed and replaced with a
new edge (u, v). The DFPGU is also efficiently computed in Θ(|V |+ |E|) time using
adjacency lists.
5.1.3.3 Potential referents
A vertex in DFPGT having no children represents a newly created pointer. That is,
pointers in DFPGT with no children represent pointers returned from the malloc
function, pointers created with the address-of operator (&), or pointers representing
statically allocated objects. A newly created pointer, by definition, refers to the object
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of its initial assignment. Therefore, the set of potential referents R of a pointer p
(represented in the DFPGT by a vertex v) is given by the set of vertices that are
reachable from v and have no children. Formally, the potential referents of v are given
by Rv =
{
u ∈ V : v ; u ∧ deg+(u) = 0
}
, where ; denotes reachability and deg+(u)
denotes the outdegree of vertex u. For any given pointer, its set of potential referents
can be computed efficiently in O(|V |+ |E|) time using a breadth- or depth-first search.
5.1.3.4 Potential sub-object referents
A pointer created with the address-of operator refers to a sub-object if it has a
composite type, and its value is the result an indexing operation through a composite
type. The address of a sub-object is computed by indexing through the fields of an
aggregate object beginning at the aggregate’s base address b. Therefore, a pointer p
refers to a sub-object if its definition has the form p = &(b + ∑xi) where p and b
are pointers to composite types and xi are offsets that index through the elements of
the aggregate pointed to by b. For indexing into a structure type, an offset xi must
be a compile-time constant, but when indexing through an array, xi is not required
to be constant. For any given pointer represented in the DFPG, the pointer may
potentially refer to a sub-object if there exists a sub-object reference in the pointer’s set
of potential referents R. Formally, the set of potential sub-object referents R(s)v ⊆ Rv
for a vertex v is given by R(s)v = {r ∈ Rv : is-sub(r)} where is-sub(r) denotes the
proposition that the definition of r matches the indexing pattern r = &(b+∑xi).
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5.1.3.5 Temporally unsafe pointers
If the pointer metadata associated with the invalid pointer may potentially propagate
to another pointer p, then p may be temporally unsafe. Therefore, all vertices
in the DFPG reachable from invalid represent pointers that may be temporally
unsafe. Formally, the set of pointers T that may be temporally unsafe is given by
T = {v ∈ V : invalid ; v}. The set of all pointers that may be temporally unsafe
can be efficiently computed in O(|V |+ |E|) time using a breadth- or depth-first search
beginning at the vertex representing the invalid pointer.
5.1.3.6 Spatially unsafe pointers
Pointers in the DFPG reachable from NULL or manufactured pointers or from pointers
defined in terms of pointer arithmetic may be spatially unsafe. Additionally, a pointer
that is not physically sub-typed [18] with each of its potential referents may also be
spatially unsafe since the object to which the pointer refers is unknown statically. A
type τ is a physical sub-type of type τ ′, denoted τ  τ ′, if a value of type τ ′ may
be operated upon as if it had type τ , which is to say that in the memory layout
of the two types, the values stored in corresponding locations are compatible for
assignment. The vertices representing NULL and manufactured pointers and pointers
defined in terms of pointer arithmetic can be identified efficiently in Θ(|V | + |E|)
time by performing a breadth- or depth-first search. If these vertices are represented
by the set A, then the set S of pointers that may be spatially unsafe is given by
S = {v ∈ V : (∃u ∈ A)(u ; v) ∨ (∃r ∈ Rv)(τ(v)  τ(r))} where τ(v) denotes the type
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of the pointer represented by vertex v.
5.1.3.7 Pointers that may alias
Pointers that may alias are represented in DFPGU as connected components. In-
tuitively, since pointers that may alias might refer to the same objects, there is a
path between all vertices in DFPGU that have overlapping sets of potential referents.
Thus, pointers that may alias are in the same connected component in DFPGU , and
pointers that must not alias are in different connected components. The connected
components of an undirected graph can be computed efficiently in Θ(|V |+ |E|) time
by performing a breadth- or depth-first search. A search beginning at vertex v will
find the entire single connected component containing v (and no additional vertices)
in O(|V |+ |E|) time. The remaining connected components are found by initiating a
similar search beginning at the next unvisited vertex and continuing until all vertices
have been visited.
5.1.4 Example application
It is again useful to consider a real-world example to better understand how a program’s
DFPG is actually constructed. Recall the merge sort procedure described in Section
4.5. Figure 5.2 shows (a) the DFPG of the merge sort algorithm presented in Figure
4.4 and (b) its corresponding DFPGU . Crucially, these data-flow graphs simulate
the flow of pointer metadata, which was shown for a portion of the algorithm: in
Figure 4.5, pointer metadata is given type pmdb_t. Note that the nodes in the graph

















(b) DFPGU for the merge sort algorithm
Figure 5.2: Merge Sort DFPG. The DFPG (a) and corresponding DFPGU (b)
are shown for the merge sort algorithm [23]. The DFPGU shows three connected
components.
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Because the original L and R arrays are deallocated with calls to free, the pointer
metadata of each is updated to be equal to that of the invalid pointer, indicating that
L and R now refer to an “invalid” region of memory. MemSafe uses Andersen’s alias
analysis to insert %-nodes for every loaded pointer that may alias with the locations
used in storing pointers (including stores of the metadata associated with the invalid
pointer and the loads of pointer metadata performed by the pointer bounds checks,
which are not shown in Figure 4.5). Because Andersen’s analysis is flow-insensitive,
the analysis identifies pointer loads of locations that may alias with stored-to locations
regardless of where they occur in the control-flow of the program. Therefore, even
though the L and R arrays are not deallocated until the end of the merge procedure,
invalid is propagated to other pointers in the algorithm.2 Note that since there are no
pointer loads involving pointers derived from the original array A, and since A is not
deallocated, the pointer metadata of invalid does not propagate to A.
The example’s DFPGU in Figure 5.2 is formed by removing the invalid pointer,
and all edges incident with it, from the DFPG and replacing all directed edges with
undirected edges. The graph is also simplified by removing %-functions that have
only a single remaining argument (after having removed the invalid pointer). The
DFPGU shows three connected components that correspond to the disjoint alias sets
associated with the original L, R, and A arrays.
2As mentioned in Section 4.1, MemSafe performs a simple reachability analysis to avoid the
insertion of %-functions for impossible pointer data-flow. However, that analysis was not used in
constructing this example in order to show the propagation of the pointer metadata associated with
the invalid pointer.
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5.2 Optimizations of the Basic Approach
MemSafe utilizes the previously described properties of a program’s DFPG to perform
several optimizations that reduce the cost of enforcing memory safety at runtime. Since
the DFPG blurs the distinction between spatial and temporal errors by encoding
memory deallocation and pointer stores as direct pointer assignments, the optimizations
described below effect the runtime overhead of achieving both spatial and temporal
memory safety.
In the discussion below, the following C source code example will be used to
demonstrate the application of MemSafe’s optimizations.
Example 5.1—Original Code for Demonstrating Optimizations:
1: struct { ... int array[100]; ... } s;
2: ...
3: int *p = &(s.array[42]);
4: int *q = &(s.array[0]);
5: ...
6: *p = x;
7: ...
8: for (int i=0; i < 42-n; i++) {
9: q[i] = *p;
10: }
In this example, a nested object (a structure containing an array) is allocated on the
procedure stack in line 1. In line 3, a pointer p is created that refers to a location
within the array field of the structure s, and in line 4, another pointer q is created
that refers to the beginning of array. The element to which p refers (element 42 of
array) is then assigned some value x in line 6. Finally, in lines 8–10, pointer q is used
to iterate over the first part of array (elements 0 to 42− n) and assign each element
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the value to which p refers, which in this case, is the value x.
Although this code fragment is somewhat contrived, it contains several features
that are useful for demonstrating the application and functionality of MemSafe’s
optimizations. These features include (1) multiple dereferences of the same pointer,
(2) sub-object pointer accesses, (3) pointer arithmetic involving both constant and
non-constant offsets, and (4) array accesses within the body of a loop.
In the remainder of this section, several effective optimizations for eliminating
unneeded safety checks and code for the propagation of metadata are described.
Throughout the discussion, the above code fragment, instrumented with the code
transformations necessary for enforcing spatial and temporal memory safety, will be
reproduced in order to demonstrate the application of each optimization.
5.2.1 Dominated dereferences optimization
Multiple dereferences of the same pointer require safety checks only for the dereference
that dominates the others. Dominated dereferences do not require checking. Well-
known in compiler theory, a dereference d1 dominates [7] another dereference d2 if every
path from the beginning of the program to d2 includes d1. Given the naming invariant
of the SSA form—that is extended to include assignments of the invalid pointer and
%-functions (see Section 4.1)—all variables with the same name are required to have
the same value. Thus, if the dereference of a pointer is guaranteed to always be
executed before another dereference of the same pointer, memory safety checks for
the second dereference are redundant, since the second pointer must have the same
value as the first.
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Within a basic block, a dereference d1 dominates d2 if d1 comes before d2 in the
order of instructions. Across basic blocks, d1 dominates d2 if the basic block containing
d1 dominates the basic block containing d2. The dominators of a basic block n are
defined on the control-flow graph of the function f containing n and given by the







where n0 is the entry block of f. Thus, the dominator of the first basic block in f is
itself, and the set of dominators for any other basic block n in f is the intersection of
the set of dominators for all predecessors p of n. Since a basic block also dominates
itself, n is also in the set of dominators for n.
The concept of dominance is integral to the SSA form, since all definitions must
dominate their uses, and the computation of dominators is required for converting
a program into SSA form. Although, the direct solution to the above equations
is computed in O(N2) time, where N is the number of basic blocks in function f,
Lengauer and Tarjan [57] developed an efficient near-linear-time algorithm that relies
on properties of the depth-first spanning tree [23] of f’s control-flow graph.
The following code fragment demonstrates the application of the Dominated Deref-
erences Optimization (DDO) using the running code example introduced above. Below,
the source code is shown after conversion to SSA form and after the insertion of all
necessary checks and metadata required for enforcing memory safety. Note that the
original for loop is replaced here with an equivalent do while loop to show the
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inserted φ-functions. Unnumbered lines indicate MemSafe’s insertions for performing
runtime checks and propagating the required metadata.
Example 5.2—Dominated dereferences optimization:
1: struct { ... int array[100]; ... } s;
RO = RO ∪ {(id ∈ I, 〈&s, &s + sizeof(s)〉)}
2: ...
3: int *p0 = &(s.array[42]);
4: int *q0 = &(s.array[0]);
〈addr, id〉p0 = 〈addr ∈ A, ids〉
M [addrp0 ]← 〈&s.array[0], sizeof(s.array), idp0〉
〈addr, id〉q0 = 〈addr ∈ A, ids〉
M [addrq0 ]← 〈&s.array[0], sizeof(s.array), idq0〉
5: ...
PBC(p0, sizeof(int), addrp0, idp0);
OBC(p0, sizeof(int), idp0);




10: int i0 = φ(0, i1);
11: if (i0 < 42-n) {
12: int *q1 = q0 + i0;
〈addr, id〉q1 = 〈addr, id〉q0
PBC(p0, sizeof(int), addrp0, idp0);  Dominated dereferences do
OBC(p0, sizeof(int), idp0); not require checking
PBC(q1, sizeof(int), addrq1, idq1);
OBC(q1, sizeof(int), idq1);
13: *q1 = *p0;
14: } else {
15: break;
16: }
17: i1 = i0+1;
18: } while (1);
Since the dereference of p0 in line 6 dominates the dereference of p0 in line 13, the
object and pointer bounds checks before the dereference of p0 in line 13 are redundant
and are eliminated.
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5.2.2 Temporally safe dereferences optimization
Dereferences of pointers that are guaranteed to be temporally safe do not require an
object bounds check. Recall that since temporal errors are modelled as spatial errors,
with the introduction of assignments of the invalid pointer, the pointer bounds check
is capable of ensuring complete spatial and temporal safety for object-level references.
However, if a pointer may refer to a sub-object (and may be temporally unsafe), its
dereference requires an OBC in addition to a PBC to ensure temporal safety.
To understand why an OBC is needed to ensure the temporal safety of potential sub-
object references, consider a pointer p that refers to the base address of a dynamically
allocated structure containing a nested sub-object. If the structure is deallocated
with free(p), the statement p = invalid is inserted into the program in order to
propagate the metadata of the invalid pointer. MemSafe updates the pointer metadata
of p according to the metadata propagation rule for dynamic memory deallocation
(see Section 4.3.2):
M [addrp]← 〈base, bound, id〉invalid
However, if before the deallocation of s, there exists a sub-object reference of the form
q = (p)->field (which is represented as q = &((*p).field)), the pointer metadata
for q is defined according to the rule for the address-of operator (see Section 4.3.3)
and is represented as
〈addr, id〉q = 〈addr ∈ A, id〉M [addrq] ← 〈&s.field, sizeof(s.field), id〉
where s is equal to *p and id refers to the unique id assigned to s when it was allocated.
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Thus, q is assigned a new address for storing metadata, and its base and bound are
equal to the “narrowed” sub-range of a particular field of the nested structure. Only if
q had been defined as an object-level reference of the form q = p would it inherit addrp
and the metadata associated with the invalid pointer when p is used to deallocate s.
Therefore, a PBC is not capable of enforcing temporal safety for sub-object references
and an OBC is instead required.
However, the OBC can be eliminated for pointers that are guaranteed to be tem-
porally safe. Pointers that may be temporally unsafe are determined by traversing
the DFPG (see Section 5.1.3.5). In addition, pointers that may be temporally unsafe
but cannot be sub-object references (see Section 5.1.3.4) are, by the above discussion,
capable of being checked with a PBC. Since an OBC requires that a lookup operation
be performed of the object metadata facility RO (and any required blocking due to
thread synchronization primitives), MemSafe preferentially removes an OBC where a
PBC is sufficient for enforcing memory safety.
The following code fragment demonstrates the application of the Temporally safe
Dereferences Optimization (TDO) using the running code example. Below, the source
code is shown after eliminating the redundant checks for the dereference of p0 in line
12 with the dominated dereferences optimization.
Example 5.3—Temporally safe dereferences optimization:
1: struct { ... int array[100]; ... } s;
RO = RO ∪ {(id ∈ I, 〈&s, &s + sizeof(s)〉)}
2: ...
3: int *p0 = &(s.array[42]);
4: int *q0 = &(s.array[0]);
〈addr, id〉p0 = 〈addr ∈ A, ids〉
M [addrp0 ]← 〈&s.array[0], sizeof(s.array), idp0〉
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〈addr, id〉q0 = 〈addr ∈ A, ids〉
M [addrq0 ]← 〈&s.array[0], sizeof(s.array), idq0〉
5: ...
PBC(p0, sizeof(int), addrp0, idp0);
OBC(p0, sizeof(int), idp0);  Temporally safe dereferences




10: int i0 = φ(0, i1);
11: if (i0 < 42-n) {
12: int *q1 = q0 + i0;
〈addr, id〉q1 = 〈addr, id〉q0
PBC(q1, sizeof(int), addrq0, idq1);
OBC(q1, sizeof(int), idq1);
13: *q1 = *p0;
14: } else {
15: break;
16: }
17: i1 = i0+1;
18: } while (1);
Although p0 refers to a sub-object (the array field of structure s), p0 is guaranteed to
be temporally safe in this example, and the object bounds checks before the dereference
of p0 in line 6 and the dereference of q1 in line 13 are eliminated.
5.2.3 Non-incremental dereferences optimization
A pointer may be spatially unsafe if the vertex representing it in the DFPG is
reachable from NULL or manufactured pointers or pointers defined in terms of pointer
arithmetic. Additionally, a pointer is may also spatially unsafe if it is not physically
sub-typed with each of its potential referents (see Section 5.1.3.6). All other pointers
are guaranteed to be spatially safe. If a spatially safe pointer is also temporally safe
(see Section 5.1.3.5), a PBC before its dereference is not required and is removed. Recall
that the pointer bounds check is capable of ensuring the temporal safety of object
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references in addition to the spatial safety of object and sub-object references. Since
MemSafe preferentially removes (with TDO) an OBC for the dereference of pointer
that may be temporally unsafe, but which must not be a sub-object reference, a PBC
cannot be removed if the dereferenced pointer may be temporally unsafe.
As a refinement of the above discussion, compile-time bounds checking is possible
for pointers that are reachable in the DFPG from pointers defined in terms pointer
arithmetic if every such path in the DFPG only involves the arithmetic of constant
values. Every possible constant-offset address expression for a pointer p can be
determined by performing a depth-first search of the DFPGT beginning at the vertex
representing p. If each potential address expression is within bounds of, and physically
sub-typed with, the type associated with each potential referent of p, a PBC for the
dereference of p is not required and is eliminated.
The following code fragment demonstrates the application of the Non-incremental
Dereferences Optimization (NDO) using the running code example. Below, the source
code is shown after eliminating the object bounds checks for pointers p0 and q1 with
the temporally safe dereferences optimization.
Example 5.4—Non-incremental Dereferences Optimization:
1: struct { ... int array[100]; ... } s;
RO = RO ∪ {(id ∈ I, 〈&s, &s + sizeof(s)〉)}
2: ...
3: int *p0 = &(s.array[42]);
4: int *q0 = &(s.array[0]);
〈addr, id〉p0 = 〈addr ∈ A, ids〉
M [addrp0 ]← 〈&s.array[0], sizeof(s.array), idp0〉
〈addr, id〉q0 = 〈addr ∈ A, ids〉
M [addrq0 ]← 〈&s.array[0], sizeof(s.array), idq0〉
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5: ...
PBC(p0, sizeof(int), addrp0, idp0);  Non-incremental dereferences




10: int i0 = φ(0, i1);
11: if (i0 < 42-n) {
12: int *q1 = q0 + i0;
〈addr, id〉q1 = 〈addr, id〉q0
PBC(q0, sizeof(int), addrq0, idq0);
13: *q1 = *p0;
14: } else {
15: break;
16: }
17: i1 = i0+1;
18: } while (1);
Since the definition of pointer p0 does not involve any pointer arithmetic—it only
involves the address-of operator (&) after expanding the complex expression—and p0 is
not equal to the NULL pointer or a manufactured pointer, p0 is spatially safe and must
refer to the address of its assignment in line 3. In addition, since p0 is also temporally
safe, the pointer bounds check before the dereference of p0 in line 6 is not required
and is eliminated.
5.2.4 Monotonically addressed ranges optimization
A pointer whose value is a monotonic function of a loop induction variable is said
to refer to a monotonically addressed range of memory [42]. Induction variable
increments of the form in = in−1 + 1 and in = in−1 − 1 are examples of monotonic
functions that are common in real-world applications. In general, if a pointer refers to
a monotonically addressed range of memory, and if the value of the loop terminating
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condition is loop-invariant, then it is possible to determine an expression for the range
of memory to which the pointer refers throughout the execution of the loop.
For example, let p0 be the initial value of a pointer p that is dereferenced within
the body of loop having a monotonically increasing induction variable. The range
of memory to which p can refer is given by [p0 + f(i0), p0 + f(in)), where f is some
monotonic function of the induction variable i. The initial and final values of i are
represented by i0 and in, respectively, and are determined by the loop starting and
terminating conditions. For the sake of discussion, assume that i has been identified
with a suitable loop induction variable recognition analysis [7], and that the loop has
been subsequently transformed such that i is the single canonical induction variable,
meaning that i is initialized to zero and incremented by one on every iteration of the
loop [58]. The range of memory to which p can refer then simplifies to [p0, p0 + n],
where n is the terminating condition of the loop.
For the dereference of a pointer referring to a monotonically addressed range of
memory, MemSafe removes the pointer’s PBC from within the loop body, and instead
inserts a Monotonically Addressed Range Check (MARC) in the loop pre-header. If the
pointer’s dereference also requires an OBC, this check is placed in the loop pre-header
as well. MARC is a runtime check defined by the following forcibly inlined procedure.
Runtime Check 5.1—Monotonically addressed range check:
1: inline void MARC(ptr, size, addr, id, trip_count) {
2: 〈base, bound, id〉ptr ←M [addr]
3: ptr_max = ptr + trip_count;





For a loop having a canonical induction variable i, MemSafe signals a safety violation
during the execution of the loop pre-header if *ptr + i will access a location outside
the range specified by [baseptr, boundptr) on any iteration of the loop. Since i is
canonical, trip_count is determined by the loop terminating condition. Additionally,
because a MARC utilizes pointer metadata, the id of the dereferenced pointer must be
compared to the id located at the metadata’s address since the address may have
been reused (see Section 4.2.2). Finally, Note that a MARC does not eliminate the need
to perform an object bounds check for potential sub-object references that may be
temporally unsafe. However, if the dereference of a pointer also requires an OBC, this
check can be placed in the loop pre-header as well.
A basic block p is the pre-header [7] of a loop if it is the immediate dominator [7]
of the loop header h. p is the immediate dominator of h if (1) p 6= h, (2) p dominates
h, and (3) p does not dominate any other dominator of h. The basic block h is the
header [7] of a loop if (1) from any basic block in the loop there is a path of directed
control-flow edges leading to h, (2) there is a path of directed edges from h to any
other basic block in the loop, and (3) there is no edge from any block outside the loop
to any block within the loop other than h.
The following code fragment demonstrates the application of the Monotonically
addressed Ranges Optimization (MRO) using the running code example. Below, the
source code is shown after eliminating the PBC before line 6 with the non-incremental
dereferences optimization.
Example 5.5—Monotonically Addressed Ranges Optimization:
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1: struct { ... int array[100]; ... } s;
RO = RO ∪ {(id ∈ I, 〈&s, &s + sizeof(s)〉)}
2: ...
3: int *p0 = &(s.array[42]);
4: int *q0 = &(s.array[0]);
〈addr, id〉p0 = 〈addr ∈ A, ids〉
M [addrp0 ]← 〈&s.array[0], sizeof(s.array), idp0〉
〈addr, id〉q0 = 〈addr ∈ A, ids〉
M [addrq0 ]← 〈&s.array[0], sizeof(s.array), idq0〉
5: ...
6: *p0 = x;
7: ...
8: int i1;
MARC(q0, sizeof(int), addrq0, idq0, 42-n);
9: do {
10: int i0 = φ(0, i1);
11: if (i0 < 42-n) {
12: int *q1 = q0 + i0;
〈addr, id〉q1 = 〈addr, id〉q0
PBC(q0, sizeof(int), addrq0, idq0);  Monotonically addressed
13: *q1 = *p0; ranges can be checked in
14: } else { loop pre-header
15: break;
16: }
17: i1 = i0+1;
18: } while (1);
Since the definition of q1 in line 12 occurs within the body of a loop having a
loop-invariant terminating condition (42− n), and q1 is a function of the canonical
loop induction variable i0, q1 refers to a monotonically addressed range of memory.
Therefore, the PBC for the dereference of q1 in line 13 is not required, and MemSafe
instead inserts a MARC in the loop pre-header.
The monotonically addressed ranges optimization is similar to array bounds check
elimination [15, 41, 53, 73, 81] and loop-invariant code motion [7] of compiler theory.
Loop-invariant code motion is a compiler optimization that automatically moves
loop-invariant code from within a loop to a location outside the loop in order to avoid
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unnecessarily repeating computations. However, since the pointer dereferences that
are targeted by MRO are not loop-invariant, loop-invariant code motion is unable
to hoist a PBC within a loop and move the check to the loop’s pre-header. The PBC
must first be converted to a MARC by the monotonically addressed ranges optimization
before it becomes loop-invariant and capable of being hoisted.
Array bounds check elimination is a well-researched technique whereby the un-
needed bounds checks for affine array accesses can be eliminated. However, MRO does
not require a memory reference to be an affine array access. Indeed, a dereferenced
pointer could itself be an induction variable. In certain cases, though, techniques such
as affine conversion [36] can be used to convert pointer accesses of array elements into
semantically equivalent array representations. Thereafter, the array access would be
subject to bounds check elimination. MRO is more general than array bounds check
elimination, but for affine array accesses, bounds check elimination could be used with
MemSafe to completely eliminate some of the required runtime checks.
5.2.5 Partitioned metadata optimization
In a multithreaded program, concurrent threads must acquire read/write locks when
attempting to update or retrieve metadata from the global metadata facilities RO, RP ,
and RF (see Section 4.4). In order to avoid some of the runtime cost associated with
the required thread synchronization primitives, MemSafe can partition each metadata
facility into separate structures and thereby reduce metadata facility access contention.
Furthermore, thread synchronization primitives can be removed entirely if concurrent
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threads access disjoint data structures after the contentious metadata facilities have
been partitioned. The code constituting a “thread” can be conservatively determined
automatically through an analysis of a program’s call graph.
As discussed in Section 5.1.3.7, connected components in the DFPGU represent
disjoint alias sets. Since pointers that must not alias are guaranteed to never refer to
the same objects, the metadata for a pointer in one particular connected component
of the DFPGU will never propagate to a pointer in another connected component.
To understand why, consider two pointers p and q. If metadata propagates from p to
q, the pointers are required to alias since the metadata associated with each would
indicate that both p and q refer to a region of memory bounded by the same base and
bound address. By definition, pointers that refer to the same region of memory, or
overlapping regions of memory, must alias.
Therefore, since the metadata for pointers in one connected component cannot
propagate to the pointers of another connected component (an exception being the
metadata for the invalid pointer which is discussed below), the global metadata
facilities RO, RP , and RF can be partitioned into N disjoint structures, where N is
the number of connected components in the DFPGU . Thus, all pointers in a connected
component n are assigned the metadata facilities RO(n), RP (n), and RF (n), and all
update and retrieval operations involving pointers in the nth connected component
make use of the nth set of metadata facilities.
When computing the DFPGU , the invalid pointer and edges incident with it
are removed from the graph in order to avoid representing an artificial flow of data
introduced by MemSafe’s analysis. Therefore, after partitioning the metadata facilities,
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a separate invalid pointer, represented by invalid(n), is created for each connected
component. This ensures that the metadata associated with the original invalid
pointer will not propagate to multiple connected components of the DFPGU .
The following code fragment demonstrates the application of the Partitioned
Metadata Optimization (PMO) using the running code example. Below, the source
code is shown after converting the PBC within the loop body to a MARC in the loop
pre-header by applying the monotonically addressed ranges optimization. Also, since a
multithreaded program is assumed for this example, thread synchronization primitives
have been added to control access to the metadata facilities.
Example 5.6—Partitioned Metadata Optimization:
1: struct { ... int array[100]; ... } s;
if (pthread_rwlock_wrlock(&object_lock) != 0) {
abort("Unable to acquire write lock for metadata facility");
}
RO(n) = RO(n) ∪ {(id ∈ I, 〈&s, &s + sizeof(s)〉)}  Object metadata facility
pthread_rwlock_unlock(&object_lock); partitioned into N
2: ... disjoint structures
3: int *p0 = &(s.array[42]);
4: int *q0 = &(s.array[0]);
〈addr, id〉p0 = 〈addr ∈ A, ids〉
M [addrp0 ]← 〈&s.array[0], sizeof(s.array), idp0〉
〈addr, id〉q0 = 〈addr ∈ A, ids〉
M [addrq0 ]← 〈&s.array[0], sizeof(s.array), idq0〉
5: ...
6: *p0 = x;
7: ...
8: int i1;
MARC(q0, sizeof(int), addrq0, idq0, 42-n);
9: do {
10: int i0 = φ(0, i1);
11: if (i0 < 42-n) {
12: int *q1 = q0 + i0;
〈addr, id〉q1 = 〈addr, id〉q0
13: *q1 = *p0;




17: i1 = i0+1;
18: } while (1);
After the allocation in line 1, an entry for the object metadata associated with s is
added to the nth object metadata facility RO(n). Here, it is assumed that the address of
s does not flow into any pointers other than the ones in the example. Thus, p0, q0, and
q1 are represented in the same connected component of the DFPGU . Since it is also
assumed that no other threads of execution access RO(n), the thread synchronization
primitives surrounding the update operation after line 1 are eliminated.
5.2.6 Unused metadata optimization
Metadata is unused if it is no longer required for performing safety checks that have
been removed with the above optimizations. Therefore, MemSafe removes such unused
metadata and the code required for its propagation. Metadata is deemed unused and
removed according to the following three rules, which are applied iteratively until all
unused metadata has been identified and eliminated:
1. Object metadata that is not directly used for a safety check is considered unused
and is removed. This includes the code that inserts object metadata into the
object metadata facility RO.
2. Pointer metadata that is not directly used for a safety check, stored in the RP
or RF metadata facilities, or copied to other pointers as a result of pointer
assignments or casts (see Section 4.3) is considered unused and is removed. This
includes pointer metadata retrieved from RP or RF with lookup operations.
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3. If all lookup operations for theRP orRF metadata facilities have been eliminated
for all pointers in a particular connected component of the DFPGU , all store
operations to that metadata facility involving the pointer metadata of any
pointer in the same connected component are also eliminated.
Since connected components in the DFPGU represent disjoint alias sets, the last rule
simply states that for a disjoint set of pointers that may alias, if none of these pointers
are ever used to retrieve metadata from RP or RF , then metadata does not need to
be associated with these pointers in the same metadata facility.
The following code fragment demonstrates the application of the Unused Metadata
Optimization (UMO) using the running code example. Below, the source code is
shown after converting the PBC within the loop body to a MARC in the loop pre-header
by applying the monotonically addressed ranges optimization.
Example 5.7—Unused Metadata Optimization:
1: struct { ... int array[100]; ... } s;
RO = RO ∪ {(id ∈ I, 〈&s, &s + sizeof(s)〉)}  Unused metadata can be
2: ... eliminated
3: int *p0 = &(s.array[42]);
4: int *q0 = &(s.array[0]);
〈addr, id〉p0 = 〈addr ∈ A, ids〉
M [addrp0 ]← 〈&s.array[0], sizeof(s.array), idp0〉
〈addr, id〉q0 = 〈addr ∈ A, ids〉
M [addrq0 ]← 〈&s.array[0], sizeof(s.array), idq0〉
5: ...
6: *p0 = x;
7: ...
8: int i1;
MARC(q0, sizeof(int), addrq0, idq0, 42-n);
9: do {
10: int i0 = φ(0, i1);
11: if (i0 < 42-n) {
12: int *q1 = q0 + i0;
〈addr, id〉q1 = 〈addr, id〉q0
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13: *q1 = *p0;
14: } else {
15: break;
16: }
17: i1 = i0+1;
18: } while (1);
Since all object bounds checks have been eliminated previously, the update of the
object metadata facility RO after the allocation in line 1 is eliminated. Similarly, since
the pointer bounds checks for the dereference of p0 and q1 have been eliminated, and
since the pointer metadata for p0 and q1 (defined after lines 4 and 12, respectively) is
not propagated through either RP or RF , it is removed as well. After applying all of
the above optimizations, the only code remaining that is required to enforce memory
safety is the definition of the pointer metadata for q0 after line 4, and the MARC before
line 9, which uses this metadata.
The unused metadata optimization is similar to, but not the same as, the well-known
dead code elimination optimization [7] in compiler theory. Dead code elimination is
used to remove code that is guaranteed to be never executed (unreachable code), and
code that operates on dead variables. Unreachable code is identified by inspecting
a program’s call and control-flow graphs. For example, a basic block that has no
immediate predecessors in the control-flow graph represents unreachable code. Dead
variables are variables that are defined but never used. Such unused variables are
trivial to identify in a program’s SSA form since each assignment is given a unique
name. If a defined value never appears on the right-hand side of an expression, the
value is never used, and it is safe to eliminate the assignment.
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However, the unused metadata optimization cannot be accomplished using dead
code elimination since the metadata, and the code inserted for its propagation, is
neither necessarily unreachable nor does it represent dead code. The inserted metadata
is assumed reachable since it is a requirement of the inserted safety checks, which
themselves are assumed reachable, and the code for metadata propagation, even if
all safety checks have been eliminated, is not dead code since RO, RP , and RF must
maintain state throughout the execution of a program. Thus, the unused metadata
optimization is an enhancement of traditional dead code elimination achieved through





Having described MemSafe’s approach for inserting and optimizing the runtime checks
needed for ensuring memory safety, this chapter describes the implementation of the
MemSafe compiler and the global data structures it requires for maintaining metadata.
Additionally, implementation issues related to the C language and the typical C
programming development process are also considered.
6.1 MemSafe’s Analysis and Transformation
MemSafe is implemented within the Low Level Virtual Machine (LLVM) [56] compiler
infrastructure. LLVM’s intermediate representation is a low-level, typed SSA [26] form
that is language-independent and also independent of any instruction set architecture.
Thus, the implementation of MemSafe’s transformation for ensuring memory safety is
not specific to a particular computer architecture, and in theory, could also be used to
enforce safety for languages other than C. However, MemSafe has not been tested for
this purpose. By default, MemSafe uses Andersen’s analysis [4] for interprocedural
flow- and context-insensitive points-to information, but MemSafe is compatible with
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any alias analysis implementation that operates within the LLVM infrastructure.
MemSafe consists of a collection of analyses and transformations that each con-
tribute a portion of the overall approach described in Chapter 4. These include:
1. An analysis and transformation that creates a temporary global variable for
representing the invalid pointer and assigns it to each pointer whose referent is
deallocated, as presented in Section 4.1.1. Pointers to deallocated objects are
identified by locating calls to free and by determining the local variables whose
addresses may escape the function in which they are defined. While MemSafe
conservatively assumes that the address of a variable escapes if it is saved in
another variable, an escape analysis (implemented as a client of alias analysis)
can be used to obtain more precise information.
2. An analysis and transformation that uses the results of alias analysis to insert
%-functions, as described in Section 4.1.2. For simplicity, %-functions are imple-
mented as calls to a variable-argument function since %-function arguments can
be of any (pointer) type and number.
Additionally, a simple reachability analysis is used to improve upon the results
of alias analysis. For example, consider the pointer store operation *ptr1 = p0
and the pointer load operation p1 = *ptr2. If alias analysis indicates that the
pointers ptr1 and ptr2 may alias, p0 would be added to the %-function inserted
for p1. However, if there is no control-flow path from the store operation to
the load operation, this is unnecessary since there is no program execution in
which the stored value can modify the loaded value. MemSafe does not include
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stored pointers in the %-functions inserted for loaded pointers if the store cannot
reach the load. Note that the imprecision of this approach is the result of the
flow-insensitivity of Andersen’s analysis and that MemSafe’s reachability analysis
does not result in a flow-sensitive alias analysis.
3. An analysis that constructs the DFPG for the transformed code, as described
in Section 5.1. The DFPG is made available to the remaining transformations.
4. An analysis and transformation that inserts the required runtime checks and
metadata for ensuring memory safety, according to the check insertion and
metadata propagation rules in Sections 4.2–4.3 and the optimizations in Section
5.2. The metadata facilities RO, RP , and RF are declared as global data
structures and code for their initialization is placed in main.
5. A pass that aggressively removes the inserted assignments of the invalid pointer
(but not its associated metadata) and all %-functions, since these are only used
for MemSafe’s analysis.
Each of the above analyses and transformations are run sequentially on a program
after it as been translated into LLVM’s intermediate form, linked, and optimized with
LLVM’s standard set of compiler optimizations. Applying MemSafe’s transformation
after LLVM’s optimizations improves the results of alias analysis and ensures that
MemSafe avoids inserting unnecessary checks. The same optimizations are run after
MemSafe has completed its transformation to further optimize the inserted checks
and to eliminate any dead code MemSafe may have introduced during its analysis.
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6.2 Metadata Facilities
The global facilities (RO, RP and RF) MemSafe requires for maintaining object
and pointer metadata can be implemented using any data structure that supports
efficient insertion, deletion, and retrieval operations. For simplicity and ease of
implementation, MemSafe uses dynamically resized hash tables for all three metadata
facilities. Collisions are resolved using separate chaining. Hash functions are a modulo
of the key with the size of the table, which becomes an efficient bitwise and operation
by restricting table sizes to powers of two.
The prototype implementation of MemSafe makes two simplifications in the process
described for creating pointer and object metadata. Fist, MemSafe acquires addresses
addr ∈ A for storing a pointer’s pointer metadata using malloc, and this storage is
released back to the system using free when a pointer’s metadata is updated to be
that of the invalid pointer. Second, MemSafe acquires a unique id ∈ I, which is used
as a key for the object metadata facility by incrementing a global counter. While this
ensures that each generated id is unique, this places a finite limitation on the number
of objects that can be allocated by a program. However, note that a 4GHz computer
would take 136 years to overflow a 64-bit counter allocating a new object on every
clock cycle.
6.2.1 Implementation alternatives
Although the prototype implementation of MemSafe utilizes hash tables for maintaining
the required metadata, other implementations are possible. In particular, tries [38]
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can often be used as an alternative to hash tables. A trie is a prefix tree data structure
in which the position of a node in the tree indicates the key with which the node’s
data is associated. Tries are useful for implementing associative containers because
the time required for performing insertion, deletion, and retrieval operations is O(m),
where m is the length of a key. Although a hash table is capable of performing these
operations in constant time, complex hash functions, key collisions, and table resizing
can, in the worst case, degrade their performance to O(n) time, where n is the number
of keys. Tries are also simpler than hash tables to implement effectively, and they are
commonly used for implementing dictionaries and spell checking algorithms.
Splay trees can also be used instead of hash tables for implementing MemSafe’s
metadata facilities. A splay tree [78] is a self-optimizing binary search tree in which
the frequently accessed nodes are moved towards the root of the tree, where they
become quick to access again. The insertion, deletion, and retrieval operations of a
splay tree are each performed in O(log n) amortized time, where n is the number of
nodes in the tree. When accessing a node, a special splaying operation is performed
that uses a sequence of tree rotations to place the accessed node at the root of the
tree. Because of this self-optimizing property, if used to maintain metadata, splay
trees can mimic a program’s locality of reference and ensure the base and bound
information of the most frequently dereferenced pointers is kept near the root of the
tree. Another advantage of splay trees is that, because their elements are sorted,
they can be used to perform range lookups, which can be useful for some forms of
metadata propagation (see Section A.1 for an example). Splay trees are commonly
used to implement software caches and garbage collection algorithms.
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While the above design alternatives apply to all three metadata facilities, the
function metadata facility RF could also be implemented using a stack instead of an
associate container. Just like parameters are passed to functions by pushing them
onto the call stack, the 〈addr, id〉 pointer metadata associated with pointer arguments
could be pushed onto a disjoint shadow stack before procedure calls. A callee could
then pop the required metadata from the top of the shadow stack at the beginning of
the procedure. The advantage of this approach is its simplicity: although the hash
table is an effective implementation of the function metadata facility, a stack-based
approach would likely require less memory overhead and the insertion, deletion, and
retrieval operations would be more predictable in runtime.
As a final implementation alternative, pointer metadata could be passed to functions
through the use of additional arguments. In order to do so, each function accepting
pointer arguments must be replaced with an equivalent function accepting an additional
metadata argument for each of its original pointer arguments. While this approach is
essentially a stack-based model, it eliminates the need for maintaining a separate data
structure for RF . However, the requirement to modify function prototypes would
complicate interfacing with variadic functions and pre-compiled libraries.
6.3 Metadata Allocation
Since the metadata associated with pointers is propagated at pointer assignments,
it can be efficiently allocated locally using automatic memory that is disjoint from
the pointers with which it is associated. However, the metadata that is maintained
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in the global metadata facilities requires dynamic storage. To avoid the runtime
cost associated with dynamic memory management, MemSafe initially sizes the RP
and RF metadata facilities large enough such that the need to dynamically allocate
additional storage is a rare occurrence.
MemSafe makes the following improvement to the above approach for lowering the
dynamic allocation overhead of the object metadata facilityRO. Since object metadata
exists in RO only for as long as the object it is associated with is allocated, the storage
space required for object metadata can be located with the objects. For stack-allocated
objects, their corresponding object metadata can be efficiently allocated on the stack,
and a pointer to this structure can be maintained in RO. For an object allocated on
the heap, instead of requiring the program to perform an additional call to malloc
to allocate the storage needed for the metadata, MemSafe transforms the program
such that the object’s metadata is maintained in a header structure appended to the
beginning of the allocated region.
Figure 6.1 demonstrates MemSafe’s transformation for lowering the runtime cost
associated with dynamically allocating object metadata. In the original code frag-
ment (a), an array of ten of structures is allocated dynamically with malloc, and
then this object is later deallocated with free. The metadata associated with array
(not shown) must be dynamically allocated and inserted into RO.
In the transformed code (b), line 1 computes the storage space required for the
original array plus one header structure h for storing array’s object metadata. In line
2, a region of memory is allocated and the pointer header is created to point to the
metadata structure. This pointer is incremented by the size of one header structure in
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1: array = (struct s*) malloc(10 * sizeof(struct s));
...
2: free(array);
(a) Original source code
1: size = 10 * sizeof(struct s) + sizeof(struct h);
2: header = (struct h*) malloc(size);
3: array = (struct s*) (header + 1);
4: header->base = (void*) array;
5: header->bound = (void*) (array + 10);
6: header->id = id;
...
7: header = ((struct h*) array) - 1;
8: free(header);
(b) Transformed source code






Figure 6.1: Header allocation. The original source code (a)
is transformed (b) to efficiently allocate memory for the header
and initialize the object metadata. The memory layout (c) of the
resulting allocation contains enough padding to hold the header
in addition to the original data.
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line 3 to obtain a pointer to the array. Lines 4–6 store the metadata of array in the
header structure, and a pointer to this structure is maintained in RO (not shown). In
order to deallocate the array, the base address of the allocated object is computed in
line 7, and in line 8, this address is used to deallocate the entire region. Note that the
object metadata for array would have been unmapped in RO before the call to free
(see Section 4.3). The resulting memory layout (c) of the entire structure shows the
location of the two pointers.
6.4 Limitations
Although MemSafe’s method of ensuring the memory safety of C is complete and
compatible with most programs, given C’s weak typing guarantees and the typical
application development process, in practice, MemSafe is not free from limitations.
For example, the implementation of MemSafe currently does not support inline
assembly instructions and does not allow self-modifying code. For programs requiring
assembly, MemSafe could be extended with the appropriate rules for handling these
instructions, but this would likely limit the effectiveness of MemSafe’s optimizations.
Self-modifying code is now commonly disabled by default in most modern operation
systems. Additional limitations of MemSafe’s implementation are discussed below.
6.4.1 Separate compilation
MemSafe’s most significant limitation is its use of whole-program analysis to limit the
number of required checks and to avoid unnecessary metadata propagation. Although
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analyzing the entire program is essential for reducing the cost of software-provided
memory safety, it negates the advantages of separate compilation, and can be prob-
lematic for use in common build environments. However, MemSafe’s whole-program
analysis, which is based the construction of the DFPG, is not required for enforcing
safety. The checks and metadata propagation described in Sections 4.2–4.3 are fully
compatible with separate compilation, and MemSafe’s optimizations can be turned
off for programs where whole-program analysis is infeasible. Chapter 7 presents
performance overheads with and without using whole-program analysis.
6.4.2 NULL and manufactured pointers
Pointers that are NULL or defined as a type-cast from a non-pointer type cannot be
associated with a valid object. Therefore, MemSafe sets the base and bound of such
pointers to be equal to that of the invalid pointer. Although this may result in false
positives, they have been observed to be rare occurrences in practice. For reading and
writing to memory-mapped I/O locations, MemSafe requires a target’s backend to




Having discussed the prototype implementation of the MemSafe compiler, this chapter
presents a thorough evaluation of MemSafe’s approach for ensuring the memory
safety of C programs at runtime. Specifically, this chapter evaluates (1) MemSafe’s
completeness by demonstrating that it is capable of detecting known memory safety
violations in several large programs, (2) MemSafe’s runtime cost by measuring its
runtime overhead on a variety of programs and comparing this slowdown with that of
prior methods, and (3) the effectiveness of MemSafe’s static analysis by measuring
quantities related to MemSafe’s data-flow representation and the number of required
checks and performed optimizations.
In performing the above evaluation, it will be demonstrated that MemSafe is
compatible with a variety of C programs and that it does not require any source
code modifications or programmer intervention. Additionally, it will be shown that
MemSafe’s key contributions—namely, the modeling of temporal violations as spatial
violations, the use of a hybrid metadata representation, and MemSafe’s data-flow
representation—are effective tools for reducing the runtime cost of dynamically ensuring
memory safety.
137
Benchmark Size Detected All
Suite Program LOC Derefs
BugBench 099.go 29246 16632 yes
129.compress 1934 232 yes
bc-1.06 14288 2474 yes
gzip-1.2.4 9076 1722 yes
ncompress-4.2.4 1922 838 yes
polymorph-0.4.0 716 65 yes
Table 7.1: Violations detected in BugBench. MemSafe’s ability to detect all
memory violations in the BugBench [60] programs is demonstrated. Program size is
measured in lines of code (LOC) and the number of static dereferences.
7.1 Effectiveness in Detecting Errors
To provide evidence of its completeness and ability to detect real errors, MemSafe was
evaluated on programs containing known memory errors from the BugBench [60] suite
of programs. BugBench is a collection of programs containing various documented
software bugs that was expressly created to evaluate the effectiveness of error detection
tools. Table 7.1 shows that MemSafe is capable of detecting all known memory
errors in six programs from BugBench. BugBench programs that were excluded from
Table 7.1 include programs that only contain errors that are not related to spatial
or temporal safety (e.g., memory leaks and race conditions). Thus, the programs in
Table 7.1 are representative of all memory safety violations in BugBench. The size of
each program is given in lines of code (LOC) and the number of static dereferences.
MemSafe’s ability to detect real-world memory violations was further validated by
it compiling two large applications and successfully detecting the known memory errors.
Table 7.2 summarizes the memory safety violations detected by MemSafe in various
versions of the Apache HTTP server [6] and the GNU Core Utilities [39] software
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Application Version LOC Component Detected Violation
Apache HTTP Server∗ 2.0.39 262487 mod_ext_filter null dereference
2.0.40 266741 mod_env null dereference
2.0.46 282682 mod_ssl dangling pointer
2.0.48 284627 mod_ssl null dereference
2.0.50 262266 mod_rewrite buffer overflow
2.0.52 263513 mod_auth_ldap null dereference
2.0.54 265243 mod_auth_ldap null dereference
2.0.59 267783 mod_rewrite uninitialized pointer
2.2.0 310283 mod_proxy double free
2.2.2 311235 mod_dbd double free
2.2.6 314531 mod_proxy_balancer buffer overflow
2.2.8 316713 mod_log_config null dereference
2.2.9 332867 mod_ldap null dereference
2.3.4 206590 mod_proxy null dereference
GNU Core Utilities† 5.2.1 103659 fts double free
5.2.1 103659 copy buffer overflow
5.2.1 103659 who buffer overflow
5.3.0 107147 cut double free
5.9.0 112781 regexec buffer overflow
6.10 69491 mkfifo null dereference
6.10 69491 mknod null dereference
6.10 69491 ptx buffer overflow
Table 7.2: Violations detected in real-world applications. MemSafe’s ability
to detect known real-world memory violations in the Apache HTTP Server [6] and
GNU Core Utilities [39] software package is demonstrated. Program size is measured
in lines of code (LOC).
∗Source of violations: https://issues.apache.org/bugzilla/
†Source of violations: http://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/bug-coreutils/
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package. The Apache HTTP server is a widely-used open source web server, and the
GNU Core Utilities is a GNU software package that provides the basic text, shell, and
file utilities (e.g., cat, expr, and cp) common among virtually all Unix-like operating
systems. To reproduce the known errors in these programs, the online development
archive and bug database of each was consulted in order to identify particular versions
of the software that contain memory safety violations and the runtime conditions
necessary for producing them. Having discovered the known violations, MemSafe was
then used to compile each version of the software, and the programs were executed to
verify that the inserted runtime checks successfully detected the violations. The size
of each program in Table 7.2 is given in lines of code.
7.2 Runtime Performance
MemSafe’s increase in runtime and memory consumption was measured on a total
of 30 programs from the Olden [71], PtrDist [9] and SPEC [79] benchmark suites.
Programs from Olden and PtrDist suites are known for being memory allocation
intensive, while those from SPEC are larger and generally more computationally
intensive. The programs were executed on a system running the Ubuntu 8.04 LTS
Desktop operating system with Linux kernel version 2.6.24. The system contains a
single 3GHz Pentium 4 processor and 2GB of main memory. Program execution times
were determined by taking the lowest of three times obtained using the GNU/Linux
time command, and memory usage was measured by instrumenting all allocation and
deallocation instructions to record the number of allocated objects and their sizes.
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Due in part to LLVM’s research-quality implementation of Andersen’s analysis, the
current implementation of MemSafe is not yet robust enough to compile the entire set
of SPEC benchmarks. The results presented in this section pertain to the subset that
MemSafe correctly compiles.
7.2.1 Increase in runtime
Table 7.3 summarizes the runtime and memory consumption overheads of MemSafe’s
fully optimized approach. While this section discusses the increase in runtime of
programs compiled with MemSafe’s safety checks, the discussion of their increase in
memory consumption is deferred until Section 7.2.2.
The “Runtime” and “Slowdown” columns of Table 7.3 show that MemSafe ensured
complete spatial and temporal safety for all 30 programs with an average overhead
of 88%. In general, MemSafe’s overhead was observed to be comparable to that of
CCured [64]: on the allocation intensive Olden benchmarks, MemSafe’s overhead
was 29% versus CCured’s 30%, and on CCured’s entire set of reported benchmarks,
MemSafe overhead was 69% versus CCured’s 80%. Not including bc (on which
CCured’s overhead was particularly high) reduces these to 65% and 30%, respectively.
While the runtime cost of MemSafe is similar to that of CCured, MemSafe does
not incur the drawbacks associated with the use of CCured—the need for manual
modifications and the compatibility issues arising from the use of “fat pointer.” Due
to CCured’s need for manual code modifications, results for CCured on additional
programs were not obtained.
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Benchmark Size Runtime (s) Memory (MB) Slowdown
Suite Program LOC Derefs Base MemSafe Base MemSafe MemSafe CCured MSCC
Olden bh 2073 284 4.64 5.34 14.67 17.70 1.15 1.44 2.82
bisort 350 76 1.31 1.59 214.73 275.12 1.21 1.45 1.76
em3d 688 187 5.11 6.95 54.84 55.15 1.36 1.87 1.79
health 502 236 0.47 0.70 36.63 53.61 1.48 1.29 2.72
mst 428 57 0.31 0.36 24.90 24.92 1.17 1.06 1.76
perimeter 484 258 0.36 0.48 37.33 80.12 1.34 1.09 3.37
power 622 285 4.09 4.70 2.91 5.14 1.15 1.07 1.22
treeadd 245 26 0.38 0.59 48.00 182.92 1.55 1.10 3.23
tsp 582 194 3.83 4.44 144.00 278.65 1.16 1.15 2.28
average 716 178 2.28 2.79 64.22 108.15 1.29 1.30 2.33
PtrDist anagram 650 113 1.56 2.96 0.24 0.25 1.90 1.43 –
bc 7297 3927 1.34 3.15 0.72 0.72 2.35 9.91 –
ft 1766 246 2.04 3.61 3.24 9.20 1.77 1.03 –
ks 782 239 1.54 2.97 0.02 0.09 1.93 1.11 –
yacr2 3986 1000 1.96 5.98 29.88 30.17 3.05 1.56 –
average 2896 1105 1.69 3.73 6.82 8.09 2.20 3.01 –
SPEC’95 099.go 29246 16632 0.62 1.26 0.00 0.01 2.03 1.22 2.60
129.compress 1934 232 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 2.20 1.17 1.85
130.li 7597 4905 0.06 0.12 19.91 19.91 1.93 1.70 –
147.vortex 67202 25135 0.00 0.00 96.41 96.41 – – –
average 26495 11726 0.17 0.35 29.08 29.08 2.05 1.36 –
SPEC’00 164.gzip 8605 1499 20.72 43.10 187.93 187.94 2.08 – 1.46
175.vpr 17729 5386 8.34 16.26 44.35 44.37 1.95 – 3.53
181.mcf 2412 534 11.34 21.89 99.86 99.46 1.93 – 2.85
186.crafty 24975 7579 14.93 34.94 7.09 7.14 2.34 – –
255.vortex 67213 25134 3.96 8.28 96.46 96.46 2.09 – –
256.bzip2 4649 1254 22.33 45.55 191.95 191.96 2.04 – –
300.twolf 20459 11741 7.52 15.34 6.39 12.74 2.04 – –
average 20863 7590 12.73 26.48 90.58 91.49 2.07 – –
SPEC’06 401.bzip2 8293 4013 6.20 17.55 855.79 855.79 2.83 – –
445.gobmk 197215 27614 0.29 0.66 28.50 28.66 2.27 – –
456.hmmr 35992 7582 7.82 17.52 59.82 59.89 2.24 – –
458.sjeng 13847 5832 10.12 22.26 179.63 179.64 2.20 – –
473.astar 5842 1873 0.00 0.00 313.15 313.15 – – –
average 52238 9383 4.89 11.60 287.38 287.43 2.39 – –
Average 18394 5136 4.77 9.62 93.31 106.92 1.88 – –
Table 7.3: Dynamic results with whole-program analysis. Program size is
measured in lines of code and the number of static dereferences, runtime is measured in
seconds, and memory consumption is measured in megabytes. Slowdown is computed
as the ratio of the execution time of the instrumented program to that of the original
program. Slowdown for MemSafe with all optimizations is shown in comparison with
CCured [64] and MSCC [82] where results are available.
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Benchmark Size Runtime (s) Memory (MB) Slowdown
Suite Program LOC Derefs Base MemSafe Base MemSafe MemSafe CCured MSCC
Olden bh 2073 284 5.00 9.35 14.67 19.52 1.87 1.44 2.82
bisort 350 76 1.32 5.77 214.73 294.74 4.37 1.45 1.76
em3d 688 187 5.22 7.41 54.84 55.39 1.42 1.87 1.79
health 502 236 0.46 2.36 36.63 57.96 5.12 1.29 2.72
mst 428 57 0.30 0.38 24.90 24.93 1.26 1.06 1.76
perimeter 484 258 0.36 1.83 37.33 90.67 5.09 1.09 3.37
power 622 285 4.09 4.83 2.91 5.94 1.18 1.07 1.22
treeadd 245 26 0.38 2.09 48.00 208.00 5.51 1.10 3.23
tsp 582 194 3.83 19.04 144.00 304.00 4.97 1.15 2.28
average 716 178 2.33 5.89 64.22 117.91 3.42 1.30 2.33
PtrDist anagram 650 113 1.57 2.97 0.24 0.25 1.89 1.43 –
bc 7297 3927 1.34 4.03 0.72 0.73 3.01 9.91 –
ft 1766 246 2.05 3.63 3.24 11.15 1.77 1.03 –
ks 782 239 1.54 3.33 0.02 0.09 2.16 1.11 –
yacr2 3986 1000 1.97 6.15 29.88 30.20 3.12 1.56 –
average 2896 1105 1.69 4.02 6.82 8.49 2.39 3.01 –
SPEC’95 099.go 29246 16632 0.62 1.25 0.00 0.01 2.02 1.22 2.60
129.compress 1934 232 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 1.78 1.17 1.85
130.li 7597 4905 0.06 0.20 19.91 19.92 3.32 1.70 –
147.vortex 67202 25135 0.00 0.00 96.41 96.42 – – –
average 26495 11726 0.17 0.37 29.08 29.09 2.37 1.36 –
SPEC’00 164.gzip 8605 1499 20.75 43.99 187.93 187.94 2.12 – 1.46
175.vpr 17729 5386 8.39 27.27 44.35 44.37 3.25 – 3.53
181.mcf 2412 534 11.28 30.79 99.86 99.86 2.73 – 2.85
186.crafty 24975 7579 14.95 42.91 7.09 7.15 2.87 – –
255.vortex 67213 25134 3.95 21.73 96.46 96.46 5.50 – –
256.bzip2 4649 1254 22.30 53.74 191.95 191.96 2.41 – –
300.twolf 20459 11741 7.51 30.94 6.39 14.71 4.12 – –
average 20863 7590 12.73 35.91 90.58 91.78 3.29 – –
SPEC’06 401.bzip2 8293 4013 6.23 24.23 855.79 855.79 3.89 – –
445.gobmk 197215 27614 0.30 0.99 28.50 28.77 3.30 – –
456.hmmr 35992 7582 7.82 28.00 59.82 59.89 3.58 – –
458.sjeng 13847 5832 10.11 30.23 179.63 179.64 2.99 – –
473.astar 5842 1873 0.00 0.00 313.15 313.15 – – –
average 52238 9383 4.89 16.69 287.38 287.45 3.44 – –
Average 18394 5136 4.79 13.65 93.31 109.99 3.09 – –
Table 7.4: Dynamic results with separate compilation. Program size is mea-
sured in lines of code and the number of static dereferences, runtime is measured in
seconds, and memory consumption is measured in megabytes. Slowdown is computed
as the ratio of the execution time of the instrumented program to that of the original
program. Slowdown for MemSafe with all optimizations is shown in comparison with





























Spatial Safety: MSCC MemSafe
Figure 7.1: Runtime comparison with MSCC. Slowdown for MemSafe and
MSCC [82] is shown for spatial and temporal and spatial-only safety.
Additionally, MemSafe demonstrated a significant and consistent improvement
over the reported performance of MSCC [82], the tool with the lowest overhead among
all existing complete and automatic methods that detect both spatial and temporal
errors. On the Olden benchmarks, MemSafe’s average overhead (29%) was roughly
1/4 that of MSCC (133%), and on the entire set of MSCC’s reported benchmarks,
MemSafe’s overhead (44%) was roughly 1/3 that of MSCC (137%).
In order to provide a direct comparison with MSCC (instead of relying on published
results) on the same computer hardware, an attempt was made to compile our entire
set of benchmarks with MSCC. However, perhaps due to MSCC having not been
actively maintained since its publication, it was found to be difficult to compile
MemSafe’s entire set of 30 benchmarks with MSCC. Figure 7.1 compares the slowdown
of MemSafe’s fully optimized approach for spatial and temporal safety with that
of MSCC on the set of benchmarks MSCC compiled correctly. MemSafe’s average
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overhead for these benchmarks (74%) was roughly 1/6 that of MSCC (486%). While
these results show a dramatic increase in runtime overhead for MSCC, the overall
trend is similar to the reported results for MSCC shown in Table 7.3. Comparisons
with additional methods on the Olden benchmarks is presented in Section 1.2.
MemSafe’s optimized approach improves the runtime cost required for memory
safety in comparison to that of prior work for the following reasons: (1) MemSafe’s
data-flow representation enables performance-enhancing optimizations that reduce
overhead from 253% to 88% (explained later). (2) MemSafe’s modeling of temporal
errors as spatial errors, combined with a hybrid metadata representation, enables
MemSafe to ensure temporal safety with only a 10% increase in the overhead of spatial
safety alone (also explained later). In particular, MemSafe’s large improvement versus
MSCC on the Olden benchmarks is due to the fact that these programs deallocate all
dynamically allocated memory at once before terminating. Thus, by determining that
there is no control-flow path from the deallocation to other points in the program,
MemSafe is able to eliminate the propagation of the metadata associated with the
invalid pointer and remove all object bounds checks. Deallocated memory at the end
of a program is a common programming style when objects are required to have an
unlimited lifespan or when memory reallocation is not needed.
Table 7.4 summarizes, in the same way as Table 7.3, the runtime performance of
MemSafe’s fully optimized approach, but when limited by disabling whole-program-
analysis. Moreover, MemSafe was instructed to not use interprocedural information
when inserting the required runtime checks and code for propagating metadata.
Thus, these results represent the worse-case execution time associated with separate
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compilation, since each function, in a sense, was processed as if it were contained in a
separate module. The “Slowdown” column of Table 7.4 shows that MemSafe’s average
runtime overhead increases to 209% overall and to 242% on the Olden benchmark
suite by disallowing interprocedural analysis.
To explain the seemingly large increase in MemSafe’s runtime overhead when
restricted to separate compilation, note that while not being true whole-program
analyses themselves, both CCured and MSCC link the intermediate representation
of separately processed files together to form one monolithic representation of the
program before generating object code. Thus, the compiler backend of each of
these tools benefits from interprocedural information when performing optimizations.
Interprocedural optimization was completely disabled to obtain the runtime overheads
for MemSafe’s approach presented in Table 7.4.
7.2.2 Increase in memory consumption
The “Memory” column of Table 7.3 reports the memory consumption of each pro-
gram when compiled with the LLVM compiler and when compiled with MemSafe.
MemSafe ensured complete spatial and temporal safety for all 30 programs with an
average increase in memory of 13.61MB, which is equal to 48.60% of the programs’
original memory requirements. MemSafe’s average memory consumption overhead is
significantly higher for the Olden (73.52%) and PtrDist (130.32%) benchmark suites
compared to the three SPEC (8.46%) benchmark suites. Since MemSafe requires
the metadata of each allocated object to be mapped in the object metadata facility,
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allocation intensive programs, like those in the Olden and PtrDist suites, can be
expected to require more memory for maintaining metadata than computationally
intensive programs. In particular, the memory required for MemSafe’s metadata is
determined by the number of allocated objects rather than their total size.
Table 7.4 shows MemSafe’s increase in memory consumption when whole-program-
analysis is disabled. Without the full effectiveness of MemSafe’s optimizations for
eliminating unnecessary checks and metadata, MemSafe’s average memory consump-
tion increases from 13.61MB to 16.67MB (57.77%).
7.2.3 Effectiveness of optimizations
Figure 7.2 shows that MemSafe’s optimizations and whole-program analysis are
effective tools for reducing the runtime overhead required for ensuring memory safety.
Shown in the “Average” histogram, MemSafe’s optimizations reduced its average
runtime overhead from 253% to 88%. Since the optimization for dominated dereferences
(DDO) is minimally effective, it is presented in Figure 7.2 as the baseline. The
optimization for temporally-safe dereferences (TDO) reduced overhead by 102%, and
the optimization for non-incremental dereferences (NDO) reduced overhead by 37%.
Combined with the optimization for unused metadata, which is included with both,
NDO and TDO accounted for the greatest reduction in overhead. The optimization for
monotonically addressed ranges (MRO) was marginally effective and reduced overhead
by only 1%.
Figure 7.3 shows the effectiveness of MemSafe’s optimizations without utilizing
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whole-program analysis. When restricted to not use interprocedural information,
MemSafe’s optimizations reduced the overhead from 253% to 209%. TDO reduced
overhead by 11%, NDO reduced overhead by 7%, and MRO reduced overhead by
an additional 2%. Hence, MemSafe’s average overhead with separate compilation
was 209% versus 88% with whole-program analysis. MemSafe’s seemingly large
improvement in runtime overhead when given the ability to perform interprocedural
optimizations is not by chance: By representing memory deallocation and pointer
stores as direct assignments, MemSafe makes whole-program optimizations much more
effective. Thus, MemSafe’s overheads are lower than those of existing methods that
cannot benefit in this way.
7.2.4 Additional cost of temporal safety
Figure 7.2 also quantifies the additional runtime cost required for MemSafe to ensure
temporal safety. The last bar in the “Average” histogram shows that MemSafe’s
overhead for both spatial and temporal safety (88%) is comparable to the runtime
overhead MemSafe requires for ensuring spatial safety alone (80%). Thus, for the
30 programs tested, MemSafe ensured complete temporal safety with a modest 10%
increase in the average overhead for achieving spatial safety alone.
Finally, the additional cost of ensuring temporal safety with MemSafe is a significant
reduction in the cost of achieving temporal safety with MSCC. On MSCC’s set of
reported benchmarks, the additional cost of ensuring temporal safety with MemSafe







































Figure 7.4: Effect of aliasing. The average number of %-nodes modifiable by each
pointer store is shown with Andersen’s alias analysis versus no alias analysis.
safety (62%) by a factor of 62. For the set of programs that were successfully compiled
with MSCC on the same platform as MemSafe (shown in Figure 7.1), the additional
cost of ensuring temporal safety with MemSafe (13%) is a reduction in the additional
runtime cost required for MSCC to ensure temporal safety (114%) by a factor of nearly
9. Thus, while the overheads for MemSafe are much lower than that of MSCC, the
difference in the additional overhead required to achieve temporal safety is further
evidence that by modeling temporal errors as spatial errors, MemSafe’s optimizations
are effective tools for reducing the additional cost of temporal safety.
7.3 Static analysis
The “Checks,” “Opts.,” and “DFPG” columns of Table 7.5 describe results related
to MemSafe’s whole-program analysis. First, the “Checks” column shows the static
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Benchmark Size Checks (%) Opts. (%) DFPG
Suite Program LOC Derefs PBC OBC MARC DDO TDO NDO Invalid (%) %/Store
Olden bh 2073 284 19.01 0.00 1.76 27.11 70.07 52.11 0.00 7.19
bisort 350 76 9.21 0.00 0.00 35.53 64.47 55.26 0.00 9.93
em3d 688 187 31.55 0.00 3.21 7.49 82.35 57.75 0.00 1.84
health 502 236 22.46 0.00 0.00 15.25 84.32 62.29 0.00 3.42
mst 428 57 19.30 0.00 5.26 12.28 77.19 63.16 0.00 0.24
perimeter 484 258 19.77 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 80.23 0.00 142.61
power 622 285 37.89 0.00 0.00 22.46 75.79 39.65 0.00 0.00
treeadd 245 26 39.47 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 60.53 0.00 5.33
tsp 582 194 15.98 0.00 0.00 31.96 68.04 52.06 0.00 31.07
average 716 178 23.85 0.00 1.14 16.90 80.25 58.12 0.00 22.40
PtrDist anagram 650 113 33.63 0.00 0.00 21.24 52.21 45.13 0.00 0.29
bc 7297 3927 15.76 3.79 1.12 32.85 57.70 50.27 8.99 43.62
ft 1766 246 30.49 0.00 0.00 24.80 70.33 44.72 3.92 155.43
ks 782 239 28.03 0.00 0.00 27.62 49.37 44.35 0.00 13.71
yacr2 3986 1000 34.70 5.00 3.90 34.60 51.20 26.80 4.85 6.15
average 2896 1105 28.52 1.76 1.00 28.22 56.16 42.25 3.55 43.84
SPEC’95 099.go 29246 16632 57.54 0.00 5.96 25.44 11.06 11.06 0.00 –
129.compress 1934 232 16.38 0.00 4.74 40.95 37.93 37.93 0.00 4.13
130.li 7597 4905 14.92 0.00 0.06 27.26 70.89 57.76 0.00 694.18
147.vortex 67202 25135 7.35 0.25 0.04 34.36 64.25 58.25 13.18 1511.59
average 26495 11726 24.05 0.06 2.70 32.00 46.03 41.25 3.30 736.63
SPEC’00 164.gzip 8605 1499 21.35 0.47 4.34 44.70 30.02 29.62 0.96 3.79
175.vpr 17729 5386 21.59 0.32 2.32 22.08 71.67 54.01 7.07 14.52
181.mcf 2412 534 7.30 0.19 1.31 23.60 69.10 67.79 9.61 25.74
186.crafty 24975 7579 38.49 11.11 0.01 15.64 46.15 45.86 23.77 29.08
255.vortex 67213 25134 7.35 0.25 0.04 34.37 64.24 58.24 13.18 1511.61
256.bzip2 4649 1254 43.46 0.40 3.03 41.23 14.83 12.28 1.12 316.95
300.twolf 20459 11741 16.73 0.88 0.25 20.82 72.24 62.21 9.39 3.71
average 20863 7590 22.32 1.95 1.61 28.92 52.61 47.14 9.30 54.72
SPEC’06 401.bzip2 8293 4013 17.29 8.07 1.20 12.09 75.18 69.42 27.83 440.48
445.gobmk 197215 27614 38.51 8.52 1.96 19.49 41.80 40.05 12.70 209.98
456.hmmr 35992 7582 27.13 8.76 1.58 18.40 65.63 52.89 14.21 108.66
458.sjeng 13847 5832 26.29 2.54 0.22 28.21 48.47 45.28 18.37 80.29
473.astar 5842 1873 7.90 2.62 0.32 19.38 75.71 72.40 18.91 39.38
average 52238 9383 23.42 6.10 1.06 19.51 61.36 56.01 18.40 133.89
Average 18394 5136 24.23 1.77 1.42 24.04 62.07 50.31 6.48 177.68
Table 7.5: Static results with whole-program analysis. Program size is mea-
sured in lines of code and the number of static dereferences. The static number of
required checks and optimizations are measured as a percentage of dereferences. The
DFPG is measured by the percentage of nodes reachable from invalid and the average
number of %-nodes modifiable by each pointer store.
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Benchmark Size Checks (%) Opts. (%)
Suite Program LOC Derefs PBC OBC MARC DDO TDO NDO
Olden bh 2073 284 42.96 33.10 1.76 27.11 36.97 28.17
bisort 350 76 46.05 38.16 0.00 35.53 26.32 18.42
em3d 688 187 40.11 20.86 3.21 7.49 62.57 49.20
health 502 236 60.17 38.14 0.00 15.25 46.61 24.58
mst 428 57 31.58 14.04 5.26 12.28 64.91 50.88
perimeter 484 258 98.06 89.53 0.00 0.00 10.47 1.94
power 622 285 48.42 11.23 0.00 22.46 64.56 29.12
treeadd 245 26 63.16 31.58 0.00 0.00 68.42 36.84
tsp 582 194 64.95 59.28 0.00 31.96 8.76 3.09
average 716 178 55.05 37.32 1.14 16.90 43.29 26.92
PtrDist anagram 650 113 33.63 0.00 0.00 21.24 52.21 45.13
bc 7297 3927 39.62 31.65 1.12 32.85 30.00 26.41
ft 1766 246 30.49 0.00 0.00 24.80 70.33 44.72
ks 782 239 34.73 6.69 0.00 27.62 42.68 37.66
yacr2 3986 1000 42.00 22.40 3.90 34.60 33.90 19.50
average 2896 1105 36.09 12.15 1.00 28.22 45.82 34.68
SPEC’95 099.go 29246 16632 57.93 0.42 5.96 25.44 10.67 10.67
129.compress 1934 232 21.98 5.60 4.74 40.95 32.33 32.33
130.li 7597 4905 50.38 48.60 0.06 27.26 22.32 22.30
147.vortex 67202 25135 50.10 49.13 0.04 34.36 15.50 15.50
average 26495 11726 45.10 25.94 2.70 32.00 20.21 20.20
SPEC’00 164.gzip 8605 1499 23.08 2.54 4.34 44.70 28.09 27.89
175.vpr 17729 5386 53.47 46.05 2.32 22.08 26.90 22.13
181.mcf 2412 534 25.84 19.10 1.31 23.60 50.19 49.25
186.crafty 24975 7579 57.63 31.73 0.01 15.64 26.82 26.72
255.vortex 67213 25134 50.10 49.15 0.04 34.37 15.49 15.49
256.bzip2 4649 1254 45.06 3.67 3.03 41.23 11.56 10.69
300.twolf 20459 11741 58.08 48.09 0.25 20.82 25.14 20.86
average 20863 7590 44.75 28.62 1.61 28.92 26.31 24.72
SPEC’06 401.bzip2 8293 4013 83.85 79.79 1.20 12.09 3.46 2.87
445.gobmk 197215 27614 58.85 31.96 1.96 19.49 19.95 19.70
456.hmmr 35992 7582 63.60 55.01 1.58 18.40 21.79 16.42
458.sjeng 13847 5832 48.13 28.07 0.22 28.21 23.56 23.44
473.astar 5842 1873 54.40 51.90 0.32 19.38 26.70 25.89
average 52238 9383 61.77 49.35 1.06 19.51 19.09 17.66
Average 18394 5136 49.28 31.58 1.42 24.04 32.63 25.26
Table 7.6: Static results with separate compilation. Program size is measured
in lines of code and the number of static dereferences. The static number of required









































Figure 7.5: Compile-time slowdown. For each program, slowdown is computed
as the ratio of the compilation time required by MemSafe to that of the base LLVM
compiler using the default set of optimizations.
number of required checks, organized by check type, as a percentage of the static
number of total pointer dereferences. Second, the “Opts.” column shows the static
number of checks (i.e., PBC and OBC) that were eliminated by MemSafe’s optimizations,
organized by optimization type. Finally, the “DFPG” column summarizes the DFPG
with the percentage of nodes reachable from the node representing the invalid pointer
and with the %/store quantity. The former indicates the portion of pointers that may
refer to temporally invalid objects, and the latter indicates the average number of
loaded memory locations that each pointer store may potentially modify. Thus, these
two quantities are a static estimate of the uncertainty in pointer data-flow. Figure 7.4
demonstrates that Andersen’s alias analysis [4] is often capable of reducing %/store
by several orders of magnitude.
Table 7.6 shows the static number of required checks and the number of checks
that were eliminated with MemSafe’s optimizations when MemSafe’s whole-program
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analysis was disabled. Thus this represents the results of MemSafe’s static analysis
in a separate compilation development environment where it is unable to make use
of interprocedural information. Since the DFPG is only useful for interprocedural
optimization, Table 7.6 does not report the size or complexity of the DFPG.
Finally, Figure 7.5 shows MemSafe’s compile-time slowdown for each program.
Slowdown is computed as the ratio of the compilation time required by MemSafe
to that of the base LLVM compiler using default optimizations. In general, the
compile-time requirements of MemSafe are modest. For 93% of the benchmarked
programs (i.e., 28 out of 30), MemSafe was able to ensure memory safety with an
increase in compile-time by less than a factor of two. The compilation time required by
ft and 130.li surpassed this threshold due to the time required to query alias analysis
for each pair of pointer load and store instructions, which is needed for inserting
%-functions (see the algorithm for %-function insertion in Section 4.1.2.1). Despite these






Most prior techniques related to the enforcement of memory safety were presented in
Section 3.2 after having described the various types of spatial and temporal memory
errors. Therefore, this chapter will not repeat that content, but it will discuss additional
details for methods capable of detecting both spatial and temporal violations as well
as techniques that can only detect one type of error. This chapter also presents a
discussion of previous work related to MemSafe’s data-flow analysis.
8.1 Spatial and Temporal Safety
While generally not enforcing complete memory safety, several methods are capable
of detecting both spatial and temporal errors. Purify [43] operates on binaries, but
only ensures the safety of heap-allocated objects. Yong and Horwitz [83] present a
similar approach and improve its cost with static analysis, but this method only checks
store operations. Safe C [9] ensures complete safety but is incompatible due to its
use of fat-pointers. Patil and Fischer [68] address these issues by maintaining disjoint
metadata and performing checks in a separate “shadow process,” but this requires
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an additional CPU. CCured [64] utilizes a type system to eliminate checks for safe
pointers and reduce metadata bookkeeping. However, CCured’s use of fat-pointers
causes compatibility issues, and some programs require code modifications to lower
cost. MSCC [82] is highly compatible and complete but is unable to handle some
downcasts. Fail-Safe C [66] maintains complete compatibility with ANSI C but incurs
significant runtime overhead. Finally, Clause et al. [20] describe an efficient technique
for detecting memory errors, but it requires custom hardware.
8.2 Spatial Safety
Methods that primarily detect bounds violations are numerous. Notable is the work
by Jones and Kelly [49] since it maintains compatibility with pre-compiled libraries.
However, this method has high overhead and results in false positives. Ruwase and
Lam [74] extend this method to track out-of-bounds pointers to avoid false positives.
Additionally, Dhurjati and Adve [30] utilize Automatic Pool Allocation [55] to improve
cost, and Akritidis et al. [3] constrain the size and alignment of allocated regions to
further improve cost. However, these methods do not detect temporal violations and
are unable to detect sub-object overflows.
HardBound [28] is a hardware-assisted approach for ensuring spatial safety with
low overhead. This method encodes fat-pointers in a special “shadow space” and
provides architectural support for checking and propagating metadata. SoftBound
[62] is a related technique that records pointer metadata in disjoint data structures
similar to MemSafe’s representation. However, while these methods ensure complete
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spatial safety, they do not ensure temporal safety, and HardBound requires custom
hardware to achieve low overhead.
8.3 Temporal Safety
Few methods are designed primarily for detecting temporal violations. Dhurjati and
Adve [29] describe a technique based on the Electric Fence [69] malloc debugger:
Their system assigns a unique virtual page to every dynamically allocated object
and relies on hardware page protection to detect dangling pointer dereferences. This
approach is improved with Automatic Pool Allocation [55] and a customized address
mapping. However, this method does not detect spatial violations and only detects
temporal violations of heap objects. CETS [63] inserts temporal safety checks before
pointer dereferences and utilizes an efficient lock-and-key mechanism, instead of hash
tables, for accessing the required temporal metadata. However, this method also does
not detect spatial violations and must be combined with an existing spatial safety
mechanism in order to guarantee complete temporal safety.
8.4 Software Debugging Tools
While not intended for deployment in production-quality applications, automated
debugging tools can be used to detect some memory safety violations during software
development and testing. Valgrind [65] is a heavyweight dynamic binary instrumenta-
tion framework providing the Memcheck [75] tool for debugging memory accesses and
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leaks, and Mudflap [33] is a compiler approach for debugging memory accesses imple-
mented in the GCC [40] compiler infrastructure. However, these tools are incapable of
ensuring complete spatial and temporal memory safety and incur significant runtime
overheads. For example, both Memcheck and Mudflap are unable to detect spatial
safety errors where an out-of-bounds pointer to one object happens to fall within
bounds of another object. They are also unable to detect temporal safety errors when
the runtime system reallocates memory to a previously deallocated location. Moreover,
Memcheck does not aim to ensure spatial or temporal safety for stack-allocated objects
and increases runtime by a factor of 10–30.
8.5 Other Methods of Memory Protection
Several methods utilize software checks to enforce various security-related policies.
Abadi et al. [1] describe a technique to prevent software attacks by enforcing control-
flow integrity. Similarly, Castro et al. [17] enforce data-flow integrity with an analysis
based on reaching definitions, and WIT [2] enforces write-integrity by ensuring each
write operation accesses an object from a static set of legally modifiable objects.
Although these techniques are capable of preventing many memory access violations,
they do not ensure complete spatial and temporal safety.
DieHard [12] is a memory allocator capable of preventing many heap-related errors.
It uses random object placement within a larger-than-normal heap to prevent invalid
frees and probabilistically avoid heap buffer overflows. However, this method is
incapable of ensuring complete spatial and temporal safety.
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Other methods seek to provide minimal memory protection guarantees to programs
executed on systems lacking hardware virtual memory. Simpson et al. [76] developed
a low-overhead method for achieving memory segmentation using compiler-inserted
runtime checks. Like paging, segmented virtual memory is a common approach for
providing coarse-grained memory protection, and Appendix B shows how MemSafe’s
metadata propagation rules can be modified to achieve segment protection instead
of full memory safety. In another method, Biswas et al. [14] developed a technique
for avoiding out-of-memory errors with compiler-inserted runtime checks, memory
reuse, and the compression of unused data. Finally, Middha et al. [61] developed a
similar method for avoiding out-of-memory errors in embedded systems by sharing
stack space among the executing tasks of multitasking workloads.
8.6 SSA Extensions
Various methods have extended SSA [26] to incorporate alias information. IPSSA [59]
is an interprocedural, Gated SSA [67] that uses alias analysis to replace indirect stores
with φ-like functions whose semantics are similar to our %-function. However, IPSSA
represents all indirect stores as direct assignments, whereas MemSafe’s %-function
is only used for pointer stores. Other extensions include the χ- and µ-extensions
[19], which model may-def and may-use information, but unlike the %-function, do
not keep track of the defining values. Finally, Cytron and Gershbein [25] describe a
demand-driven algorithm that incrementally incorporates alias information with SSA





MemSafe is a whole-program compiler analysis and transformation for ensuring
the spatial and temporal memory safety of C programs. Although it is complete,
compatible, does not require any manual code modifications, and has lower runtime
cost than other methods, MemSafe is not without limitations, and additional work
can enhance it further. This chapter identifies several aspects of MemSafe in which
additional research is warranted. These areas include (1) MemSafe’s performance
overheads and the scope of its evaluation, (2) the specification and verification of
MemSafe’s transformations and optimizations, and (3) additional uses of MemSafe’s
core technology for tasks not directly related to ensuring the memory safety of C
programs.
9.1 Performance Enhancements and Evaluation
Although MemSafe’s performance overheads are, on average, lower than that of
existing complete and automatic methods that are capable of detecting both spatial and
temporal errors, they are not yet low enough for MemSafe to be used with performance-
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critical applications. In addition, while MemSafe has been evaluated on a set of
thirty benchmark programs and two large and widely-used open source applications,
performance overheads are, in general, application-dependent, and MemSafe’s current
results may be a poor indicator of its results for other commonly-used applications.
The following is a list of future work related to lowering MemSafe’s performance
overheads and improving its evaluation.
1. The implementation alternatives discussed in Section 6.2 for constructing Mem-
Safe’s global metadata facilities (i.e., RO, RP , and RF) should each be evaluated
in terms of their runtime overhead and memory usage. MemSafe’s prototype
implementation should then be updated to use the most efficient data structures,
which would lower the overall cost of maintaining the required metadata.
2. Additional optimizations for lowering MemSafe’s runtime overhead and memory
usage should be considered. The six optimizations presented in Section 5.2 are
not exhaustive, and additional optimizations could have a significant impact on
MemSafe’s average performance overheads. An effective means of discovering
potential optimization opportunities is to instrument the applications exhibiting
high runtime with profiling instructions that help to determine the source of
their overhead.
3. Sophisticated static analysis techniques should be investigated for lowering
MemSafe’s runtime overhead and memory usage. In particular, while MemSafe’s
static analysis currently only relies on a flow- and context-insensitive alias
analysis, more precise analyses [e.g. 13] may yield fewer runtime checks and
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metadata propagation.
4. MemSafe’s performance overheads should be evaluated on multithreaded pro-
grams. Given the current proliferation of multi-core and multiprocessor CPUs,
the multithreading paradigm has emerged as the dominant concurrent program-
ming and execution model. While Section 4.4 ensures MemSafe’s metadata
facilities and runtime checks are thread safe, the runtime cost of the required
thread synchronization primitives has yet to be evaluated in a multithreaded
environment.
9.2 Specification and Verification
In addition to lowering MemSafe’s performance overheads and improving its evalua-
tion, additional work would be useful for increasing the number of programs to which
MemSafe can be applied and guaranteeing the correctness of MemSafe’s transforma-
tions. The following is a list of future work related to the specification of MemSafe’s
metadata propagation rules and their verification.
1. Additional metadata propagation rules should be devised for handling inline
assembly instructions and self-modifying code. Although programs utilizing
these features are uncommon, extending MemSafe with the necessary rules would
increase the number of programs to which MemSafe could be applied. However,
as mentioned in Section 6.4, MemSafe’s optimizations would likely be of little
benefit to such programs, so the runtime cost of ensuring their memory safety is
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expected to be high.
2. MemSafe’s program transformations and optimizations should be formally veri-
fied in order to prove their correctness. Related work in this regard has provided
formalisms of spatial safety [62, 64], temporal safety [63], and static mem-
ory safety analyses based on the results of flow- and context-insensitive alias
analysis [22], which could serve as a starting point.
9.3 Additional Uses
Although MemSafe has been demonstrated to be an effective tool for ensuring the
memory safety of C programs, the technology developed for MemSafe could be useful
in other contexts. The following is a list of future work that could potentially reuse
some or all of MemSafe’s main components for performing tasks not directly related
to ensuring the memory safety of C programs.
1. MemSafe should be evaluated on its ability to prevent the exploitation of security
vulnerabilities and to thwart attempts at malicious attacks. As mentioned in
Section 1, many, if not all, security vulnerability exploits rely on some form of
memory access violation (e.g., a buffer overflow error) in order for an attacker to
perform a malicious act. Since MemSafe can ensure a program’s memory safety,
it could also be used as a defense against such attacks.
2. The current implementation of MemSafe is capable of ensuring memory safety
for programming languages other than C, and its effectiveness in doing so should
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be evaluated. Since LLVM’s intermediate representation is source language
independent, MemSafe can ensure the memory safety of any language that
can be compiled by LLVM. LLVM’s compiler frontend currently supports sev-
eral languages in the C family of programming languages including C, C++,
Objective-C, and Objective-C++.
3. While MemSafe’s analysis and transformation passes operate on LLVM’s inter-
mediate representation, it is possible that MemSafe could be made to ensure
memory safety by directly analyzing application binaries. Ensuring the safety
of binaries would require a new set of metadata propagation rules for assembly
language instructions, but given the low-level nature of LLVM’s instruction set,
this is likely an achievable task. However, without accurate source-level infor-
mation, MemSafe’s optimizations would be ineffective, and MemSafe’s spatial
safety guarantees would be limited to object-level safety. Sophisticated binary
translation techniques and composite type reconstruction methods could improve
MemSafe’s ability to directly ensure the memory safety of binaries.
4. Several of MemSafe’s key components—in particular, the use of the invalid
pointer to represent memory deallocation and the use of the %-function to
represent indirect pointer assignments—may have general applicability, and their
usefulness should be explored outside the context of ensuring memory safety. It
is conceivable that MemSafe’s DFPG, which incorporates both of these tools,
could simplify or enable other compiler optimizations as it does for optimizations





This dissertation describes MemSafe, an automatic compiler analysis and transforma-
tion technique that is capable of ensuring the memory safety of C programs at runtime.
MemSafe transforms a program such that it detects all spatial and temporal memory
violations before they occur, while remaining compatible with existing code and
requiring lower runtime overhead than previous techniques. The major contributions
of this dissertation are summarized below.
The motivation behind this research is the realization that use of the C programming
language is likely going to remain common despite the many well-known memory
safety violations it allows. The features of C that make it a desirable language for
systems-level programming—including weak typing, low-level access to computer
memory, and unchecked pointer use—are the very features whose misuse cause the
variety of hard-to-detect memory errors that plague today’s software. The detection
or prevention of memory errors in C is a challenging problem because, while these
violations often cause a program to crash immediately, their symptoms frequently go
undetected long after they occur, resulting in data corruption and incorrect results
and making software debugging particularly difficult.
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As evidence of this problem, a variety of methods exist for retrofitting C programs
with software checks to detect memory errors at runtime. However, these techniques
generally suffer from one or more practical drawbacks that have thus far limited their
adoption. These weaknesses include (1) the inability to detect all spatial and temporal
violations, (2) the use of incompatible metadata (the bounds information required for
performing runtime checks), (3) the need for manual code modifications, and (4) the
tremendous runtime cost of providing complete safety.
MemSafe addresses the above drawbacks and ensures the memory safety of C
programs by utilizing a whole-program compiler analysis and transformation that
performs a limited amount of static analysis to prove memory safety whenever possible
and inserts runtime checks to ensure the safety of the remaining memory accesses.
MemSafe is complete, compatible, requires no manual code modifications, and generally
has lower runtime overhead than prior techniques achieving a similar level of safety.
In this regard, MemSafe makes several novel contributions to the research community,
which are each summarized below.
First, MemSafe uniformly handles all memory violations by modeling temporal
errors as spatial errors. By doing so, the use of separate mechanisms for detecting
temporal errors is no longer required. In particular, MemSafe avoids the drawbacks
associated with using conservative garbage collection and explicit temporal checks.
MemSafe achieves this uniformity of errors by modeling memory deallocation as an
explicit pointer assignment, thereby enabling spatial safety mechanisms to be reused
to enforce temporal safety.
Second, MemSafe captures the most salient features of object and pointer meta-
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data in a hybrid spatial metadata representation. MemSafe’s metadata representation
exploits the strengths of both approaches, while simultaneously avoiding their weak-
nesses, in order to ensure its completeness and compatibility. Additionally, object and
pointer metadata create a synergy that allows properties related to temporal safety to
be represented using spatial metadata.
Finally, MemSafe uniformly handles pointer data-flow in a representation that
simplifies several performance-enhancing optimizations. Unlike previous methods that
require runtime checks for all pointer dereferences and the expensive propagation of
metadata at every pointer assignment, MemSafe eliminates redundant checks and
the propagation of unused metadata. MemSafe achieves this uniformity of pointer
data-flow by modeling indirect pointer assignments as explicit pointer assignments,
which enables MemSafe’s whole-program analysis and optimizations to reason solely
about the ways in which pointers are defined.
Experimental results indicate that MemSafe is capable of detecting memory safety
violations in real-world programs with a lower runtime overhead than previous methods.
Results show that MemSafe detects all known memory errors in multiple versions
of two large and widely-used open source applications as well as six programs from
a benchmark suite specifically designed for the evaluation of error detection tools.
MemSafe enforces complete safety with an average overhead of 88% on 30 widely-used
performance evaluation benchmarks. In comparison with previous work, MemSafe’s
average runtime overhead for one common benchmark suite (29%) is a fraction of
that associated with the previous technique (133%) that, until now, had the lowest
overhead among all existing complete and automatic methods that are capable of
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detecting both spatial and temporal violations.
Since MemSafe’s performance overheads cannot necessarily be considered “low,”
MemSafe is likely only permanently deployable in applications where memory safety
is the primary design concern. In practice, it has been observed that many runtime
checks can be avoided with MemSafe’s simple optimizations, and for safety-critical
applications, MemSafe’s moderate runtime overheads can be an acceptable trade-off
compared to redesigning systems in a safe language. However, for performance-critical
applications, MemSafe is primarily useful as a dynamic bug detection tool.
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Appendix A
Metadata Propagation for the C
Standard Library
The metadata propagation rules presented in Section 4.3 are sufficient for MemSafe to
ensure the spatial and temporal memory safety of many C programs. However, the C
standard library routines provide programmers with the ability to manipulate memory
and pointers in ways that are not covered by those metadata rules. In this appendix,
MemSafe is extended with the rules required for a program to correctly propagate
metadata when using the C standard library routines. Specifically, Section A.1
describes metadata propagation for the memory copying functions of string.h,
and Section A.2 describes metadata propagation for the variadic function macros of
stdarg.h.
A.1 Memory Copying Functions of string.h
The memory copying functions (e.g. memcpy and memmove) defined in the string.h
standard library generally copy a specified number of bytes from a location indicated
by a source pointer src to the location referred to by a destination pointer dest.
173
Although these procedures result in multiple read and write operations, MemSafe only
needs to perform bounds checks for the source and destination buffers once before the
operation begins.
However, any in-memory pointer values that are located in the source buffer and
copied to the destination buffer must also have their associated pointer metadata
copied. Recall that pointer metadata that is associated with in-memory pointers is
maintained in the pointer metadata facility RP . Thus, any mapped address in RP
that is within the range [base, bound) of the source buffer, must have its metadata
copied and associated with a new address that is located at a distance of dest− src
bytes from the original address. This is achieved with the following metadata rule for
memory copying functions. Numbered lines indicate original code.
Metadata Rule A.1—Memory copying functions:
1: memcpy(v, u, size);
S = {(ptr, 〈addr, id〉*ptr) ∈ RP : basesrc ≤ ptr < boundsrc} (A.1.1)
D = {(ptr + (dest− src), 〈addr, id〉*ptr) : (ptr, 〈addr, id〉*ptr) ∈ S} (A.1.2)
RP = RP ∪D (A.1.3)
In this example, the definition of S selects the pointer metadata associated with
the source buffer that must be copied (A.1.1), and the definition of D associates
the metadata with a new address within bounds of the destination buffer (A.1.2).
Finally, RP is updated to contain the copied metadata (A.1.3). To avoid the runtime
overhead of performing the metadata copy, MemSafe attempts to infer if the source
buffer contains any in-memory pointer values by reasoning about its type and usage.
Although this may lead to the pointer metadata facility not being properly updated,
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instances of in-memory pointers being coped with the string.h functions have been
observed to be rare in practice.
A.2 Variadic Function Macros of stdarg.h
The variadic function macros defined in stdarg.h enable functions to process an
unspecified number of optional arguments in addition to their fixed number of manda-
tory arguments. Variadic functions are convenient because they are able to accept
a different number of arguments per invocation. For example, the printf function
accepts one mandatory argument, the format string, and a variable number of optional
arguments, which are the values to print. Declaring a function to be variadic simply
involves placing an ellipsis (‘. . . ’) as the last argument in the function’s argument list.
Within the body of a variadic function, optional arguments are processed sequen-
tially in the order in which they were passed to the function. To do so, a program
initializes a pointer of type va_list to point to the front of the optional argument
list using the va_start macro. The program can then process each argument with
successive calls to the va_arg macro. For example, the first call to va_arg returns
the first optional argument, the second call returns the next optional argument, etc.
Finally, a program calls the va_end macro to indicate it is finished processing the
optional arguments.
Propagating the pointer metadata associated with the optional pointer arguments
of a variadic function is straightforward and follows the metadata rules presented in
Section 4.3 for function calls. Recall that within the body of a function, MemSafe
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retrieves the pointer metadata of mandatory arguments from the function metadata
facility based on their position in the function’s argument list. Optional arguments
are handled in the same way, and MemSafe retrieves their pointer metadata according
to the following metadata rule. Numbered lines indicate original code.
Metadata Rule A.2—Variadic function arguments:
1: void f(int x, ...) {
2: va_list ap;
3: int *p, i;
4: ...
5: for(i=0; i < x; i++) {
6: p = va_arg(ap, int*);




In this example, function f is declared to be variadic. Without loss of generality,
the value of argument x is assumed to indicate at runtime the number of optional
arguments that are passed to f , and it is also assumed that each optional argument
is a pointer to type int. The loop beginning in line 5 iterates over the number of
arguments using an induction variable i, and pointer p is assigned the location of
the next argument using the va_arg macro on each iteration of the loop. After p is
assigned, MemSafe retrieves from RF its associated pointer metadata by performing
the lookup operation fmd(〈&f, i+ 1〉), where the argument’s offset in the function’s
argument list is given by i+ 1 since x is the first argument of the function (A.2.1).
While the above rule ensures that optional pointer arguments inherit the correct
pointer metadata, MemSafe must also define metadata associated with the argument
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list itself. Since the argument list is allocated contiguously in memory, it is essentially
an array, and MemSafe must insert pointer bounds checks to ensure each va_arg
operation falls within bounds of the list. Typically, a program ensures each access of
the argument list is within bounds by counting the number of arguments at runtime.
For example, the printf function counts the number of format specifiers in its format
string argument to determine the number of optional arguments to process. However,
since the optional arguments can be of different types at runtime, MemSafe cannot rely
on their number, and must utilize the base and bound addresses of the argument list
to perform the required check. MemSafe creates the pointer metadata of the argument
list according to the following metadata rule. Numbered lines indicate original code.
Metadata Rule A.3—Argument list bounds:
1: int x;
2: ...
〈addr, id〉 = 〈addr ∈ A, idf〉 (A.3.1)
M [addr]← 〈0,∑ni=1sizeof(ai), idf〉 (A.3.2)
RF = RF \ {(〈&f,−1〉, fmd(〈&f,−1〉))}
∪ {(〈&f,−1〉, 〈addr, id〉)}
(A.3.3)
3: f(x, a1 . . . an);
In this example, the variadic function f is called in line 3. However, before the call
MemSafe must define the pointer metadata for the function’s argument list. First,
MemSafe obtains a new address for storing the bounds information of the list (A.3.1).
Then, MemSafe stores the list’s base and bound addresses at the specified location,
temporally setting the base address to zero and the bound address equal to the total
size of the arguments (A.3.2). Within the body of f , this range will be adjust to reflect
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the correct starting and ending locations in memory, but here MemSafe simply defines
the size of the list. Finally, MemSafe updates RF with the list’s pointer metadata
using a key of 〈&f,−1〉, where the index −1 is reserved for a function’s argument list
pointer (A.3). Refer to Section 4.3 for additional information regarding the keys used
with the function metadata facility.
Within the body of a variadic function, in addition to retrieving the pointer
metadata of any optional pointer arguments, a program must also retrieve the metadata
of the argument list itself. MemSafe retrieves metadata for the argument list according
to the following metadata propagation rule. Numbered lines indicate original code.
Metadata Rule A.4—Argument list pointer:
1: void f(int x, ...) {
2: va_list ap;
〈addr, id〉ap = fmd(〈&f,−1〉) (A.4.1)
M [addrap]←M [addrap] + 〈&x+sizeof(x), &x+sizeof(x), 0〉 (A.4.2)
7: ...
8: }
In this example, after the argument list pointer ap is declared, MemSafe retrieves its
pointer metadata from the function metadata facility with the fmd(〈&f,−1〉) lookup
operation (A.4.1). MemSafe then offsets the base and bound addresses of the list by an
amount that will locate the list adjacent to and directly following the last mandatory
argument (i.e., x) in memory (A.4.2).
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Appendix B
Spatial Safety and Segmentation
Since the nontrivial performance overheads of MemSafe could limit its usefulness with
some performance-critical applications, MemSafe can be modified to enforce lesser
forms of memory protection. In doing so, an acceptable trade-off between the level
of memory protection and the resulting increase in runtime may be achieved that is
suitable for these programs. In this appendix, Section B.1 considers a modified set
of runtime checks and metadata propagation rules that would be required to ensure
only spatial safety, and Section B.2 further modifies these rules in order to achieve
coarse-grained segment-level protection [76].
B.1 Spatial Safety
Before MemSafe’s checks and metadata propagation rules are modified to eliminate the
enforcement of temporal safety, recall MemSafe’s basic method of detecting temporal
memory violations. In order to ensure temporal safety, MemSafe assigns the invalid
pointer to pointers that no longer refer to a temporally valid object. Since the invalid
pointer refers to an impossible address range, spatial safety checks for the dereference
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of pointers equal to invalid are guaranteed to report a safety violation. Thus, MemSafe
achieves temporal safety by reusing the techniques of spatial safety. To reduce the
runtime cost of ensuring both spatial and temporal safety, MemSafe maintains a
combination of pointer and object metadata. The pointer bounds check (PBC) uses
the pointer metadata to enforce complete spatial and partial temporal safety whereas
the object bounds check (OBC) uses the object metadata to enforce complete temporal
and partial spatial safety, as depicted in Figure 4.2.
For MemSafe to achieve only spatial safety, much of MemSafe’s basic method is
no longer required. Specifically, MemSafe does not require assignments of the invalid
pointer to be inserted for modeling memory deallocation, and MemSafe does not require
object metadata or the OBC, since these are primarily used for enforcing the temporal
safety of sub-object references. The remainder of this section describes changes to
MemSafe’s checks and metadata propagation rules (presented in Sections 4.2–4.3) that
are needed in order to enforce only spatial safety.
B.1.1 The required checks and metadata
MemSafe only requires a limited amount of metadata for ensuring spatial safety. As
mentioned above, object metadata is not required for ensuring spatial safety so it can
be eliminated along with the object metadata facility RO. In addition, the id field of
MemSafe’s pointer metadata representation is no longer required since it is used to link
a pointer to the object metadata of its referent. Thus, to ensure spatial safety, MemSafe
requires only pointer metadata in the form of a tuple 〈base, bound〉p that indicates the
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range [base, bound) of memory pointer p is permitted to access. MemSafe maintains
this pointer metadata in memory and allocates at runtime an address addrp from a
set of unused address A for storing 〈base, bound〉p. These values are stored to memory
with an explicit dereference operation, represented by M [addrp] ← 〈base, bound〉p,
where M [addrp] holds the value at address addrp in memory.
The pointer bounds check, modified to enforce only spatial safety, utilizes the
above pointer metadata. Before every pointer dereference, MemSafe inserts a call to
the forcibly inlined procedure defined below. Refer to Section 4.2 for additional details
regarding pointer metadata and the original PBC.
Runtime Check B.1—Pointer bounds check (spatial safety):
1: inline void pbc(ptr, size, addr) {
2: 〈base, bound〉ptr ←M [addr]




B.1.2 Propagation of the required metadata
Having presented the modified pointer bounds check and the metadata MemSafe
requires for enforcing spatial safety, this section describes MemSafe’s corresponding
translations for creating and propagating the required pointer metadata. Similar
assumptions are made in the following discussion as were made in Section 4.3. Namely,
it is assumed that the program has been transformed into a low-level, typed SSA form
that includes MemSafe’s %-functions for modeling pointer stores as explicit pointer
assignments. However, since temporal safety is not enforced, it is assumed that
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assignments of the invalid pointer have not been inserted.
B.1.2.1 Memory allocation
For static and automatic memory allocation, metadata is neither created or propagated
since such allocation does not define a new pointer value. Whereas to achieve full
memory safety, the bounds of the allocated object must be mapped in the object
metadata facility, this mapping is no longer required for achieving only spatial safety.
However, for dynamic memory allocation, MemSafe creates pointer metadata according
to the following metadata rule. Numbered lines indicate original code.
Metadata Rule B.1—Dynamic memory allocation (spatial safety):
1: int *p;
2: ...
3: p = (int*) malloc(size);
〈base, bound〉p =
〈NULL, NULL〉 if p = null,〈p, p+size〉 otherwise (B.1.1)
M [addrp ∈ A]← 〈base, bound〉p (B.1.2)
In this example, an object of size bytes is allocated dynamically by calling malloc, and
the address returned by malloc is assigned to the pointer p. If the value returned by
malloc is equal to NULL, MemSafe sets the base and bound addresses associated with
p equal to NULL.1 Otherwise, the pointer metadata is defined such that it refers to the
space occupied by the allocated region of memory (B.1.1). Finally, MemSafe obtains
1Setting the base and bound addresses associated with the returned pointer to NULL is equivalent
to defining the base and bound of the region to be that of the invalid pointer, as is done in Section
4.3. This ensures that any PBC inserted before the dereference of the returned pointer will report a
safety violation.
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an address addrp for holding the pointer metadata of p and stores the metadata at
this location (B.1.2).
B.1.2.2 Address-of operator
Like dynamic memory allocation, the address-of operator (&) creates a pointer to a
new location. Therefore, MemSafe must define the metadata of the newly created
pointer. MemSafe sets the pointer metadata of a pointer defined in terms of the
address-of operator according to the following metadata rule. Numbered lines indicate
original code.
Metadata Rule B.2—Address-of operator (spatial safety):
1: struct { ... int array[100]; ... } s;
2: int *p;
3: ...
4: p = &(s.array[42]);
M [addrp ∈ A]← 〈&s.array[0], sizeof(s.array)〉 (B.2.1)
In this example, pointer p is assigned the address of an element of the array field
of structure s. Because the program creates a new pointer, MemSafe obtains a new
address for locating the pointer metadata of p and creates and stores the metadata at
the specified address (B.2.1).
B.1.2.3 Pointer copies and arithmetic
Pointers defined as simple pointer copies or in terms of pointer arithmetic inherit
the pointer metadata of the original pointer. MemSafe sets the pointer metadata
of pointers defined by simple assignments according to the following metadata rule.
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Numbered lines indicate original code.
Metadata Rule B.3—Pointer copies and arithmetic (spatial safety):
1: int x, *p0, *p1;
2: ...
3: p1 = p0 + x;
addrp1 = addrp0 (B.3.1)
In this example, since pointer p1 is defined in terms of pointer arithmetic, it simply
inherits the pointer metadata associated with pointer p0 (B.3.1).
B.1.2.4 %-functions
MemSafe requires the use of the pointer metadata facility RP for disambiguating
the value produced by a %-function in order for the returned pointer to inherit the
correct metadata. Since MemSafe’s pointer metadata representation was able to be
simplified by not enforcing temporal safety, the pointer metadata facility must be
updated accordingly. The pointer metadata facility, modified to support spatial safety
only, maps the address of an in-memory pointer to the address of its pointer metadata
and is defined by the partial function:
pmd : A→ A
ptr 7→ addr*ptr
where A are memory addresses. For convenience, pmd is also represented more
generally as the relation RP , where (ptr, addr*ptr) ∈ RP .
For pointer loads, MemSafe creates a new definition for the loaded value and assigns
it the result of a %-function, which indicates the set of values to which the loaded
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value may potentially be equal. For a pointer ptr whose pointed-to location is loaded
in defining another pointer p, MemSafe retrieves from the pointer metadata facility
the required pointer metadata for p with the lookup operation pmd(ptr). MemSafe
performs this operation according to the following metadata rule for pointer loads.
Numbered lines indicate original code.
Metadata Rule B.4—Pointer loads (spatial safety):
1: int **ptr1, *p0, *p1, ...;
2: ...
3: p0 = *ptr1;  MemSafe models in-memory data-flow with
4: p1 = %(a0, b0, ...); the %-function
addrp1 = pmd(ptr1) (B.4.1)
In this example, an in-memory pointer is loaded and assigned to pointer p0. MemSafe
then creates a new pointer p1 and assigns it the result of a %-function indicating
the values the in-memory pointer may potentially equal. The address of the pointer
metadata for p1 is retrieved from the pointer metadata facility with the pmd(ptr1)
lookup operation (B.4.1), and all uses of p0 are replaced with uses of p1.
For each argument of the %-function, MemSafe saves the location of the pointer’s
metadata in RP at the point where it is is stored to memory. MemSafe updates the
pointer metadata facility for pointer stores according to the following metadata rule.
Numbered lines indicate original code.
Metadata Rule B.5—Pointer stores (spatial safety):
1: int **ptr2, *a0;
2: ...
3: *ptr2 = a0;  ptr2 may alias ptr1 from above
RP = (RP \ {(ptr2, pmd(ptr2))}) ∪ {(ptr2, addra0)} (B.5.1)
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In this example, pointer ptr2 is assumed to potentially alias with pointer ptr1 from
the previous example. Thus, pointer a0 appears in the %-function defined above for
pointer p1 because of the pointer store in line 3. Here, MemSafe maps pointer ptr2 to
the address of the pointer metadata of a0 in RP (B.5.1).
B.1.2.5 NULL and manufactured pointers
Pointers defined as NULL or as a cast from a non-pointer type must have their base and
bound addresses set to NULL. An exception to this rule is made for memory-mapped
I/O locations, and MemSafe requires a target’s backend to specify the base and bound
address of all memory-mapped address ranges. MemSafe defines the pointer metadata
for NULL and manufactured pointers according to the following rule. Numbered lines
indicate original code.
Metadata Rule B.6—NULL and manufactured pointers (spatial safety):
1: int *p;
2: ...
3: p = (int*) 42;
M [addrp ∈ A]← 〈NULL, NULL〉 (B.6.1)
In this example, pointer p is defined as a type-cast from the integer 42. Thus, MemSafe
obtains an address to store the pointer metadata of p and defines its base and bound
addresses to be equal to NULL (B.6.1).
B.1.2.6 Function arguments and return values
Just as the pointer metadata facility had to be modified to account for the simpli-
fied pointer metadata representation required to achieve spatial safety, the function
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metadata facility RF must be modified as well. Recall that MemSafe uses RF for
propagating pointer metadata for pointers passed as arguments to functions or re-
turned from functions. Let callee values refer to formal pointer arguments and pointer
values that are returned from functions. Similarly, let caller values refer to actual
pointer arguments and local pointer values to be returned from functions. The function
metadata facility maps a callee value to the location of the pointer metadata of its
corresponding caller value and is defined by the partial function:
fmd : C → A
callee 7→ addrcaller
where C is the set of caller values, A are memory addresses, and callee is a tuple
〈&f, i〉 indicating the ith pointer associated with function f. The function fmd is also
represented as the relation RF , where (callee, addrcaller) ∈ RF . Refer to Section 4.3
for additional details regarding the function metadata facility.
For function calls, MemSafe creates an entry in the function metadata facility for
pointer arguments passed to the function. Similarly, MemSafe defines the pointer
metadata of a pointer returned from the function call by performing a lookup operation
of RF . MemSafe updates and defines pointer metadata for function calls according to
the following metadata rule. Numbered lines indicate original code.
Metadata Rule B.7—Function calls (spatial safety):
1: int *p0, *p1;
2: ...
RF = (RF \ {(〈&f, 1〉, fmd(〈&f, 1〉))}) ∪ {(〈&f, 1〉, addrp0)} (B.7.1)
3: p1 = f(p0);
addrp1 = fmd(〈&f, 0〉) (B.7.2)
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In this example, a pointer p0 is passed as an argument to function f and pointer p1
is assigned the returned value. The return value of f is statically associated with
the index “0,” and its single pointer argument is given an index of “1.” Thus, before
the function call, the address of the pointer metadata of p0 is associated with the
tuple 〈&f, 1〉 in RF (B.7.1). Similarly, after the call returns, the address of the pointer
metadata for p1 is retrieved from RF with the tuple 〈&f, 0〉 (B.7.2).
For the declaration of a function with pointer arguments, MemSafe retrieves from
RF the address of each incoming pointer’s metadata. Similarly, if a function returns
a pointer value, MemSafe creates an entry in the function metadata facility for the
location of its pointer metadata just before the function returns. MemSafe updates
and defines pointer metadata for function declarations according to the following
metadata rule. Numbered lines indicate original code.
Metadata Rule B.8—Function declarations (spatial safety):
1: int* f(int *q) {
2: int *r;
3: ...
addrq = fmd(〈&f, 1〉) (B.8.1)
2: . . .
RF = (RF \ {(〈&f, 0〉, fmd(〈&f, 0〉))}) ∪ {(〈&f, 0〉, addrr)} (B.8.2)
3: return r;
4: }
In this example, pointer q is a formal argument of function f, and pointer r is returned
at the end of the procedure. Since q is declared to be the first pointer in the function’s
argument list, MemSafe retrieves the address of the pointer metadata for q from
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RF with the tuple 〈&f, 1〉 at the beginning of the procedure (B.8.1). Similarly, since
MemSafe statically assigns pointer return values the index “0,” the address of the
pointer metadata of r is associated with the tuple 〈&f, 0〉 in RF before the procedure
exits (B.8.2).
B.2 Segmentation
Often times low-end embedded systems do not have any form of hardware memory
protection. For these systems, MemSafe can be used to achieve a low-overhead,
yet weaker form of spatial memory safety called segment-level protection, or simply
memory segmentation [76]. To understand how MemSafe can be used to enforce
memory segmentation, it is important to consider the layout of a program’s memory.
The address space available to a program is typically organized into four basic
segments, which are described below.
1. Code Segment: The code segment (sometimes called the “text segment”) is the
portion of memory allocated to a program for holding its executable instructions.
This segment has a statically known size and is typically marked read-only.
2. Globals Segment: The globals segment of memory contains the statically allocated
objects that are both initialized and uninitialized by the programmer. The globals
segment also has a statically known fixed size, but unlike the code segment, it is
not read-only. The portion of memory containing uninitialized global data is
also known as the “BSS segment,” which historically was an acronym for “Block
Started by Symbol”. The globals segment is usually placed above and adjacent
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to the code segment in memory.
3. Heap Segment: The heap segment is the portion of memory used for storing
a program’s dynamically allocated objects. It begins adjacent to the globals
segment and grows to larger addresses from there. Objects are allocated to the
heap segment by the malloc family of standard library functions.
4. Stack Segment: The stack segment is reserved for maintaining the program’s
execution stack. Objects are allocated to the stack segment automatically by
a programmer declaring variables as being local to a particular function. The
base of the stack is typically located at a high address in memory, and the stack
then usually grows towards lower addresses (i.e., towards the heap segment).
Since the code and globals segments are fixed in size, and since the stack segment
has a statically known base address, the base and bound addresses of each of the
above segments is known at compile-time. The only exception to this statement is
the division between the heap and stack segments, which is managed by the brk and
sbrk standard library functions.2
For a program to be spatially safe at the granularity of segments, all memory
accesses must fall within bounds of a data segment (i.e., the globals, heap, and stack
segments). For example, the dereference of a pointer to a stack-allocated object must
access memory within bounds of the stack segment, and the dereference of a pointer
to a heap-allocated object must access memory within bounds of the heap segment,
2The address of the boundary between the heap and stack segments can be determined by the
return value of the statement sbrk(0).
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etc. MemSafe can enforce segment-level spatial safety using the approach defined
above in Section B.1. However, instead of propagating the base and bound addresses
of individual objects, MemSafe must propagate the base and bound addresses of the
corresponding data segments.
B.2.1 Propagation of the required metadata
This section describes changes to the metadata propagation rules presented above
that are required for MemSafe to enforce segment-level protection. Only the metadata
rules that define the base and bound addresses of pointer metadata must be updated;
all other rules remain the same.
B.2.1.1 Memory allocation
For automatic memory allocation, metadata is neither created or propagated since
such allocation does not define a new pointer value. However, recall that MemSafe
identifies statically allocated objects by their location in memory (see Section 4.1).
For these global pointer values, MemSafe initializes their pointer metadata at the
beginning of the main procedure to refer to the base and bound addresses of the
globals segment. For dynamic memory allocation, MemSafe creates pointer metadata
according to the following metadata rule. Numbered lines indicate original code.
Metadata Rule B.9—Dynamic memory allocation (segmentation):
1: int *p;
2: ...
3: p = (int*) malloc(size);
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〈base, bound〉p =
〈NULL, NULL〉 if p = null,〈base, bound〉heap otherwise (B.9.1)
M [addrp ∈ A]← 〈base, bound〉p (B.9.2)
In this example, MemSafe sets the base and bound addresses associated with p equal
to NULL if the value returned by malloc is equal to NULL. Otherwise, the pointer
metadata is defined such that it refers to the base and bound addresses of the entire
heap segment (B.9.1). Finally, MemSafe obtains an address addrp for holding the
pointer metadata of p and stores the metadata at this location (B.9.2).
B.2.1.2 Address-of operator
MemSafe sets the pointer metadata of a pointer defined in terms of the address-of
operator (&) according to the following metadata rule for achieving segment-level
protection. Numbered lines indicate original code.
Metadata Rule B.10—Address-of operator (segmentation):
1: struct { ... int array[100]; ... } s;
2: int *p;
3: ...
4: p = &(s.array[42]);
M [addrp ∈ A]← 〈base, bound〉stack (B.10.1)
In this example, pointer p is assigned the address of a stack-allocated object. Thus,
MemSafe obtains a new address for locating the pointer metadata of p and stores
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